Defining moment for the Balkans
The year 2008 will be a decisive one for the Balkans, particularly for Kosovo, Serbia proper, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as the international community dangles carrots and offers up unearned rewards in an attempt to appease the perceived losers in the Kosovo status game, regardless of the outcome, bloodshed is likely. Editor's Note: This is the first in ISN Security Watch's 2008 Prognosis series. Please find a link to the entire series at the end of this article. Prognosis by Anes Alic for ISN Security Watch (21/12/07) The political and security focus in the Balkans in 2008 will depend on the outcome of a status resolution for the Serbian province of Kosovo, whose ethnic Albanian leaders have vowed to declare independence in February. The international community will be closely monitoring developments in other countries in the region, fearing that a unilateral proclamation of independence in Kosovo and Serbia's reaction could profoundly affect particularly Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should Kosovo declare independence, international community officials involved in the process are preparing for a low-level insurgency. International forces already have begun boosting their military and police strength, faced with the possibility that an insurgency could spill over into Macedonia, southern Serbia and Bosnia. Whatever decision on Kosovo is made, some form of violence is inevitable, and the international community is hoping that its forces in the form of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will manage to keep the situation under control. Even though both sides, the ethnic Albanians and Serbs, have called for a peaceful end to the status process, they have also made it clear that they will accept nothing short of a decision in their respective favors. Both sides have armed paramilitary forces ready to "defend their homeland." Likely scenarios Should Kosovo's Albanian leaders fulfill their promise and proclaim unilateral independence in February - a move that will largely depend on the level of the support from western powers - several scenarios are likely, though the order in which they are played out is less predictable. First of all, the Serbian majority in northern Kosovo will reject an independence proclamation and seek form of autonomy for the area in an attempt to remain tied to Serbia proper. Indeed, Serbian enclaves in Kosovo are still completely politically and financially integrated with Serbia, including administratively and with regard to schools, health care and retirement funds. On 11 December 2007, Serbia opened a government office in Kosovo's ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, saying it would "serve to intensify Belgrade's parallel network of services for Serbs." The move was criticized by the UN, which called the move a deliberate provocation. However, the creation of a Serbian majority entity within the borders of an independent Kosovo will resound throughout other former Yugoslav republics - all of which have their own disgruntled minorities whose political representatives have promised greater autonomy. For its part, the Albanian minority in southern Serbia has warned that if Kosovo Serbs create an autonomous entity in the province, the ethnic Albanians in that region would attempt to create a similar autonomous entity there. Next in line would be Macedonia, whose 25 percent ethnic Albanian minority and their radical leaders have pledged an armed rebellion and secession from the country, with the aim of integrating with Kosovo. However, such a move lacks support from ethnic Albanian political leaders in the Macedonian government. Since November 2007, Macedonian paramilitary groups, led by the Albanian National Army (ANA) - a group operating in Kosovo and Macedonia and listed as a terrorist organization by the US and the EU - threatened to renew the 2001 rebellion and already has clashed several times with Macedonian forces, which have very limited authority in the areas of the country bordering Kosovo. Macedonian secessionists are closely monitoring the Kosovo status solution, and regardless of the outcome, Macedonia will face political and security instability. Finally, the final Kosovo solution will have a serious ripple effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina and pose grave consequences for the country's territorial integrity. Bosnia's Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska was created during the war on the territory the Bosnian Serb military conquered between 1992 and 1995. By the end of the war, Republika Srpska was a largely ethnically cleansed territory, legalized by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Since 1996, most international community efforts have been focused on stripping powers (both economic and military) from the country's separate entities and, for all intents and purposes, doing away with these separate governments and working toward a unified country. However, Republika Srpska's existence as a separate entity created through the results of a military conflict and based on a simple ethnic majority has in some respects legitimized the calls of other separatists in the region. Politicians in Republika Srpska, which comprises 49 percent of Bosnian territory, have warned that should Kosovo declare or be granted independence by the international community, they will hold a referendum among Bosnian Serbs to vote on secession from Bosnia and annexation to Serbia. According to a November 2007 public opinion poll held in Republika Srpska, 77 percent of Bosnian Serbs believed Serbs should break away from Bosnia if Kosovo Albanians seceded from Serbia. Waiting on Belgrade It is still not clear how Serbia will react should Kosovo gain independence, though Belgrade has said that a military response is not an option.It has threatened to impose an economic and travel blockade on Kosovo in the event that the province declared independence. Such a move would include cutting telephone and electricity services, which could paralyze the province for some time. Whether Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders will choose to unilaterally declare independence depends largely on the amount of perceived support for such a move from western power houses. It is expected that the US and a handful of EU countries will be the first in the line to officially recognize an independent Kosovo. Serbia has not of yet announced a course of action against those countries that choose to officially recognize an independent Kosovo. But Belgrade could decide to sever diplomatic ties with and recall its ambassadors from those countries. Initiating trade embargoes with the latter, however, would have a negative impact on the Serbian economy. Belgrade's most probable course of action will be through "legalese" in the form of declaring the ethnic Albanian parts of Kosovo in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 by seceding from the sovereign territory of Serbia. Serbia could use this resolution to keep the northern part of Kosovo and its Serbian majority under Belgrade's authority. The Kosovo issue will be the focus of the upcoming Serbian presidential elections set for 20 January, even though more or less all candidates hold the same stance concerning Kosovo - that it is an integral part of Serbia. Outside forces and appeasement rewards The success of eventual international recognition of an independent Kosovo will also depend on Russia's reaction. So far, the traditional Serbian ally has managed to block all western efforts to grant Kosovo independence, but has stopped short of suggesting an alternative solution other than to opine that no decision can be made on Kosovo without Belgrade's approval. Presumably, Russia will continue to insist on further negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, though the US, Britain and France rejected such a call on 12 December, after another round of talks failed and it became clear that finding a solution to satisfy all parties would be impossible. Regarding the unstable political and security situation in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2008 the EU will step up efforts to bring those two countries closer to integration. In November and December 2007, the EU initialed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first step toward membership, even though the two countries showed no visible progress. The signings were widely seen as an attempt to appease local leaders and prevent radicalization. On 17 November, the EU initialed the SAA with Serbia, despite the fact that the main obstacle to the agreement, Serbia's failure to arrest and hand over Bosnian Serb wartime general Ratko Mladic, has not been cleared. Then on 4 December, the EU initialed the same agreement with Bosnia, even though just weeks before, the country was facing the worst political crisis in its post-war history. One of the main pre-negotiation conditions between Bosnia and the EU is police and constitution reform, both intended to strengthen state-level institutions. Since 2005, local leaders have failed to make any progress on these reforms due the Bosnian Serb fears that the suspension of the separate Republika Srpska police and further stripping of its power through constitutional changes would ultimately mean the entity's demise. Now that the international community has postponed the police reform requirement, some progress can be expected in 2008, as long it does not interfere with ethnic interests. The initialing of the SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina was made possible after local leaders pledged to solve the problem of police reform or face international community sanctions. Nonetheless, progress on these reforms in 2008 is unlikely, as the country's ethnic leaders have not changed their stances and show no signs of budging to reach consensus. For its part, Serbia can expect quicker EU integration as it holds the key to stability in its hands, with EU country leaders describing Serbia "as the region's lynchpin," which must not be allowed to "destabilize." Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who will take over the EU's rotating presidency in January, said in a recent statement that Serbia could win EU membership candidate status in mid-2008. A similar message was sent following a 14 December meeting of EU leaders in Brussels, where they stressed that independence for Kosovo from Serbia was inevitable but that Serbia could earn itself expedited EU accession on two conditions: that it fully cooperate with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, with or without arrest of Ratko Mladic, and that is recognize an independent Kosovo. At the same meeting, EU leaders also agreed in principle to send a 1,800-strong security force to Kosovo. But even if Serbia were to accept these two conditions, which Belgrade initially rejected, it would spark heated discussion within the EU, where some members fear that granting Kosovo independence without Serbia's explicit approval could undermine their own territorial integrity. Russia, opposing Kosovo's independence, continues to argue that half a dozen ethnic enclaves around the Black Sea would be inspired to declare independence following the Kosovo example. _____ http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18493 Anes Alic, based in Sarajevo, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East and the Executive Director of ISA Consulting <http://www.isaintel.com> . The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). ISN <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18494> Security Watch 2008 Prognosis Related ISN Publishing House entries State-Building <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?q51=kosovo&lng=en&ord51=Publication+Date&id=45453> and Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans (15 Nov 2007) Kosovo <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?q51=kosovo&lng=en&ord51=Publication+Date&id=44131> Merits "Special Status as Part of the EU" (5 Oct 2007) Kosovo <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?q51=kosovo&lng=en&ord51=Publication+Date&id=44485> - Third Time Lucky? (Sept 2007) Europe <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?q51=kosovo&lng=en&ord51=Publication+Date&id=36126> Report, No. 185: Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate - Europe's Responsibility (21 Aug 2007)
