rusackas commented on code in PR #43389:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/43389#discussion_r3832415256
##########
superset/semantic_layers/api.py:
##########
@@ -672,6 +675,11 @@ def runtime_schema(self, uuid: str) -> FlaskResponse:
if not layer:
return self.response_404()
+ try:
+ layer.raise_for_access()
+ except SupersetSecurityException as ex:
+ return self.response(403, message=ex.message)
Review Comment:
Good catch, added the 403 response docs to the OpenAPI schema.
##########
superset/commands/theme/import_themes.py:
##########
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ def import_theme(config: dict[str, Any], overwrite: bool =
False) -> "Theme | No
if existing:
if not overwrite or not can_write:
return existing
+ if existing.is_system or existing.is_system_default or
existing.is_system_dark:
+ raise ThemeImportError(
+ "Cannot overwrite a system theme or the active "
+ "system-default/dark theme via import"
+ )
Review Comment:
Good catch, mirrored UpdateThemeCommand's own admin carve-out here so admins
can still overwrite the active system theme via import.
##########
tests/unit_tests/utils/test_core.py:
##########
@@ -1942,13 +1942,28 @@ def test_sanitize_svg_content_safe():
def test_sanitize_svg_content_removes_scripts():
- """Test that nh3 removes dangerous script content."""
+ """Test that dangerous script content is removed."""
malicious_svg = '<svg><script>alert("xss")</script><rect/></svg>'
result = sanitize_svg_content(malicious_svg)
assert "script" not in result.lower()
assert "alert" not in result
+def test_sanitize_svg_content_removes_script_with_attributes_on_closer():
+ """A closing </script foo> tag is still a valid closer to browsers."""
+ malicious_svg = "<svg><script>fetch('/api/v1/me/')</script foo></svg>"
+ result = sanitize_svg_content(malicious_svg)
+ assert "script" not in result.lower()
+ assert "fetch" not in result
+
+
+def test_sanitize_svg_content_removes_unterminated_script():
+ """An unterminated <script> opener with no closing tag is still
stripped."""
+ malicious_svg = "<svg><script>alert('xss')"
+ result = sanitize_svg_content(malicious_svg)
+ assert "script" not in result.lower()
Review Comment:
Traced the sanitizer behavior here - once the tag markers are stripped the
payload is left as inert plain text, not re-parsed as markup, so it's safe
as-is. Asserting full text removal would actually be the wrong expectation.
Leaving this one.
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