Kosovo – divisible sovereignty
Side-stepping the sovereignty issue and avoiding partition requires increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church. By Gerard Gallucci Sovereignty is usually thought to be indivisible, zero sum. But quantum physics tells us that reality may simply be in the eye of the beholder. This insight could offer the key to unlocking the Kosovo status problem. Perhaps both sides – Belgrade and Pristina – can get what they want by seeing status each in their own way, with nods and winks from the rest of us. The concept of sovereignty goes back to the age of kings. Ever since mankind has lived in groupings larger than clans, who gets to be the boss and why have been central political issues. Kings and emperors claimed authority through descent from the gods. When the divine-right sovereigns were finally overthrown, sovereignty came to rest on the people or nation. Wikipedia defines sovereignty as the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a territory and adds that it can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided. Sovereignty is the claim to rule over a place that has as its basis the assertion of that claim. Of course, not all claims to sovereignty are recognized or actionable. During recent debate and speculation about Kosovo's status <http://www.transconflict.co.uk/News/2010/January/Kosovo_Okay_Really_Whats_Next.php> and possible renewed diplomatic efforts after the ICJ renders its judgment, there has been increased mention of a possible scenario that could be seen as a way to sidestep the sovereignty issue and also avoid partition <http://www.transconflict.co.uk/News/2009/December/Kosovo_partitioning_what_from_what.php> . At the core of such a solution would be increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar <http://www.transconflict.co.uk/News/2010/April/Kosovo_what_to_do_with_the_north_ad_interim.php> and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Church. This would have to go somewhat further than the Ahtisaari Plan, which left important details – of how Pristina and Belgrade would have to interact to enable local self-rule and to operationalize links to Serbia – either unsettled or open to manipulation or blockage by the Kosovo government. For the north, links to Pristina would probably have to be kept minimal while in the south, where the Serbs must live in the midst of independent Kosovo, such links would have to be somewhat more organic. The role of Belgrade would be a mirror image of this. In the north, local institutions would function in practice as part of Serbia while in the south, Belgrade would have defined access and the ability to support local Serb communities but no role in governing them. Oversight of the Church (and Church land) might be done simply as a matter of the recognized authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church. All of this would require agreed and clear rules of the road – and the devil is always in the details – and close monitoring and supervision by the internationals. As difficult as the negotiations might be to settle these Ahtisaari-plus elements <http://www.transconflict.co.uk/News/2009/November/Kosovo_what_is_to_be_done.php> of a possible agreement, it would still leave the question of status and how local Serb autonomy would be “dressed up” (i.e., what uniforms would the Serb police wear, what flags would fly and where, who gets any customs fees, how would Serbian courts in the north and Kosovo courts in the south relate, what utility companies can operate and where). But autonomy itself need not be the problem. When the Western supporters of Kosovo independence first designed the Ahtisaari Plan, it was seen as a way of avoiding creation of autonomous ethnic regions such as was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Conventional wisdom held that this had led to continuing problems in BiH and should not be repeated elsewhere. But increased autonomy – within the boundaries of Kosovo – may make more sense there than in BiH, where autonomy could be seen to challenge the status of the state boundaries as defined by the pre-existing Yugoslav republic. (The war in BiH was, after all, an effort to carve up that state.) In the case of Kosovo, both Belgrade and Pristina agree that its boundaries are not in question and both continue to reject partition. This could offer real grounds for compromise. Belgrade could continue to claim that all of Kosovo remains part of Serbia but limit itself to exercising some form of control over the north and only access in the south (vis-à-vis the southern Serbs). Pristina could maintain that its borders and independence are inviolate. Serbia would not have to recognize Kosovo independence (nor would the EU insist) but Pristina would presumably also get Serbia’s quiet acquiescence to Kosovo being further incorporated into the international system (including the UN). An agreement along these lines is certainly conceivable and could be achieved if the parties both understood that they were expected to reach a mutually acceptable solution in which neither would necessarily receive all they want. Agreement within a resuscitated Contact Group – U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia – to keep the two sides at the table and to not allow either to simply stone-wall would be essential. The Western Quint countries also would have to resist seeking to simply impose the current “solution” that has so clearly not resolved the Kosovo status issue so far. There might eventually be a new UNSCR resolution and a continued UN role in Kosovo – or at least in the north – may remain necessary for some time with a more effective EULEX perhaps allowed to try to get it right in the south. Behind all this would be the possibility that both sides could see the issue of sovereignty over Kosovo in their own way and be left to do so. Serbia could continue to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo, as could the government in Pristina. The Serbs would have a high degree of local self-rule within what everyone recognized as Kosovo. The Albanians would be able to take comfort in the fact that Serbia would not formally rule any part of Kosovo. With both sides getting the international support and “tough love” required to make this complicated formula work, and over time, perhaps the issue of Kosovo status could be subsumed within membership in the EU. Perhaps some will still say that this would only “freeze” the Kosovo conflict and not resolve it. But this misses the point that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo remains at this time irresolvable except perhaps through using force to drive one or the other side off the field. A detailed and practical agreement to disagree on sovereignty may be the best outcome for now. There could be much to talk about after the ICJ rules. Maybe the preliminaries can start now. Maybe they already have? Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not represent the position of any organization. You can read more of Mr. Gallucci's analysis of current developments in Kosovo and elsewhere by clicking here <http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/> . http://www.transconflict.com/News/2010/May/Kosovo_divisible_sovereignty.php http://www.transconflict.com/News/2010/May/Kosovo_divisible_sovereignty.php
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