The Balkan Transformation and the Underlying Energy Factor 

 

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The Balkan Transformation and the Underlying Energy Factor

Ioannis Michaletos, Athens, Greece, July 25, 2007

        
        

In 2006, Kosovo announced the initiation of an international competition
regarding the privatization of the energy sector of the province.
Privatization is to include the creation of a new 2,100-megawatt power
station, the renovation of an older facility, and the manufacture of a
lignite production station to supply these power facilities. The total
estimated cost is some 3 billion euros, a substantial amount that will be
compensated by future high energy demands in the province and an ability to
export electricity to Albania, Montenegro, and possibly
Bosnia-Herzegovina-three small nations with rising energy needs. The energy
market at stake consists of around 10 million people.

Regardless of the legality of such a move, since the province is still under
Serbian administration, competitors for the energy investment in Kosovo come
from countries that enjoy more or less cordial relations with the United
States-the Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, and Greece, among others-and, of
course, American companies. Russian or French companies were not present and
the winner will certainly follow existing U.S. policy, meaning that it will
pursue energy plans according to the planning made by the administration in
Washington.

Russia, since Vladimir Putin became president, has proved to be an apt
player in the economic game that is unfolding with the construction of a
variety of pipelines transferring hydrocarbon from the East to the West.
Nowadays, at least 25 percent of the European Union's energy needs in
natural gas and oil are being met by Russia, and in some cases countries
such as Slovenia. This percentage reaches 60 percent (Gas) or even 100
percent for Romania and Slovakia. Moreover, projections for the next
generation are in the negative for the EU since its energy dependency levels
will increase from 76 percent (Oil) to 93 percent in 2030. If one adds the
political perils of imports from the Middle East and the proximity of the
Russia market; then the influence of the former seems to be increasing.

Relations between the EU and Russia are inexorably related to the Balkans
because of its importance as a hub from which various projects are going to
facilitate the transport of energy. Furthermore, fragile political
conditions in the Balkan states will prove a tinderbox for the European
states that have so far failed to address regional conflicts in a peaceful
manner.

In the diplomatic marathon that has begun, the Albanian side must seriously
decide to negotiate the fate of Kosovo based on the protection of nation
sovereignty, which is after all the cornerstone of the United Nations
principles and the sine qua non for the peaceful existence of all
nationalities in present day Southeastern Europe. What attracts interest so
far is the formation of diverging interests between the major power units
affecting the Balkan politics and consequently the underlying importance of
the energy factor.

Firstly, for the new president of the France, Nicolas Sarkozy, Balkan policy
differs considerably from the previous Chirac administration. In the recent
G-8 meeting, Chirac proposed a delay of a Kosovo resolution, without
providing of course any concrete assurance of a final positive French
stance. For now, it seems that the French want to buy time so as to better
place itself in the changing Balkan scenery, predicting the relative decline
of American influence in the region and the rise of German and Russian
influence.

Secondly, the "Ahtisaari affair," relating to the revelations of an alleged
bribe of the ex-Finnish president by Kosovo-Albanian organized crime
figures, has caused a stir in the Balkans, not just for the probability of
the verity of the accusations, but also around possible Russia-Germany
cooperation in the whole affair. Supposedly, the German intelligence agency
leaked to the Bosnian press the information around Ahtisaari. German
involvement in this is important. The report by the Germans made an
extensive presentation of Albanian organized crime activities in the Balkans
and Kosovo, thus damaging severely the reputation of the Albanian side while
it was negotiating with the Serbians and the international community.
Further, an additional 2,500 German troops are headed Kosovo after a
decision by Berlin that anticipates trouble in the province due to Albanian
resentment over fading hopes of independence. Still, German diplomats
occasionally make remarks that are for the independence of Kosovo when
trying to appease the sentiment of the Albanian population. Two things are
certain concerning the German behavior in the region. It wants to maintain
links with all sides and indirectly assist Russia in its antagonism with the
U.S.

Russia continues its drive to become Europe's energy supply powerhouse and
the Balkans seem to be the perfect terrain for that. Of course, energy is
one aspect of Moscow's expansion; ultimately, it wants to gain as much
geopolitical space as possible.

A few weeks ago, another grand deal was signed between Athens, Sofia, Rome,
and Moscow, related to the creation of a massive pipeline transferring
natural gas from Bulgaria to Northern Greece and up to Southern Italy,
called the "South Stream." The pipeline will have a total length of some
3,200 kilometers and will pump some 30 billion cubic meters of gas each year
from Russian reservoirs. The total cost of the pipeline will exceed $10
billion.

Turkey will be affected because the proposed pipelines will bypass its
territory, thus degrading to an extent its role in regional energy politics.
Iran will also suffer from a partial exclusion from the European market.
Moreover, Italy's options for Russian gas imports, and in general the
European common energy policy, is heading toward an end.

The pipeline will traverse the Black Sea to Burgas in Bulgaria. Afterward,
it will split most probably into two parts-one heading toward Southern
Austria or Northern Italy and the other one passing through Greece and
terminating in Otrando in Southern Italy, just opposite the island of Corfu.
This massive project will be commenced in late 2009 and will be financed by
the Italian ENI Corporation and the Russian energy giant Gazprom.

Over the past four months, other important deals have been reached
concerning energy routes in the Balkans. The first deal was on the
Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline transferring oil from Bulgaria to the
Greece's Alexandroupoli. The Russians have a 51 percent stake in it. Also,
an initial agreement has been reached for the Constanja-Trieste pipeline
that will connect the Black Sea with the Adriatic via the central Balkans.
Finally, the Turkish-Greek-Italian natural gas pipeline will support the
exportation of Azeri energy to the West, again through the Balkan terrain.

Only the last one has full American support; the rest have received the
tacit disapproval of Washington, at least for the time being. That can be
explained by the United States' persistence in securing the interests of the
Albanian side in the Balkans. American policy over the past decade was based
on the fact that Russia is weak and that Europe in unwilling to invest
political capital in the Balkans. On the contrary, the modern political
climate favors Russian expansionism whereas the main European actors, and
most importantly Germany, are seeking energy sources and new markets in
order to survive in the very competitive global arena as shaped by
globalization as well as the emergence of the giants of the East (China and
India) and the unpredictable Arab-Islamic world.

Since the political strategy of the 1990's is effectively discredited,
American foreign policy experts are in a position to reshape their aims
without at the same time being seen as blaming themselves for mistakes that
were made. The possibility of radical change in the United States' Balkan
policy should be excluded since large nations never admit past mistakes for
reasons relating to their international prestige and posture. Therefore an
engagement with Russia in relation to the Balkans, energy routes, and Kosovo
should come about gradually and certainly after careful consideration of
possible trade-offs and negotiations between Washington and Moscow, as has
recently been seen. As far Kosovo is concerned, Washington supports
independence, along with Teheran and many other Islamic states that seek to
benefit from the creation of stronger bonds with the a newly created
mini-state in the Balkans strongly influenced by "Islamic charities."

The strategic aim of the United States is to at least retain its influence
in Eurasia, and the Balkans is an integral part of that. The importance of
the region is  as a hub for the energy needs of the West and the Russian
ambitions. Moreover, its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa
reserve a truly unique placement for the Balkans in the strategic
considerations of London, Washington, Moscow, Paris, Berlin and Beijing. The
coming months will reveal more of the intrigues involved, and, most
importantly, the winners and the losers of the "energy game" of the 21st
century.

The state of Balkan affairs is in flux, more so than even at the beginning
of the Rambouillet negotiations in late 1998, and there are numerous
scenarios that could unfold depending on Russia's ambitions, the willingness
of the United States to negotiate or manipulate developments, and the
ability of the Europeans to exert influence in between. Other non-state
actors such as the organized crime syndicates, the Islamic terrorist nucleus
and the plethora of international N.G.O.'s will also be assessing the
situation since their vital interests depend on a final "Balkan solution,"
of one sort or another.

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