What you're asking for is a redesign One way to address this issue is the place authentication in the hands of your database tier, and not grant any special domain level rights to IIS. This way, successful attacks against the web servers [1] would still require subsequent successful attacks against the database [2] before getting at this sensitive data.
I hope that lots of encryption is being intelligently used throughout this application -- in transit AND at rest. *ASB *(My XeeSM Profile) <http://XeeSM.com/AndrewBaker> *Exploiting Technology for Business Advantage...* * * [1] Where we hope not to find database connection strings for privileged accounts [2] Which would now be trivial *ASB *(My XeeSM Profile) <http://XeeSM.com/AndrewBaker> *Exploiting Technology for Business Advantage...* * * On Thu, Oct 7, 2010 at 1:53 PM, Klint Price <[email protected]> wrote: > So what steps should be taken to secure it since no instructions are > provided to do so? > > > > Because IIS knows the password for the xyzweb account. If someone can get > IIS to execute arbitrary code (e.g. by uploading some of their own webpages) > then IIS can connect to serverB using the domain\xyzweb account, and that > account has privileges on serverB. > > > > By running your website as a domain user it is basically giving permission > to your web server to access anything that the user has access to on the > entire domain. Wouldn’t that mean that > if someone manages to take advantage of one of the many IIS vulnerabilities > they very well may have access to information all over your network instead > of just the one machine? > > > > A workaround or possible solution would be to instruct the customer that if > they are going to use a domain account (which by architecture they are > forcing them to do), that they should use a non-privileged account, and > remove it from the “domain users” group. That way the account can be > considered “authenticated”, but has no other default rights on the domain. > Additional settings should be implemented to prevent the password from > expiring, and locking out. > > > > > > > > *From:* Brian Desmond [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, October 07, 2010 10:49 AM > > *To:* NT System Admin Issues > *Subject:* RE: Need System/Application Security Advice > > > > *It’s very common. There are many things you simply cannot do if you run > in a local security context. FYI if you run the app pool as Network Service > on a domain joined machine that provides it the domain rights of the > server’s computer account.* > > * * > > *If an internet facing app even not in a corp environment runs on a web > farm and is anything other than static content you’re almost guaranteed to > have a domain and shared domain accounts running it too.* > > * * > > *Thanks,* > > *Brian Desmond* > > *[email protected]* > > * * > > *c - 312.731.3132* > > * * > > * * > > *From:* Klint Price [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, October 07, 2010 7:36 PM > *To:* NT System Admin Issues > *Subject:* RE: Need System/Application Security Advice > > > > Internal corporate, yes. Directly exposed to the internet? I would hope > not. > > > > *From:* Brian Desmond [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, October 07, 2010 10:34 AM > *To:* NT System Admin Issues > *Subject:* RE: Need System/Application Security Advice > > > > *Ermm what you describe (as I understand it) is probably how 75-90 percent > of apps run on IIS in a corporate environment.* > > * * > > *Thanks,* > > *Brian Desmond* > > *[email protected]* > > * * > > *c - 312.731.3132* > > * * > > * * > > *From:* Klint Price [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, October 07, 2010 7:28 PM > *To:* NT System Admin Issues > *Subject:* Need System/Application Security Advice > > > > My off-hour job is consulting for various companies. One such small > company puts out a product that I feel needs to be fixed. > > > > Company sells two products; ProductA integrates with ProductB which both > manage sensitive data and are exposed to the public Internet > > > > Windows Forms Authentication is tied to LDAP to authenticate users prior to > allowing them into the inner-workings of the system. > > > > ProductA and ProductB are configured so that IIS allows a domain account to > run the entire website for anonymous users (the equivalent of running an app > pool with a domain account). > > > > Because the entire site runs under the domain account, there are inherent > security risks which Company fails to disclose. > > > > I am about to send off an e-mail to the higher ups detailing why this is a > bad idea without instructing the customer on the possible security risks, > and associated steps to mitigate, let alone re-architect the application to > reduce this exposure. > > > > Why is it a bad idea to configure a site in this way out-of-the-box, and > what articles can you point me to? Any security articles would also be > appreciated. > > > > At minimum I think the domain user should be removed from the “domain > users” group, with additional GPO’s applied to lock down the account. > > > > What say ye? > > > ~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~ ~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/> ~ --- To manage subscriptions click here: http://lyris.sunbelt-software.com/read/my_forums/ or send an email to [email protected] with the body: unsubscribe ntsysadmin
