Daniel Kahn Gillmor <d...@fifthhorseman.net> writes: > On Fri 2019-03-15 02:53:28 +0100, Adam Majer wrote: >> adding explicit checks would add an extra BuildRequires in the build >> process to pull in gpg, which is excessive. > > It shouldn't require gpg; it should only pull in gpgv, which is already > on the base system, no? And once the "small file" is checked, it would > then require sha256sum (or the equivalent) to verify the tarball itself; > on any modern system, that's likely to be available anyway > (e.g. coreutils' sha256sum or "openssl dgst" or whatever).
BTW gpg is needed to run the full test suite. > But you're right that we could distribute a detached signature over the > tarball in addition to the stronger mechanism. that way people who have > other defenses against rollback or version fixation attacks (or who > are willing to take the risk) can check the simpler, weaker mechanism. BTW2: In a sense everyone has other defences since the tar ball contains a file "version" with the version in it. > David, how would you feel about generating two forms of cryptographic > signature per-tarball as an interim process? Yeah, that sounds fine. IIUC, the old .sha256.asc and the "new" .tar.gz.asc? _______________________________________________ notmuch mailing list notmuch@notmuchmail.org https://notmuchmail.org/mailman/listinfo/notmuch
