...  Confusion, disagreement and dispute are the rule of the day, and will
continue to be so as long as competencies shared between Pristina and
Brussels remained ambiguous.  ...

 

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id
=106213> &id=106213


Kosovo: Rethinking EU Policy


International Relations and Security Network   |   23 Sep 2009

 

Unless the EU makes economic development a top priority, the future of an
integrated Kosovo is doomed to failure, 

 

Ekrem Krasniqi comments for ISN Security Watch.

The  <javascript:void(0);/*1253694920036*/> European Union's Law of Order
Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo is facing a serious crisis, amid growing
anti-EULEX sentiments among both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. First and
foremost, the souring mood is the result of the lack of a contract between
the EU and Kosovo Institutions that clearly details the
<javascript:void(0);/*1253694906108*/> mission's mandate.

Confusion, disagreement and dispute are the rule of the day, and will
continue to be so as long as competencies shared between Pristina and
Brussels remained ambiguous. 

In the meantime, economic development, or a lack thereof, appears to be
playing second fiddle to basic law and order, and the risk of economic and
social collapse are very real. (For all intents and purposes, Kosovo depends
on imports, diaspora remittances and the expenditures of international
personnel to stay afloat.) 

There are those among the Kosovo Albanians who believe that EULEX is working
against Kosovo's independence and full statehood. This is unfair, and
largely the result of the mission's unclear mandate. At the same time, and
in a rare moment of consensus,  <javascript:void(0);/*1253694875101*/>
Kosovo Serbs are also growing increasingly anti-EULEX, claiming that the
mission's attempts to introduce border controls (ostensibly to cut down on
what it views as a smuggling problem) means a de facto recognition of
Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Kosovo Serbs also perceive Belgrade's
cooperation with EULEX as Serbia's silent recognition of Kosovo's
independence.

Earlier this month, Serbia signed a police cooperation protocol with EULEX,
and Kosovo institutions protested the move. But the contention was not with
the contents of the protocol itself - which calls for an exchange of police
information between EULEX and Belgrade to cut down on smuggling - rather
with the way the protocol came about: It was agreed to and signed entirely
excluding input from Kosovo institutions. Indeed, Kosovo authorities should
have been involved in the protocol, and the move was ill-played by EULEX,
whose success will largely depend on its acceptance by Kosovo authorities
and the people of Kosovo.

The smashing and burning of EULEX cars and demonstrations against EULEX and
the Kosovo government by ethnic Albanian youth are just the first signs of
the growing frustration.

At the same time, the EU mission in Kosovo will find that while law and
order are desperately needed, the core of their strategy in Kosovo should be
economic development - without which, law, order and democracy have no
chance of survival.

Ten years after the war ended and a year and half after declaring
independence, Kosovo still has no industrial policy, no agricultural policy,
no education policy, no healthcare policy, no environmental policy, no
employment policy. There have been hints, here and there, of reforms, but
nothing has made it to the implementation stage due largely to lack of
competence and will among the current generation of politicians. 

Three important points should be considered. First, only after a concise
strategy for economic development is turned into legislation by the
parliament of Kosovo should Kosovo proceed with privatization - a lack of
legislation will allow for corruption and the selling off of Kosovo's most
important economic pillars for personal gain.  

Second, an economic development strategy should have education at its core.
The EU must start to produce future interlocutors in and for Kosovo. Serious
investments must be made in education, as current reforms in process lack
long-term vision. 

Third, the EU should also help the local economy by working to convince
regional neighbors to  <javascript:void(0);/*1253694809636*/> clear
political and administrative obstacles that have kept Kosovo products out of
regional markets and hit exports hard. Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina should be pressured to lift their blockade on goods exported
from Kosovo, and Albania should be pressured to lower heavy taxes and
customs duties imposed on Kosovar agricultural products. 

How much power should EULEX wield in Kosovo? Everyone will disagree, of
course. But given the corruption, self-interest and lack of political will
demonstrated by today's Kosovo politicians, a model like the international
community's mandate in Bosnia might not be far off the mark. In Bosnia, the
<javascript:void(0);/*1253695001890*/> Office of the High Representative
(OHR) has sweeping Bonn powers, which allow the High Representative to hire
and fire democratically elected officials who are obstructing reforms.  

Those who lack a serious will to reform Kosovo for the better should be
dismissed immediately by the strong arm of the international community. That
is perhaps a first step that could pave the way for a coherent economic
development strategy - should anyone feel inclined to write one - that will
make or break Kosovo's independence experiment.

Ekrem Krasniqi is a Brussels-based journalist originally from Kosovo. 

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not
the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/IR-Directory/Detail/?ots591=4888
CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=13306> International Relations
and Security Network (ISN)

Reply via email to