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WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE (USA)

OPINION

Balkan Fix

By JANUSZ BUGAJSKI

April 10, 2008

NATO's summit in Bucharest last week provided limited blessings for the
Balkans. Although Albania and Croatia were invited into the alliance,
Macedonia was shunted into the waiting room, Serbia remained on the
sidelines, and Russia's persistent threats of renewed regional conflict over
Kosovo went unchallenged.

Every NATO success in the Balkans seems to unearth a new problem and the
Bucharest gathering was no exception. Positive decisions were reached with
unanimous support for Croatia's and Albania's accession, as both countries
have achieved the standards necessary for membership. In other favorable
moves, Montenegro and Bosnia obtained Individual Partnership Action Plans
and Intensified Dialogues to prepare them for future NATO entry.

Alliance leaders indicated a readiness to develop closer relations with
Serbia after the parliamentary elections in mid-May. But with pro-Western
forces divided and losing support, and the Radical Party likely to be
included in the next Serbian government, Belgrade is more likely to edge
closer to Russia than to NATO after the national ballot.

The most glaring summit negative was the postponed decision on Macedonia's
NATO membership. The country's entry was blocked by Greece after years of
stalled negotiations over the country's name and the formal usage of that
name. The Macedonian appellation without a geographic or political qualifier
is viewed in Athens as a direct challenge to Hellenic patrimony and
identity, making it impossible for the Greek parliament to ratify
Macedonia's NATO entry.

Unfortunately, the Macedonian authorities became overconfident that
Washington would prevail as a mediator in the dispute with Athens and failed
to adopt an acceptable compromise position. The country's invitation to NATO
depends solely on an agreement with Greece - a prospect that may now prove
even more elusive than before the summit.

In the wake of NATO's postponement, Macedonian politics is likely to
radicalize. The fragile government, already abandoned by its Albanian
coalition partners, could be forced to resign if it agrees to a new name
that would entail a constitutional amendment. One can expect a flurry of
accusations against Athens and a resurgence of nationalist passions. But
this would only diminish Macedonia's reputation as a reliable NATO
candidate.

Unless a sound strategy is devised in negotiations with Greece, with
high-level U.S. involvement, the ensuing political turmoil may encourage
leaders of the Albanian minority to push for territorial autonomy in a swath
of territory bordering Kosova and Albania. This would capsize the Ohrid
agreement painstakingly devised to ensure interethnic co-existence in a
unitary state following the Albanian insurgency in the summer of 2001.

The broader regional consequences of not resolving Macedonia could also
prove destabilizing. If Skopje does not promptly recognize Kosovo's
statehood and fails to conclude a border agreement with Pristina, it could
encourage some Albanian militants inside Macedonia to push for territorial
adjustments. The militants might also conclude, in the absence of NATO
membership, that Macedonia is merely a "temporary state."

Russia will also seek to benefit from Macedonian uncertainties by prodding
for closer economic, political and security ties with Skopje and claiming to
be a stalwart protector against pan-Albanianism and "Islamic terrorism." The
objective will be to add another property on Moscow's expanding Monopoly
board and construct a chain of Balkan dependencies stretching toward Central
and Western Europe.

Following the summit declaration that NATO was committed to eventual
membership for Ukraine and Georgia - though the alliance stopped short of
offering them Membership Action Plans - Moscow issued its customary
admonitions against expansion and threatened impending insecurity if Kiev
and Tbilisi were invited into NATO. Less noticed but certainly more pressing
was a statement from the Kremlin claiming that developments in Kosovo had
yet to reach their "hottest phase," indicating that NATO and EU operations
would be challenged by Serbian resistance and a push toward partition of
Kosovo.

Moscow will continue to capitalize on Kosovo's limited international
recognition by creating headaches for NATO and forestalling the further
expansion of Western influence. Conflicts, frozen or otherwise, provide
opportunities for promoting Russia's interests in a region that has still to
be fully secured within Western institutions.

If nationalists form the next Serbian government, NATO should expect closer
coordination between Belgrade and Moscow in provoking unrest in Kosovo. They
may even precipitate the declaration of a separate Serbian administrative
entity in the northern municipalities of Kosovo.

The post-Communist elites throughout Southeast Europe remain susceptible to
Moscow's financial enticements and stand to benefit personally from opening
up their economies to more substantial Russian penetration. Economic
entrapment through an expanding Russian-controlled energy network could also
entail political acquiescence to the Kremlin's pan-European objectives.

Moscow is pursuing a dual-track strategy toward the West: widening fissures
inside Europe in order to expand its influence, and rolling back the
American presence to prevent the permanent detachment of Eastern Europe from
the Russian orbit. Seen in this broader strategic context, the Bucharest
summit registered some successes in the Balkans, but more extensive and
enduring commitments are needed in a still volatile and contested region.

Mr. Bugajski is director of the New European Democracies Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

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