AlinsRan commented on code in PR #2804:
URL:
https://github.com/apache/apisix-ingress-controller/pull/2804#discussion_r3636209616
##########
internal/adc/translator/gateway.go:
##########
@@ -134,26 +146,43 @@ func (t *Translator) translateSecret(tctx
*provider.TranslateContext, listener g
}
}
- // Only supported on TLSRoute. The certificateRefs field is ignored in
this mode.
- case gatewayv1.TLSModePassthrough:
- return sslObjs, nil
default:
- return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown TLS mode %s",
*listener.TLS.Mode)
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown TLS mode %s", mode)
}
return sslObjs, nil
}
-// translateFrontendValidation builds the downstream mTLS client configuration
from a
-// listener's frontendValidation. The referenced CA certificates (ConfigMap,
key `ca.crt`)
-// are bundled into a single trust anchor used to validate client certificates.
+// frontendTLSValidation resolves the Gateway-level frontend TLS client-cert
+// validation that applies to the given HTTPS listener. In Gateway API v1.6,
+// frontendValidation moved from the per-listener TLS config to the
Gateway-level
+// spec.tls.frontend: Default applies to all HTTPS listeners, and a PerPort
entry
+// overrides it for listeners on the matching port.
+func frontendTLSValidation(obj *gatewayv1.Gateway, listener
gatewayv1.Listener) *gatewayv1.FrontendTLSValidation {
+ if obj.Spec.TLS == nil || obj.Spec.TLS.Frontend == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+ frontend := obj.Spec.TLS.Frontend
+ for i := range frontend.PerPort {
+ if frontend.PerPort[i].Port == listener.Port {
+ return frontend.PerPort[i].TLS.Validation
+ }
+ }
+ return frontend.Default.Validation
+}
+
+// translateFrontendValidation builds the downstream mTLS client configuration
from the
+// Gateway's frontendValidation that applies to the listener. The referenced CA
+// certificates (ConfigMap, key `ca.crt`) are bundled into a single trust
anchor used
+// to validate client certificates.
func (t *Translator) translateFrontendValidation(tctx
*provider.TranslateContext, listener gatewayv1.Listener, obj
*gatewayv1.Gateway) (*adctypes.ClientClass, error) {
- if listener.TLS.FrontendValidation == nil ||
len(listener.TLS.FrontendValidation.CACertificateRefs) == 0 {
+ validation := frontendTLSValidation(obj, listener)
Review Comment:
Follow-up (ec69be2d): mirrored the rejection on the listener status too —
`validateListenerFrontendValidation` now reports `Programmed=False` for
`AllowInsecureFallback`, so the listener status no longer shows green while
translation fails.
One design question for you: `translateSecret` returning an error fails
translation for the **whole** gateway (same as an existing missing-CA ref
does), so one unsupported listener stops the other listeners/routes from being
programmed. That's the current pattern rather than something new here — do you
prefer keeping the hard-fail, or isolating per-listener so a single bad
listener doesn't take down the gateway? Happy to follow up in a separate change
if you want the latter.
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