http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/borut_grgic_and_gordon_n_bardos/2008/03/ balkans_on_the_boil.html
GUARDIAN (UK) COMMENT IS FREE Balkans on the boil Borut Grgic and Gordon N Bardos March 27, 2008 12:30 PM The current violence in the divided Kosovan city of Mitrovica - the flashpoint for Europe's newest frozen conflict - is a stark reminder of the potential dangers facing southeastern Europe after Kosovo's declaration of independence. But Kosovo is not the only place in southeastern Europe experiencing serious problems: Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia are all going through crises of their own. The EU and the US urgently need to confront these regional problems head-on if the Balkans' Euro-Atlantic integration efforts are to succeed. Of them all, Serbia is facing the most serious difficulties. Serbia's political elite includes far too many political tacticians whose primary concern is their personal survival at the top or close to the top of the political ladder. The record of the past few years speaks for itself: the assassination of a prime minister, the declaration of a state of emergency, three failed attempts to elect a president, a three-plus month long effort to form a government, and, less than a year later, the fall of that very government. New elections have been called for May 11, but it is anyone's guess whether these elections will clarify Serbia's political course, or lead to many more months of instability, weak government, and confrontation with Brussels and Washington. The problems confronting the region today are widespread. Macedonia is undergoing its worst political crisis since the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 narrowly averted a civil war there. While Macedonia has made some progress since then, winning EU candidate member status and joining Nato's Partnership for Peace programme, in the past two years we have seen little additional progress. Since 2006, on-again, off-again boycotts by Macedonia's largest Albanian political party have made it impossible for parliament to pass legislation required to further Macedonia's EU accession prospects, and last week prime minister Nikola Gruevski's Albanian coalition partner withdrew from his government, sparking yet another political crisis. Even more concerning is the fact that since September, Macedonian police and security personnel have been ambushed and killed in numerous incidents, suggesting that at least some extremists are trying to reignite a conflict there. Given all of these problems, Macedonia may receive a negative response from Nato in Bucharest next month, which will deepen the country's political crisis. Bosnia-Herzegovina, for its part, is back to dealing with many of the same constitutional and political debates it was having before war broke out in April 1992-the balance of power between the different ethnic groups, and the division of power between the central government and regional, ethnically based entities. No consensus exists either within Bosnia or among outsiders on how or even whether to reform the Dayton Peace Accords' complex system of government. This political indecision and uncertainty, and Bosnia's cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus, is significantly undermining progress on desperately needed economic reforms and EU accession. It is not alarmist to say that the region has entered a period of considerable strategic uncertainty. The pillars of stability in the region for more than a decade-the US military presence in the region, the promise of foreseeable EU integration for the Western Balkan countries, and a regional and international consensus on security arrangements such as the Dayton Peace Accords, UN security council resolution 1244, and the Ohrid Agreement-have either been removed or are being increasingly questioned, all at a time when new states are being created. Unfortunately, Brussels and Washington have yet to develop an alternative security structure to maintain stability in the Balkans in the post-Kosovo independence era. Since EU membership is not imminent, a strategic alternative to what was in place up until now is urgently needed. Given these new realities, Brussels and Washington need to move quickly on two levels. The first major challenge comes in the period between now and the Serbian elections on May 11. As a result of Kosovo's declaration of independence, relations between Belgrade, the EU, and the US are at their lowest levels since Slobodan Milosevic was in power. Since it is impossible to reconcile the various parties' differences on Kosovo, it is clear that they must all de-couple the Kosovo issue from other aspects of their relationships as much as possible. This will require a considerable amount of creative diplomacy on the part of all parties concerned, but it is the only way to prevent Serbia from going into a period of isolation which would set back regional integration efforts for years to come. Despite misgivings in some EU states, offering Serbia a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April and liberalising the visa regime for Serbian professionals and students could have a decisive impact on undecided voters in the country's upcoming elections. At the strategic level, it is vitally important that Brussels and Washington accelerate the Balkans' Euro-Atlantic integration process. The first opportunity to do this will come in April at Nato's Bucharest Summit. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia should be invited to join in sending a firm signal to extremists throughout the region that each country's security is firmly guaranteed by the alliance. Brussels should work hand-in-hand with Zagreb in order for Croatia to come into the EU as soon as possible, and no later than by the end of next year. Europe can also do more to speed up Montenegro's accession process. In regional terms, Montenegro is a multi-ethnic success story - it managed to avoid an inter-ethnic conflict even while wars were raging in neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo, and its current GDP growth has been an impressive 8% per year, while FDI inflow last year surpassed a billion Euros. For a country the size of Montenegro - roughly 700,000 inhabitants - these are notable successes. Moving Montenegro to the accession track by 2009 is doable. It would send another positive message to the region that the EU membership perspective is real and attainable, and it would boost the reform-minded government in Podgorica, urging them to do even more and faster. More generally, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the EU needs to develop a new accession model for the western Balkan states. For a variety of historical and structural reasons, what worked for the 12 countries that joined in 2004 and 2007 is unlikely to work for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or Kosovo. It is time to get serious and move beyond debates about enlargement fatigue and absorption capacity. The tragedies of the 1990s showed that Balkan problems cannot be allowed to fester. They also showed that pretending that crises in southeastern Europe do not affect important EU or US interests is a recipe for disaster. [EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:letters%40guardian.co.uk> . <http://geo.yahoo.com/serv?s=97359714/grpId=14871632/grpspId=1705043917/msgI d=32516/stime=1206623583/nc1=5028924/nc2=4836039/nc3=5286667> __,_._,___
