Qiao-yq commented on issue #1539: URL: https://github.com/apache/dubbo-admin/issues/1539#issuecomment-6093674127
## Proposed Phase 1 Breakdown Phase 1 covers requirements 4, 5, and 6, plus the foundational parts of requirements 8 and 12. It establishes the security and lifecycle boundaries required before introducing Context Compiler, Summary, long-term Memory, or RAG. | PR | Scope | Acceptance boundary | | --- | --- | --- | | PR 1: Session Ownership Foundation (#1592) | Server-owned identity context, tenant/owner persistence, Store enforcement, and isolation across Session APIs, Chat, History, and Delete | Cross-user and cross-tenant Session access is rejected consistently | | PR 2: Sensitive-Data Controls | Data classification, log/audit redaction, derived-data allowlists, secret detection, and temporary model-input filtering | Canonical messages are not silently rewritten; sensitive content does not enter logs, audits, or unauthorized derived data | | PR 3: Session Lifecycle | Idempotency, concurrent Turn control, quotas, retention, deletion propagation, cleanup, and reconciliation | Retries and concurrent writes are safe; deleted data becomes immediately unreadable and derived cleanup is recoverable | | PR 4: Production Security and Rollout Gate | JWT or signed-gateway authentication, resource-level authorization, Usage/Cost, privacy-safe audit, feature flags, and the G1 suite | Production identity and resource permissions are verified; static mode cannot pass production acceptance | ### Scope Notes PR #1592 implements the Session ownership foundation of requirement 4. Its static authenticator is limited to local development and does not represent complete production authentication. Requirement 4 is complete only after PR 4 provides: - at least one production authenticator; - policy resolution from untrusted resource references to authorized scopes; - resource-permission enforcement across Session APIs, Chat, History, and Delete; - credential, cross-tenant, and resource-revocation tests. PR 2 separates canonical-data protection from redaction: - canonical messages use access control, encryption, and retention; - logs and audits never retain raw sensitive text; - indexes and derived Memory use field allowlists and secret detection; - model input uses a temporary policy-filtered view without rewriting canonical records. ### Phase 1 Exit Gate Phase 1 is complete only when production authentication, resource authorization, concurrency, quota, deletion, cleanup, and sensitive-data tests pass against both Memory and GORM stores. Detailed API, migration, and threat-model decisions remain in the corresponding PRs and ADRs. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
