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Ten inconvenient truths about Kosovo 6 August 2007 William Montgomery 1. There are three major international forces critical to the future of Kosovo: the United States, the European Union, and Russia. None of the three have any major interest in Kosovo itself: there are no particularly valuable resources; the land is not strategically important in any sense; and its size and population make it irrelevant in global terms. In other words, this does not directly impact on the national security of any of the key international players. This should make it easier for the three to reach a mutually acceptable solution, but ironically it has made it harder. 2. Of the three, the one with the least vested interest is the United States. It has already announced long ago its desire to cede operational influence and control over the region to the European Union. At the same time, it is the one of the three which is pushing the hardest for a decision this year and which has made it clear at the highest level what that decision should be. In so doing, it has created high expectations in the Kosovo Albanian community that independence is right around the corner. These expectations are impossible to "put back in the box." The "crisis" in Kosovo, therefore, is at least in significant part of U.S. making. 3. The clear, unambiguous winner of this international "game" is Russia. It has already achieved its major objective, which is to re-assert itself on the international scene as a vital player whose views must be taken into account. Those who hold out hope that Putin will be open for compromise and action after the Presidential elections next year in Russia are only fooling themselves. It will continue to block any UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo and will force the other players into one of two unpalatable outcomes: either to accept the deadlock and do nothing on Kosovo status for the foreseeable future or to put together a "coalition of the willing" and unilaterally recognize Kosovo Independence. From the Russian viewpoint, either alternative is a "win." 4. Putin's dream scenario is the United States with the support of a number of EU/NATO countries establishing a "coalition of the willing" and giving a green light to the Kosovo Albanians to announce a referendum on independence. This would mean that this group was expressly circumventing the United Nations and thereby setting a precedent useful to Russia in Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, it has the potential to cause major rifts inside NATO and the European Union. Once again, as in Iraq, the United States will be seen as ignoring international law. While we may choose to "blame" Russia for any resulting violence, the fact is that it is the United States and any EU partners who will bear the brunt of dealing with it. 5. The European Union has potentially the most to lose. It sees the region as a "black hole" inside its natural borders and therefore, of the three, is the one with the most legitimate interest in the outcome. However, vigorous disagreements over how to proceed within the EU will weaken its unity and will show once again that the EU as an institution is unable to handle major issues in its own area. The long-standing truth about the EU is that when faced with controversy, it inevitably chooses to do nothing. Major forces within the EU are working now to achieve exactly this outcome. Their rallying cry is the need to "Maintain EU Unity at all costs!" 6. NATO is also at risk. If the Kosovo Albanians do declare independence with the support of an international "coalition of the willing," it is certain that Kosovo Serbs will refuse to accept it and will protest as they did in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991. This will include blocking off roadways and setting up its own regional controls. There will undoubtedly be "volunteers" from Serbia to help them to do so. This will become a de facto partition of Kosovo unless action is immediately taken to counter it. The question is what force will be willing and able to do so. The only viable military force is KFOR. But it is unclear if the countries contributing forces to it will be willing to take on this responsibility. Deciding to do so could easily create immense controversy and disruption in NATO itself. Several of the current troop contributors could easily pull out, putting the onus on forces from the coalition of the willing. Going into our own election year, will the United States want to be involved in another potential deteriorating security situation where its soldiers are at significant risk? It is also virtually certain the Kosovo Albanians will respond violently to any actions taken by Kosovo Serbs leading to partition. 7. The decision of the President to announce in Albania and repeat in Bulgaria on his recent visits to those countries that the United States favors independence in the near future for Kosovo had the short term impact of soothing nervous Kosovo Albanian leaders and keeping them "on the reservation," making moderate statements about the need for patience. But the cost was terribly high. Virtually all those leaders are now caught in a trap in which the United States has unintentionally placed them. They made those moderate statements because they fully believe that the United States this year will help them to achieve independence. If that promise is abrogated, those leaders will either have to radically break with their moderate positions (and insist on active measures to bring about independence) or risk being overtaken by more radical forces in Kosovo itself. It is pretty clear which course they will choose. 8. The key international players at the present time are the UK, France, and Germany. If they agree to join a coalition of the willing with the United States, the Kosovo Albanians will be given the green light to proceed, probably in November. If they are persuaded for "EU Unity" to not recognize Kosovo's independence and the United States is totally isolated, it is hard to imagine how it will be able to go forward. At the present time, those three countries are inclined to proceed, but all are subject to pressure from within their own countries and the EU itself. 9. The best way to give all the Serbs now living in Kosovo the best possible chance (with no absolute guarantee of success) to have decent lives and maintain their cultural, religious, and ethnic heritage was to fully embrace the Ahtisaari Plan. That opportunity has been lost. The reality is that the future of most Kosovo Serbs is not bright. This is certainly true for those not in northern Kosovo. 10. The KLA was created when dissatisfaction with Ibrahim Rugova's peaceful approach became too great. From its creation, it was the driving force determining the future of Kosovo. We will all be making a big mistake if we think that the fate of Kosovo rests solely with the international community. At a certain point in time in the not too distant future, the Kosovo Albanians will force this status question to the forefront in a way out of our ability to control. Given the build-up this issue has received in Serbia by the government and most of the political parties, it will also not be able to control fully the counter-reaction to the Kosovo Albanian actions. Comments http://www.b92.net/eng/insight/comments.php?nav_id=42849
