http://www.mw.ua/1000/1600/62441/
ZERKALO NEDELI (UKRAINE) 28 March 2008 Kosovo a Month After: Quo Vadis? Author: Nazar BOBITSKI It has been a month since unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence. During that time the eyes of the international media have been fixed on the dramatic protests of the Serbs of Northern Kosovo, a seemingly unstoppable but geographically limited stream of international recognitions and frantic, mostly diplomatic efforts by Belgrade to stem it. Ukraine and other countries anxiously reacted to attempts by other separatist regions to use Kosovo events as a 'road-map' to advance their own cause. So far these attempts in breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia have amounted to nothing more than mere copycats of public appeals by Kosovar leaders to third countries and international organizations. A far-reaching step was taken by Moscow to withdraw from the CIS sanctions against Abkhazia and legalize its long-standing trade ties with the region. The media fixation on the situation in Mitrovica and Belgrade has pushed to the background some other events which yet may play a decisive role in the fate of Kosovo. On February 28 in Vienna representatives of 15 countries which recognized Kosovo held the first session of what was called the founding meeting of the "International Steering Group for Kosovo". Along with the US delegates, the session was attended by representatives of 12 EU Member States as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The group derives its mandate from the provisions of Ahtisaari Plan. According to the Plan, were it approved by the UN Security Council, the governance of the province would have been discharged by the international steering group of countries which would appoint an 'international civil representative' for this purpose. The international civil representative would at the same time hold the post of the EU special representative for Kosovo. However, the next day after the group's session the UN Secretary General received the letter from the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out at the lack of legality in the status of the 'international steering group' and its 'international civil representative'. In the opinion of Serbia, it renders illegal the activities of the group and its representative in Kosovo as they constitute the breach of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. Belgrade also considers as illegal attempts to transfer the governing powers from the UN Mission in Kosovo, which it considers legitimate under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to the 'international steering group'. On the same day, February 29, the Serbian position was officially supported by Russia in the UN Security Council. As a result the UN Secretary General was obliged to officially notify the government of Slovenia as a current EU Presidency about objections of certain UN Security Council Members against the transfer of powers of the UN Mission in Kosovo to the EU Special Representative. These developments may help shed light on the profound problem of governing Kosovo which currently stays in the shadow of other events. With the absence of the decision of the UN Security Council on Kosovo status, in particular, on the fate of Ahtisaari Plan, the status of the EU special representative - 'the international civil representative' has murky legal grounds. Therefore, it casts doubt on the status of the EU special mission to Kosovo sent there to assist the EU special representative. This doubtful position raises the question of the ability of the mission to fulfill its primary task - implementation of Ahtisaari Plan which in essence is about bridging the unbridgeable - granting independence to Kosovo while securing the greatest possible autonomy and safeguarding the interests of the province's Kosovo Serb community. The attempts by the EU mission to implement the Plan will inevitably meet resistance from the newly-made sovereign Kosovo authorities. Their resistance will only grow with realization of the fact that Kosovo independence came about not as a result of the will of the international community through the UN Security Council decision but as a result of their sovereign choice as a people in accordance with the principle of self-determination. We can only ask ourselves whether the Albanian leaders of Kosovo will be responsible and wise enough to accept the EU way even if it leads to considerable devolution of their power in favour of their old adversaries, the Serb minority. The entire history of interethnic relations in the region speaks against it. In the pessimistic scenario the EU special representative and the mission will be forced to regularly adapt the Ahtisaari Plan to the realities on the ground. However, with each and every compromise and derogation the relevance and hence legitimacy of the Plan will be undermined and along with it - the mandate of the EU representatives. Once again the European Union will find itself in a situation of a hostage of those for whose fate it has assumed responsibility. The gravity of the situation is further compounded by the fact that the EU primary political weapon to deal with instabilities in the region - the promise of membership, is currently out of reach for Kosovo as the EU still lacks internal consensus to recognize a new state, let alone to negotiate new contractual links for trade, political association and so on. In these circumstances the best course of action for Serbia and the Serb inhabitants of Kosovo seems to be cessation of acts of violent dissent which only divert the international opinion and turn them into the villains of the situation. Instead, Belgrade should pressure the EU as a de-facto authority in the province to take all necessary measures to protect human rights and rights of Serbian minority in Kosovo. It should emphasize that any further progress in bilateral dialogue as well as peace in Northern Kosovo will obviously depend on it. This approach does not in any way entail Serbia's approval of Ahtisaari Plan or the surrender of its sovereignty over Kosovo. The time will show to what extent the Serbian government will be able to adopt a more rational posture and not build its position mostly on the basis of emotions. On top of that, in the absence of the 'blessing' by the UN Security Council, the continued activities of the 'international steering group for Kosovo' may lead to certain controversial outcomes elsewhere. The group has a clearly regional (West European) mould which limits her moral authority to speak on behalf of 'the international community'. At the same time, it shows the way for similar 'regionalized' settlements of other 'frozen' conflicts. For instance, another 'steering group' can be easily propped up by the countries of another region or a regional grouping of Europe to assume interim governance of breakaway provinces without much need for international legitimacy. However, the probability of the second group is quite low as its potential sponsors will soon painfully discover their true position in the international pecking order of power of influence as measured in the number of international recognitions. This is why one should not expect any time soon any new steps by Russia towards recognition of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. It is much more profitable politically for Moscow to play a role of the defener of primacy of international law and the exclusive role of the UN Security Council to settle regional conflicts rather than pursue a dubious course of wrecking the Georgian state. For Ukraine this situation, riddled with controversies, dictates to refrain from any actions leading to recognition of Kosovo's independence. At this stage it seems more beneficial, as well as right from the point of view of international law, to call the parties in question to respect the UN Charter and the exclusive powers of the UN Security Council. Ukraine should also protest vigorously against any attempts to use Kosovo as a precedent for the settlement of the other 'frozen conflicts' around the world.
