Hi Igor, comments Inline below Igor Faynberg <[email protected]> wrote on 16/05/2011 09:02:25:
> Igor Faynberg <[email protected]> > 16/05/2011 09:02 > > Please respond to > [email protected] > > To > > Mark Mcgloin/Ireland/IBM@IBMIE > > cc > > [email protected] > > Subject > > Re: [OAUTH-WG] Formal security protocol analysis of OAuth 2.0 > > The approach looks right to me; the key is that the 1.0 state machine is > rather simple. A priori, I don't see the 2.0 as more complex (even > though it involves an additional machine), and I think it should be > straight-forward to build the machine and run the reachability analysis > on the system graph. > I think the part of the 2.0 spec most people would like to scrutinise is the implicit grant flow with no secret although I suspect the conclusion may be that the user has to 100% trust the consumer povider > The conclusions of this paper puzzle me though. There are things that I > simply do not understand. For instance, what does this mean: "The > current OAuth specification uses nonce, timestamps and signatures to > guard against possible attacks. If the API interfaces are secure, they > are not needed. On the other hand, if the API interfaces are insecure, > they are not sufficient to guarantee the desired security properties." > So they claim that signing is ineffective over http! > Igor > > Mark Mcgloin wrote: > > Does anyone know of a formal security protocol analysis that has been > > carried out for OAuth 2.0? > > > > I could only find analysis done against 1.0a, like this one: > > > > http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5762765 > > > > > > thanks > > Mark > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
