Hi Mirja,

Thanks for your suggestions. We agree. Please see our responses inline.

Thanks,
Ilango


-----Original Message-----
From: Mirja Kuehlewind <[email protected]> 
Sent: Monday, February 3, 2020 2:30 AM
To: Ganga, Ilango S <[email protected]>
Cc: The IESG <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Jesse Gross 
<[email protected]>; [email protected]; Matthew Bocci <[email protected]>; 
[email protected]; T. Sridhar <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-14: (with 
DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Hi Ilango,

Please see inline.


> On 2. Feb 2020, at 20:46, Ganga, Ilango S <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Hello Mirja,
> 
> Thanks for your review of the document and comments. Please see below for our 
> responses inline, enclosed within <Response> </Response>. Let us know if you 
> are satisfied with this resolution. 
> 
> Regards,
> Ilango Ganga
> Geneve Editor
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mirja Kühlewind via Datatracker <[email protected]> 
> Sent: Wednesday, December 4, 2019 10:14 AM
> To: The IESG <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]; Matthew Bocci <[email protected]>; 
> [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
> Subject: Mirja Kühlewind's Discuss on draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-14: (with 
> DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> 
> Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-14: Discuss
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for the really well written document that addresses all transport 
> related question well (and thanks to David for the early TSV review!). I only 
> have one minor process point that need to be addressed before publication:
> 
> Inline with RFC6335 the Assignee and Contact of the port entry should also be 
> updated to IESG <[email protected]> and IETF Chair <[email protected]> respectively.
> 
> IG>> <Response>
> Agreed. This was brought up during the IANA review and we have requested IANA 
> to update the Assignee and Contact information (as noted above) before 
> publication.
> </Response>

Can you please update this information in the IANA section in the next version 
of the document accordingly, so I can clear my discuss.

IG> <Response> Yes, we will add a note to this effect in the next version of 
the document.  </Response>

> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 1) One small comment/question on the editorial note in sec 4.4.1:
> "It was discussed during TSVART early review if the level of
>   requirement for maintaining tunnel MTU at the ingress has to be "MAY"
>   or "SHOULD".  The discussion concluded that it was appropriate to
>   leave this as "MAY", considering the high level of state to be
>   maintained.
> I would have preferred a SHOULD and I'm not sure I understand what state your 
> are talking about...?
> 
> IG>> <Response>
> The “state” (in the Editorial note) refers to tracking the MTU size per 
> tunnel link (for all links) associated with the endpoint, which could be 
> challenging depending on the number of endpoints and how they are represented 
> internally in the implementation. So we have sufficient text in 4.4.1 to 
> provide guidance to the operators/implementors.
> 
> We already have text that strongly RECOMMENDs to use Path MTU discovery to 
> prevent or minimize fragmentation. So we could rephrase the sentence to 
> simply restate that fact as follows:
> 
> Entire first paragraph of 4.4.1 is referenced below (revised text is enclosed 
> in quotes " ") because we proposed to revise the first sentence in response 
> to another comment:
> 
> "It is strongly RECOMMENDED that Path MTU Discovery ([RFC1191],
>   [RFC8201]) be used to prevent or minimize fragmentation.”
>   The use of Path MTU Discovery on the transit network provides the
>   encapsulating tunnel endpoint with soft-state about the link that it
>   may use to prevent or minimize fragmentation depending on its role in
>   the virtualized network. "The NVE can maintain this state (the MTU size of
>   the tunnel link(s) associated with the tunnel endpoint), so if a
>   tenant system sends large packets that when encapsulated exceed the
>   MTU size of the tunnel link, the tunnel endpoint can discard such
>   packets and send exception messages to the tenant system(s)."  If the
>   tunnel endpoint is associated with a routing or forwarding function
>   and/or has the capability to send ICMP messages, the encapsulating
>   tunnel endpoint MAY send ICMP fragmentation needed [RFC0792] or
>   Packet Too Big [RFC4443] messages to the tenant system(s). "When 
> determining the MTU size of a tunnel link, 
>   maximum length of options should be considered as options may vary on a 
> per-packet basis".
> 
> </Response>

Looks good to me. See below for the last sentence.

> 
> 2) And one more small question on sec 4.4.1. in general:
> Is the assumption that all tunnel packets have the same options (and 
> therefore same Geneve header length) at a certain ingress, or should the 
> announced MTU always consider the maximum length that a certain ingress could 
> produce. Would be good to clarify this in the document!
> 
> IG>> <Response>  The options could vary on a per packet basis. We will add a 
> sentence at the end of the first paragraph in 4.4.1 to clarify this point:
> “When determining the MTU size of a tunnel link, maximum length of options 
> should be considered as options may vary on a per-packet basis.”

I’m not sure about the phase “should be considered” as it seem quite vague. How 
about “MUST be assumed” instead? Maybe that makes it more clear…?

IG> <Response> Yes, we will revise the text as follows:
“When determining the MTU size of a tunnel link, maximum length of options MUST 
be assumed as options may vary on a per-packet basis.”


> 
> The entire paragraph is reproduced above for reference. 
> </Response>
> 
> 3) Section 6:
> "When crossing an untrusted link, such as the public Internet, IPsec
>   [RFC4301] may be used to provide authentication and/or encryption of
>   the IP packets formed as part of Geneve encapsulation."
> Should this maybe be a normative SHOULD and not a lower case "may"?
> 
> IG>> <Response> We already have this requirement in section 6.1.1.  We can 
> rephrase the sentence as follows to provide reference to the requirement in 
> 6.6.1.
> 
> OLD:
> When crossing an untrusted link, such as the public Internet, IPsec
>   [RFC4301] may be used to provide authentication and/or encryption of
>   the IP packets formed as part of Geneve encapsulation.
> 
> NEW:
> “When crossing an untrusted link, such as the public Internet, VPN 
> technologies such as IPsec
>   [RFC4301] should be used to provide authentication and/or encryption of
>   the IP packets formed as part of Geneve encapsulation (See section 6.1.1).”
> </Response>

Okay.

> 
> 3) And one random thought on the protocol design (given we all love to design 
> protocols :-) ): Was it considered to require to have critical options first 
> in order to speed up processing?
> 
> IG>> <Response> 
> There were quite a few discussions in the working group and the NVO3 design 
> team around imposing ordering requirements on options. However, given that 
> Geneve is intended to be a flexible and general purpose protocol, it seemed 
> clear that there wasn't one ordering that would satisfy all the needs. 
> However, certain use cases could order options in a particular way as an 
> optimization and still be compatible with the protocol, and this can be 
> managed by the control plane. The recommendation from the NVO3 design team is 
> to let the control plane negotiate the ordering.  See section 4.5.1 that 
> provides text to this effect.  
> </Response>

Okay, thanks!

Mirja

> 
> <End of Responses>
> 
> 

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