Kosovo: Troubles Embedded in the EU November 20, 2007 16 23 GMT
Summary Kosovo is skating toward a declaration of independence with the reluctant support of the United States and 22 of the EU member states -- but what of the other five? Two of them could cause great complications for EU policy in the not-so-distant future. Analysis The likely rise of former militant leader Hashim Thaci to the post of prime minister after the Nov. 18 elections in Kosovo probably heralds a formal declaration of independence by the Serbian province within weeks. Though there are many concerns as to the timing and tone of the declaration, the bulk of the West -- and certainly the major powers of the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom -- all support it. But that does not mean the Kosovars enjoy unqualified support. A Kosovar declaration of independence will not be met with formal EU backing because any EU foreign policy statement requires all 27 EU states to be on board. They are not. Specifically, there are five EU members that see things differently and are unwilling to support independence for the region without explicit approval from the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). (Such authorization cannot happen without the approval of veto-wielding Russia, and Moscow will veto any resolution that its proxy Serbia dislikes.) The first three states are Spain, Romania and Cyprus. Ultimately, these states are concerned about the precedent that a unilateral Kosovar declaration would establish because they fear they are in the same boat as Serbia, as each houses a territorially cohesive minority seeking independence. In the case of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have exercised de facto independence for the past 33 years. Romania has concerns about the Hungarians of Transylvania while Spain agonizes about the Basques. But these concerns are ultimately manageable. These three states have done just fine in the modern era despite rallies for autonomy (Romania), the occasional bombing (Spain) and even a Turkish invasion (Cyprus). The three states are stable, and while they might feel reason to be nervous, they do not face an existential threat. Any problems likely will be of the tempest in a teapot variety. The other two states concerned about a Kosovar declaration, Slovakia and Greece, are another story. Like the first three, Slovakia is concerned about a potential separatist group -- the Hungarians in the country's south who might like to rejoin with their ethnic brethren in Hungary proper. And the Greeks are no fans of the Albanians, Kosovar or otherwise. But the core of these two states' opposition to Kosovar independence is based on geopolitical concerns: They see Serbia as a cultural cousin. Slovakia views the Serbs as fellow Slavs, and Greece sees them as co-religionists. Both would like to see Serbian power preserved as a counterweight against rising local powers they view with some suspicion: Hungary and Albania. This desire gives Russia an excellent opportunity. The same cultural links that make Slovakia and Greece support Serbia also tie Russia to all three states. Russia has long viewed the Western effort to achieve Kosovar independence as a veiled effort to reduce Russian and Slavic power in the Balkans -- which, to be perfectly blunt, is a paranoia well rooted in fact. This means should the Kosovars simply declare independence without any legal cover from the UNSC, it will not just be Russia working to undermine EU policy in the Balkans, but a triumvirate with two members entrenched in Europe. http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=298595
