Quantum key security hacked for first time
Researchers show weakess in commercial system
By John E. Dunn, TechWorld
May 20, 2010 09:42 AM ET

 Share/Email Tweet This Comment Print

An important weakness has been discovered in the technology of quantum
key distribution (QKD), which is increasingly being used by military
and government to secure sensitive communications.

Researchers at the University of Toronto have successfully attacked a
QKD system from Swiss company, id Quantique, the first time an attack
on a commercial system using the technology has been demonstrated.

Network Based Backup: Download nowThe highly-theoretical attack was
based on disproving assumptions about the levels of errors which can
be taken by either the sender (Alice) or receiver (Bob) to be
indicative that the key data has been compromised by a third party
(Eve).

The security principle of QKD is the impossibility of a simple
intercept-and-resend attack being hidden from sender or receiving
parties, normally taken to a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 20
percent or greater becoming apparent in the signal, a figure that
takes account of a degree of 'noise'.

Related Content
View more related contentGet Daily News by EmailHowever, the Toronto
team were able to manipulate the amount of noise created by the sender
(Alice) by shifting the time delay between the reference and signal
pulses, simulating an apparent error rate of only 19.7 percent. This
would strike the QKD system as within normal thresholds, allowing the
attacker (Eve) to hide the interception of keys.

Dr Andrew Shields of Toshiba's Cambridge Research Labs, a prominent
developer of QKD technology, described the research paper by the
Toronto team as "ingenious" but was confident that modifications could
take account of its method.

"Properly implemented quantum cryptography is still unconditionally
secure," said Shields. "It does show, however, that we have to
construct quantum cryptography systems in a way that it is not
possible for Eve to exploit the differences between theory and
reality."

He suggested that a redesigned QKD system should monitor the time
delay between photonic pulses to detect such an attack.

Earlier this month, Dr Shields' team announed that it had distributed
QKD keys at a bitrate of 1Mbit/s over 50Km distance for a period of 24
hours without the need for intervention, a breakthrough in making the
technology usable by non-experts.

Despite the appearance of first-generation commercial systems, the
technology is still seen as in its early stages and as being lab-
bound.

The full paper by researchers Hoi-Kwong Lo, Feihu Xu, and Bing Qi can
be downloaded from the website of the Deptartment of Physics and
Deptartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University
of Toronto.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"nforceit" group.
To post to this group, send an email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/nforceit?hl=en-GB.

Reply via email to