Draft -02 made this possible already.
I added the following text:
The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token in which case
the client MUST NOT
use the previous refresh token and replace it with the newly issued
refresh token.
EHL
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf
> Of Torsten Lodderstedt
> Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2010 12:28 PM
> To: Marius Scurtescu
> Cc: OAuth WG ([email protected])
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Refresh tokens security enhancement
>
> Am 04.05.2010 21:44, schrieb Marius Scurtescu:
> > On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 11:32 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> >> Am 03.05.2010 18:55, schrieb Allen Tom:
> >>
> >>> Invalidating the Refresh Token (and presumably also invalidating any
> >>> outstanding Access Tokens) would make sense as an option for
> >>> applications that require a high level of security. However, I do
> >>> not think that invalidating the Refresh Token on every Refresh
> >>> request should be required in the spec - it should be an implementation
> specific detail.
> >>>
> >>>
> >> It could be an optional feature of the spec (as many other features).
> >>
> > Torsten, can you please have a look a the "explicit request for
> > refresh token" thread?
> >
> > Would a "refresh_token_type=single" parameter solve the above?
> >
> >
> > Marius
> >
>
> Hi Marius,
>
> I expected the authorization server to decide which kind of token to use.
> Your proposal makes sense as well.
> So the client can act according to its security requirements. If the
> authorization server would like to enforce its own policy, it can detect any
> mismatch during token issuance.
>
> Nevertheless, support for the optional "refresh_token" response parameter
> of the "refresh" request is the prerequisite.
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
