The Balkan Saga Continues by Daniella Fridl
07.11.2008 <http://www.nationalinterest.org/EmailArticle.aspx?id=19374> EMAIL ARTICLE | <http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=19374> PRINTER FRIENDLY With U.S.-Russia relations continuing to deteriorate in the wake of the G8 summit and America’s continuing efforts to build a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe, we now have another nail to add to the coffin. In the United States and the European Union, there is a widely held belief that Kosovo’s independence was the last missing piece in achieving stability in the Balkans. Having just returned from Kosovo, I would have to disagree. My observations lead me to conclude that there remains serious potential for instability in Kosovo—with broad implications for U.S.-Russia relations and beyond. Serbia paid a high price for the mistakes that were made during Slobodan Milsovic’s regime. Former Finnish President and the key mediator in the Kosovo negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari, explained to me that the Serbs lost Kosovo in 1999. This is not to say that Belgrade did not have a chance to negotiate a more favorable agreement between 2005 and 2007. However, it was almost impossible for any constructive Serbian policy to develop, given the fragile structure of the governing coalition and the intense rivalries between nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and pro-European President Boris Tadic. Hence, it was politically more expedient and safe to exploit the nationalist sentiment in the country and settle on the lowest common denominator: claiming that historically Kosovo was and remains part of Serbia. Instead of sitting back in denial, hoping for a miraculous turn of events, Belgrade could have been more effective in using Russia’s support and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which protects the territorial integrity of Serbia, as leverage in securing some level of sovereignty for the Serbs living in Kosovo. Opportunities were there, but the political will, wisdom and effectiveness that were required to achieve this outcome were lacking. Although Kosovo is making slow progress toward obtaining international recognition, this new European state has many other far-more-pressing challenges. They include a still-lagging economy, high levels of organized crime and corruption, an unemployment rate close to 50 percent, a population of about two million—half under the age of twenty-five, and most importantly the unresolved question of Kosovo Serbs. Some of these issues will improve, especially considering the resources and funding that the European Union and the United States are putting in Kosovo. At the upcoming donors’ conference, the international community is expected to raise over one billion dollars to help boost Kosovo’s economy. Regrettably, the northern part of the country remains completely isolated and is not likely to reap any benefits from this aid. Mitrovica is an ethnically divided city, with the majority of Serbs living on the northern side of the Ibar River and Albanians on the southern side. Ironically, the white bridge over the river symbolizes the division between the two ethnic groups, which is evident in the UN checkpoints and barbed-wire barricades set up on both sides. Crossing into the opposite side of the bridge at nighttime is not advisable for security reasons. When I traveled to northern Mitrovica, I saw Serbian flags everywhere and photographs of former-Russian President Vladimir Putin in the shop windows of local bars. The new Kosovo constitution that came into effect on June 15 envisioned the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) ceding its responsibilities to the European Union, but that has not happened in the Serb-populated areas of Kosovo. Public institutions, hospitals and health facilities, schools, universities and all other local institutions are run by Serbs and funded directly by Belgrade, which continues to have a firm grip over this territory. The area is poor and it is common for the water supply, which is controlled by the Kosovo Albanians, to be turned off between the hours of seven p.m. and eight a.m. The atmosphere is calm. Yet there is tension in the air over the unresolved status and future of the people living there. Some 150,000 Serbs that still remain in Kosovo are becoming self-sufficient and starting to organize themselves and form parallel institutions. On June 28, Kosovo Serbs convened their own parliament, with forty-five delegates from twenty-six municipalities, for the first session of the Assembly of the Union of Municipalities of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbs drew up a declaration in which they proclaimed Kosovo an integral part of Serbia, thereby attempting to split the territory with Belgrade acting as a de facto government. Some Balkan experts in Washington claim that Serbia is the problem, not Kosovo. They say that the United States needs to present Belgrade with clear ultimatums and criterion that must be fulfilled prior to Serbia’s consideration for EU membership. Based on our experience and lessons learned from the Balkans over the past decade, are we to believe that such a policy will set Serbia on a democratic path and make Serbia recognize Kosovo’s independence? Will it improve an already-strained relationship between Washington and Moscow? Not likely. Serbia has a unique opportunity to get back on its feet and work its way toward joining the European Union. However, it is not in a position to do it without the assistance of Brussels, Washington and the continuous help of Russia. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was a timely opportunity presented to Belgrade, which in turn helped with the May elections, and the results were evident. Belgrade managed to form a coalition government consisting of the pro-European Democratic Party (DS) led by President Boris Tadic and the Socialists. Today, all eyes are on Serbia, waiting anxiously to see whether Belgrade will deliver on its democratic promise. While Belgrade must work on fulfilling its international obligations, including cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, rather than putting unrealistic pressure on Belgrade, Brussels and Washington should make an effort to constructively approach the new government and also encourage dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The issue of Serbs in Kosovo can only be resolved between the two sides, whose history and geographic location make their future interconnected. Should Brussels and Washington choose to impose unrealistic ultimatums on Belgrade, such a policy would backfire and create a domino effect, which is exactly what the opposition in Serbia is hoping for. This move will, without a doubt, send Serbia into isolation, encourage nationalists in Republika Srpska to push for secession, provoke radical Albanians in Kosovo and Albania to move forward with their goals of creating a “greater Albania,” and ignite minority Albanians living in south Serbia and Macedonia. From a broader geopolitical perspective, such a turn of events would place a further strain on relations between the United States and Russia. Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence resolved the question of stability in the Balkans but only on paper. In reality, the answer to this question is closely tied to the ability of Serbia’s new government to deal with the many obstacles it faces on the road toward EU membership, the most important of which is finding common ground with Pristina and resolving the status of Serbs in Kosovo. Washington, Brussels and Moscow have a key role to play in this process—which means enacting policy measures that give incentives for cooperation. Dr. Daniella Fridl is a recipient of a six-month fellowship from IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board). Her research countries are Serbia and Kosovo. http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19374
