This is very good summary of the motivation for extensions. GUE design was 
given quite thought on that.

For supporting tunnel stitching (draft-yong-nvo3-tunnel-stitching), it requires 
a new field in the encap. protocol to carry the next tunnel identifier. GUE can 
easily support that by defining a new flag and corresponding optional field.

Extensibility is important for a protocol to retain long.

Lucy 

-----Original Message-----
From: nvo3 [mailto:nvo3-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Tom Herbert
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 6:25 PM
To: nvo3@ietf.org
Subject: [nvo3] Extensions in nvo3 encapsulations

Alia has asked that we provide some more information as to what the motivations 
for extensions are for nvo3 and to what form they should take. Here is some 
high level explanation with respect to GUE.

Six fundamental extensions have been defined for GUE

1) VNID (draft-hy-nvo3-gue-4-nvo-03)
2) Checksum (draft-herbert-gue-extensions-00)
3) Remote checksum offload or RCO  (draft-herbert-gue-extensions-00)
4) Fragmentation (draft-herbert-gue-extensions-00)
5) Security (draft-herbert-gue-extensions-00)
6) Payload transform (draft-herbert-gue-extensions-00)

All of these share some common properties:

* The extensions seem cover three areas: integrity/security, addressing, and 
protocol processing.
* These extensions break down into two classes: those that can be processed 
without any additional information (checksum, RCO, fragmentation), and those 
that require context (VNID, security, payload xfrm)..
* These are all intrinsic to the encapsulation layer and are part of correct 
processing of the encapsulation when present. For instance the security option 
is expressly needed to secure the GUE header and in particular to provide 
security for VNID.
* All of these are mandatory in the sense that they can't be ignored at a 
receiver. For instance, if some receiver decided to ignore RCO then that would 
just become a checksum error at the ultimate receiver.
Anything to do with security can pretty much never be ignored. Also, as a 
general principle in large scale DCs, it's much better to drop a packet when 
we're not sure something is correct as opposed to allowing it through even if 
the risk is slight. Packet loss is much easier to debug than incorrectness!
* With the exception of fragmentation, a subset of these will commonly be set 
in packets for some deployment. For instance in a nvo3 deployment, VNID and 
security might be set all the time.
* These are not intended for processing by middleboxes in transit. As I 
mentioned in my response to Bob Briscoe, intermediate devices cannot correctly 
parse UDP payloads (port number ambiguity problem in the network). Such 
information should be in HBH for IPv6 or IP options in IPv4.
* These are interoperable and not proprietary.We allow proprietary extensions 
via a private data field but do do not encourage it, to do so otherwise would 
be to encourage vendor lock-in.

While these six fundamental cover current needs, we cannot predict that they 
cover all the future needs of the protocol. At some point we will need to 
extend a deployed encapsulation protocol in the data center. The most likely 
scenario that we would need to extend the protocol is to addressed a newly 
discovered security vulnerability. We anticipate that extending a protocol is a 
rare event, but at large scale we need this capability. Extending a protocol is 
far simpler that replacing a protocol especially if we can avoid needing to 
swap out massive amounts of hardware.

Another general characteristic is that GUE extensions are contained within a 
single header, as opposed to using shim headers or following headers. There are 
benefits to do this:

* It's very clear that the extensions refer to the encapsulation. For instance 
if implement a checksum in a shim header then we need some consideration as to 
how the checksum covers prior headers.
* We can limit the extensibility. This is important consideration for 
efficiency and avoid DOS attacks.
* This allows "skip ahead". If a device just wants to look at the encapsulated 
IP packet for instance it does not need to parse a header chain for that.

Thanks,
Tom

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