Chronicles Magazine // The President’s Painted Corner
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=293#comment-12233 The President’s
Painted Corner by Srdja Trifkovic
A prudent power will always seek to keep open as many options as
possible in its foreign-policy making. An increasingly rigid system of
alliances, coupled with mobilization blueprints and railway timetables,
reduced the European powers’ scope for maneuver in the summer of 1914 and
contributed to the ensuing catastrophe. The United States, by contrast,
entered the war in 1917 because Woodrow Wilson wanted to do so (rightly or
wrongly), not because he had to do so.
A mature power will never allow its promises to foreigners to entail risks
of conflict that exceed the benefits of discretion. Bismarck would have been
appalled at the manner in which his inept successors had committed
Wilhelmine Germany to upholding and defending the moribund Habsburg Empire,
come what may. The end result was the death of both; but, without that carte
blanche from Berlin, Austria could have behaved more responsibly in July
1914, possibly saving Europe from self-destruction.
A sensible power will not allow its weak­er overseas protégés to call
the shots. Algérie Française was not a colony but an integral part of
metropolitan France inhabited by millions of non-Arab French citizens who
believed that they were owed open-ended protection. De Gaulle told the
pieds-noirs that he “understood” them; then, he promptly cut Algeria off
when he decided that the cost of keeping her exceeded any possible benefits.
This painful act enabled the Fifth Republic to embark on an economic and
political recovery that halted half a century of decline.
A rational power will not create new hotbeds of instability while the old
ones remain unresolved. Mussolini’s unprovoked attack on Greece in October
1940, while his forces in North Africa were at grave risk from the British,
was a madness repeated on a grand scale in June 1941, when Hitler unleashed
the Barbarossa even though England remained undefeated.
And finally, a responsible power will avoid foreign entanglements that
violate its moral and cultural norms. The Crimean War was a crime; the
Eastern Question, its punishment. Supporting jihadists against Christians in
Bosnia in the 1990’s has yielded scores of Bosnian-trained or -connected
jihad-terrorists.
Washington’s Kosovo policy violates all five principles.
It is not prudent for the United States to insist that Kosovo should and
will become independent—as President George W. Bush did in Tirana last June,
followed by similar sermons from Dr. Rice and her aides on an almost daily
basis—even as it is obvious that Russia will veto any attempt to achieve
that goal through the U.N. Security Council, and even as the European Union
is increasingly reluctant to participate in any scheme to bypass the United
Nations. Statements by U.S. officials that Kosovo’s independence is
“inevitable” are a classic case of irresponsible policymakers painting
themselves into a corner on a peripheral issue, and then claiming that the
issue had morphed into a test of American resolve.
A mature, self-confident and globally hegemonistic “hyperpower” would
never allow Kosovo to become such a test for three reasons.
Quite apart from its historic, cultural, moral, and legal aspects, the
issue of who controls the southern Serbian province is perfectly irrelevant
to American interests. It is a small, land-locked piece of real estate, of
dubious “objective” value, away from all major Balkan transit corridors, and
not nearly as rich in natural resources as both Serbs and Albanians like to
imagine. If Kosovo were to disappear tomorrow, no ordinary American would be
able to tell the difference.
The change of Kosovo’s status against the will of Belgrade, in addition to
being a clear violation of international law, would set a precedent
potentially detrimental to U.S. interests. To enable an ethnic minority to
secede from an internationally recognized state on the grounds of that
minority’s numerical preponderance in a given locale would open a Pandora’s
box of claims all over the world, not least among Russian speakers in the
Crimea, parts of Estonia and Latvia, northern Kazakhstan, and eastern
Ukraine. It could also affect the future of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and
perhaps even California, when Mexicans achieve a simple majority in those
states. (The question is indeed “when,” not “if.”) State Department
officials Nicholas Burns and Daniel Fried still insist that no precedent
would be set by creating an independent Kosovo, but they cannot control
reality, and their assurances are nonsensical.
The Muslim world will not be appeased by Kosovo today any more than it was
appeased by Bosnia a decade ago. America will not earn any brownie points
among the world’s “Jihadists of all color and hue” (to borrow a phrase from
Rep. Tom Lantos) for creating a new Muslim state in the heart of Europe.
Albanian “gratitude” would prove as valuable to America today as it has,
over the years, to Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist
China. On the other hand, the failure to create an independent,
internationally recognized Kosovo would be yet another sign that Emperor
Bush has no clothes and that America has no sureness of touch. Furthermore,
favoring the imposition of a “solution” from the outside against the will of
one of the parties could set a dangerous long-term precedent for Israel.
Our policy is not sensible. It panders to the aspirations of a small and
primitive, yet shrewdly opportunistic, polity with territorial pretensions
against all of her neighbors. President George W. Bush declared in Tirana
last June that America is committed to Kosovo’s independence, and he was
greeted almost as enthusiastically as Benito Mussolini, Nikita Khrushchev,
and Chou En-Lai had been greeted by the Albanians over the decades. As
Nicholas Stavrou noted in the National Herald, Mr. Bush reflects the
Albanians’ talent for choosing patrons who fulfill three criteria: They must
be big enough, far enough, and willing to offend the interests of Albania’s
neighbors:
President Bush’s venture into the Balkan tinderbox is nothing short of a
blatant provocation aimed at two nations that stood side by side with the
United States in two wars, Serbia and Greece. It is part and parcel of a
neo-conservative agenda, formulated by the same gang that produced the Iraq
war . . . and threatens to engulf the Middle East into a regional
conflagration. The ultimate goal, of course, is the conversion of Russia
into a first class enemy. The new Cold War warriors view the Balkans as a
“logical extension of the Middle East” that ought to be part of a new
arrangement that would facilitate integration of Islamic and non-Islamic
cultures. Russia, in their view, cannot be trusted with any role in their
nefarious schemes to “modernize” Islam and redefine the Middle East as a
“region that starts in the Persian Gulf and ends in Sarajevo.”
It is plainly irrational to insist on Kosovo’s independence, with all the
risks such a policy entails, while the United States faces so much other
“unfinished business” around the globe. The list is well known and
depressing. Iraq is a disaster, and there is no light at the end of the
tunnel. Afghanistan is a lesser calamity only when compared with Iraq. Any
solution to the challenge presented by Iran will depend on Washington’s
ability to have Russia on its side as a partner, which is impossible if
Moscow’s concerns over Kosovo are treated as illegitimate. Russia is also an
essential partner in helping control Kim Jong Il and devising a sustainable
long-term energy policy for the Western world.
Far from being deterred by Washington’s apparent commitment to Kosovo’s
independence, Russian President Vladimir Putin sees it as a golden
opportunity to embarrass Mr. Bush and show the world that Russia can no
longer be treated with the disdainful arrogance she endured under Boris
Yeltsin. With the Bush administration’s options diminishing, Putin’s are
increasing.
On the diplomatic front, Russia can and will veto any resolution presented
to the Security Council that is based on Ahtisaari’s moribund plan and that
assumes independence as the final outcome. Resolution 1244 cannot be legally
bypassed, and it is unequivocal concerning Serbia’s sovereignty. If the
European Union (under American pressure) tries to bypass the United Nations,
however, Putin can retaliate by playing his energy card. According to
Russian and global-affairs analyst George Friedman of Stratfor,
The Russians would cut supplies if provoked. Kosovo really is that big
of an issue to them. If they gave in on this, all of Putin’s efforts to
re-establish Russia as a great power would be undermined. Putin wants to
remind Germany in particular—but also other former Soviet satellites—that
thwarting Russia carries a price. If the European Union were to unilaterally
[sic] act against Russian wishes, Putin would have to choose between
appearing as if he is all talk and no action, and acting. Putin would choose
the latter.
According to the same source, Putin also has a military option. Contrary
to popular belief, the Russian military retains an excellent core,
particularly in its airborne regiments. Moscow could fly a regiment of
troops to Belgrade, use Serbian trucks to move to the administrative line
dividing Kosovo from the rest of Serbia, and threaten to move into Kosovo to
take their place in KFOR:
To do this, they would have to fly through Romanian or Hungarian
airspace. They might be denied over-flight privileges, but the Russians
might not ask permission and [the Rumanians and Hungarians] have no appetite
for that kind of confrontation. Assume, then, that the troops reached the
Kosovo border and crossed over. Would KFOR troops open fire on them?
Of course not. Western Europe is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas,
and it cannot afford to follow Washington into an open-ended confrontation
over a peripheral issue. Signals from Moscow indicate that challenging
Kosovo’s independence militarily would prompt Russia to call NATO defense
capabilities into question, which could leave the Europeans even more
fractured. “Do not assume that the Russians would not dare try such a move,”
the Russian source insists:
The Russians are itching for an opportunity to confront the West—and
win. In the case of Kosovo, should they choose to make an issue of it, they
have the diplomatic, economic and military options to force the West to back
down. Condoleezza Rice has said that Kosovo will never be returned to
Serbian rule. Putin would love to demonstrate that it doesn’t matter what
the U.S. secretary of state wants.
In short, Kosovo is an asymmetric issue. Mr. Bush cares about it only as
it relates to U.S. “credibility.” The second greatest blunder of his
presidency may result from his willingness to accept the assurances of
inherited Clintonite bureaucrats of Mr. Burns’ ilk, who have insisted that
the Serbs will cave in and that the Russians will budge.
If push comes to shove, Mr. Bush will face Moscow all alone. There is a
great deal of dissent in Europe, from Madrid to Athens to Bucharest and
Bratislava, but not even those Europeans who are nominally
pro-independence—notably, the Germans—would sacrifice a single day’s supply
of natural gas over Albanian claims. By contrast, this is, for Serbia, an
existential issue and, for Russia, a litmus test of her ability to be a
great power once again.
The most important reason the United States should not support Kosovo’s
independence is and always has been cultural and civilizational; but trying
to explain that to the chief executive who is fanatically supportive of a
blanket amnesty for tens of millions of illegal aliens in the United States
is as futile as trying to reform Islam.
George W. Bush has painted himself into a tight corner in the Balkans, and
he will get a bloody nose if he does not relent. That is bad news for the
church-burning Albanian Muslims of Kosovo, and bad news for their
heroin-financed lobby in Washington, but it is very good news for America
and the civilized world.
Srdja Trifkovic is Chronicles’ foreign-affairs editor.
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
