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American Chronicle - 
http://www.americanchronicle.com<http://www.americanchronicle.com/> - 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/authors/view/2713<http://www.americanchronicle.com/authors/view/2713>

Friday, September 17, 2010 - 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/185664<http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/185664>

Michael Averko

The Future of Russia-NATO Relations

Some additional thoughts come to mind regarding the September 10 Russia Profile 
Weekly Experts' Panel: Another Attempt to Get Russia Into 
NATO?<http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Experts'+Panel&articleid=a1284139378>

Although unlikely at present and in the not too distant future, the idea of 
Russia in NATO should not be completely ruled out in the long term. On this 
matter, there is a basis to think differently from both the pro and not so 
pro-Russian outlooks. Offsetting that view, is the notion that Western 
interests can be arguably improved upon, with a change of some neoconservative 
and neoliberal foreign policy driven pursuits.

The future offers the potential for a less apprehensive attitude towards 
Russia. A number of individuals including former American National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski believe that in the next hundred years or so, the 
United States will experience a decline in its geopolitical prowess. Such a 
scenario can gradually nurture a different way of approaching certain matters. 

Russian membership in NATO would surely require a change of thinking within the 
grouping of key Western strategic decision makers. In the West, there is the 
view that Russia still needs to shed some of its imperial past. At times, this 
perception has ignored that mindset being evident in the West. Post-Soviet 
Russia has a pretty much stay at home and near its armed forces, which is 
different from the wider role of NATO. The budgetary considerations of 
post-Soviet Russia are geared towards giving greater preference to domestic 
concerns, when compared to the more guns over butter economic approach and 
global military presence of the Soviet Union. 

An August 17 opinion piece in The Moscow Times "Thawing the Frozen Conflict in 
Transdnestr<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thawing-the-frozen-conflict-in-transdnestr/412483.html>"
 touches on the differences of opinion over certain international disputes. The 
commentary favors decreasing, if not eliminating altogether, the relatively 
small Russian troop presence in the disputed former Moldavian SSR territory of 
Pridnestrovie (Transdnestr), with the inclusion of an international (Western) 
military force.

It suggests that Russia and Pridnestrovie might go along with this advocacy in 
exchange for some Western economic perks. This kind of a strings attached 
diplomacy can have limits. What gets offered is not always enough to influence 
a given party - which can perceive such an arrangement as encouraging the 
dominance of one side over the other in the long run. Moreover, the party being 
wooed with perks might have their own version of a string attached approach.

At last notice, the two newest European Union (EU) member nations (Bulgaria and 
Romania) have yet to be fully integrated into that entity. There are several 
countries ahead of Moldova for EU membership consideration. Moldova desires 
Pridnestrovie and not vice versa. There is ample reason to think that Russia 
and some other parts of the former Communist bloc should not get too dependent 
on Western economic support.

As noted in that Moscow Times article, the Russian army in Pridnestrovie played 
a key role in ending the war between Moldova and Pridnestrovie in 1992. With a 
limited Russian force (numbering somewhere between 1,000 and 1,500) remaining 
in place there, war between Moldova and Pridnestrovie does not appear likely. 
Why then the effort to get others militarily situated in that territory? Is it 
for the purpose of influencing a former Moldavian SSR settlement which is not 
as favorable for Pridnestrovie, as well as Russia's preference? 

Whereas Pridnestrovie seeks eventually becoming part of Russia, the Kremlin 
prefers the former Moldavian SSR as a nation, with autonomy for Pridnestrovie. 
An internationally recognized Moldova minus Pridnestrovie could potentially 
lead to a Moldovan state that is not as agreeable to Russia. On the other hand, 
Moscow does not favor a former Moldavian SSR state becoming part of a major 
military alliance which does not include Russia. The EU has another component 
besides its civilian aspect. Adopted in 2003, the 
"Berlin-Plus<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm>" 
arrangements closely link the EU and NATO on strategic issues of mutual 
interest between the two entities. 

A comparatively larger Western led military deployment in Kosovo (where 
slightly under 10,000 foreign military personnel are said to be 
located)<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm> has not made it 
a safer place than Pridnestrovie. The Western countries militarily involved in 
Kosovo are not as geographically close to that region as Russia is to 
Pridnestrovie. Unlike the Russian stance on the former Moldavian SSR, the 
leading Western nations have contradicted the territorial integrity of Serbia 
by recognizing Kosovo's independence.

>From the point of view of Russia's best interests, a case can be made against 
>the Russian government's recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
>independence. Regardless, the Russian government has an explanation for its 
>independence recognition of these two disputed former Georgian SSR territories 
>and non-independence recognition of the other contested former Communist bloc 
>lands (of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Pridnestrovie). Since the 1990s warfare 
>over disputed former Communist bloc territories (claimed by Georgia, Serbia, 
>Moldova and Azerbaijan), Georgia is the lone country to have initiated (in 
>2008) a significant military strike on land that it covets. The Russian 
>independence recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia came shortly after the 
>armed Georgian action.

There is good reason to believe that most and quite possibly all of the 
disputed former Communist bloc territories will not be completely settled 
anytime soon. This likelihood does not mean that Russia and NATO can not 
improve their relations. NATO member Turkey's independence recognition of the 
northern region of Cyprus does not appear to be made into such a great issue. 
(Turkey is the only country recognizing the independence of the "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.")

One-sided comments like these (from the referenced Russia Profile discussion) 
are counterproductive to fostering closer Russia-West ties, which are mutually 
beneficial:

"Russia does not respect the sovereignty of some of its neighbors, pursues an 
aggressive foreign economic policy to the detriment of certain key NATO 
members, and does not respect many of its OSCE and Council of Europe 
obligations (both domestic and towards other states). Consequently, it is 
inconceivable to me that the NATO states would accept Russia as a member in the 
near future, if ever. It would be tantamount to letting the wolf into the hen 
house."

The reverse can be thrown back at the leading Western governments for 
advocating the dismemberment of Kosovo from Serbia. Likewise, the problematical 
issue of Russia's relations with some of its "near abroad" is not a simple 
instance of an overbearingly evil Russia against innocent others. Most Abkhaz 
and Ossetians prefer Russia over Georgia. The overall mood in Pridnestrovie and 
a considerable segment of Ukraine's population Ukrainians differ with the 
negativity in the above excerpted comments.

An underlying factor influences Russia's image in the West. Some major Western 
media outlets and think tanks continue to noticeably downplay mainstream 
Russian views, in favor of Russians thinking like Yulia Latynina and Gary 
Kasparov. This situation does not serve to better understand Russia and runs 
opposite to being reasonably objective.
  
Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media 
critic.  

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