So you're assuming that somewhere in the process of token issuance, the client gets told what algorithm to use and remembers it.

When is this assumption true? I don't see where it happens in the OAuth delegation procedure (there's no "use this algorithm" field in responses that issue tokens/secrets). And if Token auth is being used as a general authentication mechanism, the token secret might just be something like a password, which the user remembers, not the UA, so the UA would need to be informed somehow (by the user or the server) of what signing algorithm to apply.

--Richard



On Jan 28, 2010, at 1:01 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

Not really. The algorithm is part of the token not the challenge. Either you have a token for this resource or not, and if you have one, it tells you which algorithm to use. In other words, when you get a token, it comes with the algorithms it supports (if more than one) and whatever secrets required executing it. When the client gets the challenge, it makes no difference what the challenge includes because the token attributes dictate the rest.

I am assuming there isn't a need for a server to issue a token with multiple algorithm and then letting individual resources narrow it down.

EHL

-----Original Message-----
From: Richard L. Barnes [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2010 8:55 PM
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
Cc: OAuth WG ([email protected])
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] What are the primary criteria in issuing an
authentication challenge?

I'm in the "1.5" camp -- "Use Token with HMAC-SHA256". There's no point to
specifying acceptable tokens, since from the perspective of the
authentication protocol, the token is an opaque string. But it would be a good idea to specify what the parameters for the authentication should be. The critical parameter is of course the signature algorithm the server will accept (I'm OK with just allowing one), but you might also provide a valid
range for timestamps.

--Richard


On Jan 27, 2010, at 10:11 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

An authentication challenge (to make sure we are all on the same
page) is something the server sends to the client when denying access
to a protected resource. The challenge can be as simple as "use
Basic", or complex as "use Digest with the following parameters".
OAuth 1.0 doesn't really use a challenge because it was created for
cases where the API calls are preconfigured and hardcoded into the
client. The client should never receive an OAuth challenge the way the
protocol was originally designed.

In my token authentication draft I tried to propose multiple
mechanisms (not fully baked yet) for issuing a challenge and allowing
the client to figure out what to do next. Before producing another
draft, it is important to figure out what challenge model we want to
use. Here are the general options I came up with:

1. Basic / OAuth 1.0 style - Simply say "use Token". The client is
left on its own to figure out what to do next.

2. Basic / OAuth 1.0 + simple discovery - Say "use Token and if you
need a new token go there". It is still not clear how this will help
the client given that getting a token is likely it include many
different options, and to fully address this we need to dig deep into
discovery which was left out of scope.

3. Token attributes - the server informs the client of the kind of
tokens accepted (based on their cryptographic properties or the
resource-set/realm they are good for). This is just like #2 but with
the ability for the server to support more than one token type per
resource.

Question: Is the ability for a single token-protected resource to
support more than one token type (say Plain+SSL *and* HMAC-256) part
of our requirements? If not, there is no reason at all for the
challenge to include anything other than #1 or #2 (probably defined as
a future extension).

EHL

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