http://euobserver.com/7/25706

We shall all pay for Kosovo's independence

22.02.2008 - 07:46 CET | By Peter Sain ley Berry

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - If one thing is certain it is that the Kosovo 
story has not ended with the province's unilateral declaration of 
independence. On the contrary, it looks as though Kosovo will be hanging 
even more heavily around the necks of the international community and 
the European Union in particular for a great many years to come.


One cannot blame the Kosovars: the majority community's aspirations are 
entirely legitimate, especially given what they suffered at the hands of 
Milosevic's cohorts a decade ago. But just because an aspiration is 
legitimate does not necessarily mean that it should be granted or even 
that it is wise. All sorts of communities around the world desire 
independence or regime change. To accede to them would be a recipe for 
chaos. The very word ‘balkanisation' carries a derogatory overtone. 
Well, since Sunday, the Balkans has been balkanised yet again.

On every continent we find enclaves that would prefer to live under a 
different jurisdiction: tribes, races, minorities, nations that never 
had their own state. They are legion. There are indeed some within the 
European Union itself. And then there is the obverse: those states that 
have acquired independence by historical accident, but which are coveted 
by their neighbours. Luckily, we have the United Nations and a defended 
world order.

The apologists claim that Kosovo was a unique case. That its previous 
sufferings and its UN Protectorate status made it different. But every 
case is unique when it comes to that. I have still to hear a convincing 
reason why the status quo could not have been maintained until such time 
as the whole region joined the European Union.

Which might have been the case had not the Kosovars learned that the USA 
and its principal European allies would not only back a unilaterally 
declared independence but would actually throw money at it as well. At 
that point all hope of a negotiated outcome went out of the window.

There are at least ten reasons why it is doubtful that independence will 
prove in the interests of the EU, or of the Western Balkans or even, in 
the long run, of the Kosovars themselves:

Illegal in international law
First, however many states may recognise it, Kosovo's independence is 
still illegal in international law. As the EU is trying to bolster the 
rule of law in international relations, this is an own goal;

Secondly,Kosovo lacks the ability to run its own affairs. The EU is 
sending a 2,000 strong mission to reinforce the justice system. Nor can 
Kosovo manage its own security. No colony has ever been granted 
independence on such a weak basis;

Thirdly, with 40 per cent unemployment, a failing economy, poor 
infrastructure, high levels of organised crime, significant outward 
migration, an independent Kosovo is simply unviable without massive 
external support;

Fourth, encouraging Kosovo down the independence path has split the EU, 
damagingly, between those countries that recognise Kosovo and those that 
do not. It has also opened a chasm in relations between a majority of 
states and Serbia, and a minority and Kosovo. To claim that the EU is 
united in its approach to Kosovo is blatantly untrue. All we can say is 
that for want of a common policy we agree to differ.

But if the EU cannot agree a common policy towards Kosovo, how can it 
expect to unite around a common policy towards Russia or an 
international climate change treaty? Moreover, this rift is not likely 
to heal swiftly. The probability is that it will fester, causing 
continuing disharmony;

Fifth, Kosovan independence is likely to prove costly. The whole 
apparatus of statehood has to be funded. Already over a billion euro has 
been pledged - almost twice what the EU is sending to Afghanistan in the 
same period. Olli Rehn, the enlargement commissioner, said this week it 
was necessary to support Kosovo ‘so that we don't have to pour in EU 
taxpayers money for ever and have a black hole in the Balkans.' But that 
is precisely what we have now done!

Sixth, our willingness to sanction illegal independence will give 
succour to communities tempted down the same route. While it is unlikely 
that Kosovo will have an immediate resonance in Catalonia, or even 
Scotland, we have created a dangerous precedent. Who knows by whom it 
may be exploited in the future?

To what end?
Seventh, and to what end? For Kosovo will not really be independent at 
all. A Kosovan passport will hardly become a travel document of choice. 
Nor will there be a Kosovan seat at the UN. Kosovo has swapped its 
status as a UN protected vassal of Serbia, for that of a UN protected 
vassal of the EU. Apart from the satisfaction of being able to poke 
Serbia in the eye, independence is effectually meaningless;

Eighth, there is no obvious exit strategy! Olli Rehn expects matters to 
‘settle.' That is a big expectation. Iraq was once similarly expected to 
‘settle'. It is doubtful that Serbia will ‘settle' either, to judge from 
the Serb Foreign Minister's recent ferocious speech to the European 
Parliament. So it is not clear what the endgame will be. Can we imagine, 
ten years hence, Serb and Kosovan ministers meekly sharing a table to 
discuss Cyprus, or Russia or even renewable energy?

Ninth, the finance and personnel flowing into Kosovo may themselves 
cause problems if neighbouring states feel neglected. That won't assist 
relations. Meanwhile within Kosovo itself there is a danger of building 
dependency - an economy reliant on EU subsidy, employment dominated by 
the state sector, hand-outs instead of enterprise. A state supported by 
the EU but without the independent ability to accede to the EU. This 
could lead to Kosovans feeling like a colonised people, rather than 
independent citizens, delaying rather than accelerating, their EU accession;

Last, the focus on, and the tensions over, Kosovo could delay the 
timetable for Western Balkan accession as a whole. This risks upsetting 
the stability of the region as a whole and increases the potential for 
renewed violence.

Kosovo's independence then, or rather its recognition, is a sorry tale 
of short-term expediency over long term planning and proof, if proof be 
needed, that what people think they want may not be always in their best 
interests. There is a downside to independence as well as an up. And 
that applies each way.

The author is editor of EuropaWorld



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