On 12/1/11 1:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 12/01/2011 08:10 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: >> On 12/1/11 1:09 PM, Rob Richards wrote: >>> On 11/28/11 10:39 PM, Barry Leiba wrote: >>>>> The OAuth base doc refers in two places to TLS versions (with the same >>>>> text in both places: >>>>> >>>>> OLD >>>>> The authorization server MUST support TLS 1.0 ([RFC2246]), SHOULD >>>>> support TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246]) and its future replacements, and MAY >>>>> support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security >>>>> requirements. >>>>> >>>>> In both the shepherd review and the AD review, this was called into >>>>> question: >>>>> 1. MUST for an old version and SHOULD for the current version seems >>>>> wrong. >>>>> 2. Having specific versions required locks us into those versions (for >>>>> example, all implementations will have to support TLS 1.0, even long >>>>> after it becomes obsolete, unless we rev the spec. >>>> The comments I've gotten on this show a clear consensus against the >>>> change I suggest, and against any attempt to require a version of TLS >>>> other than 1.0. I still, though, am concerned that locking this spec >>>> into TLS 1.0 is limiting. So let me propose an alternative wording, >>>> which again tries to make the version(s) non-normative, while making >>>> it clear which version(s) need to be implemented to get >>>> interoperability: >>>> >>>> NEW >>>> -------------------------------------------- >>>> The authorization server MUST implement TLS. Which version(s) >>>> ought to be implemented will vary over time, and depend on >>>> the widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at >>>> the time of implementation. At the time of this writing, TLS version >>>> 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but has very limited >>>> actual deployment, and might not be readily available in >>>> implementation toolkits. TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the >>>> most widely deployed version, and will give the broadest >>>> interoperability. >>>> >>>> Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer >>>> mechanisms that meet their security requirements. >>>> -------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Comments on this version? >>>> >>>> Barry >>>> >>> >>> Text is neutral enough for me as it's not mandating anything that isn't >>> readily available. Only comment is whether or not there is a need to >>> even talk about the specific versions or if just the following is >>> enough: >>> >>> The authorization server MUST implement TLS. Which version(s) ought to >>> be implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread >>> deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of >>> implementation. >>> >>> Servers MAY also implement additional transport-layer mechanisms that >>> meet their security requirements. >> >> That seems fine to me. > > FWIW, I think I'd prefer Barry's as Rob's would be more likely > to generate discusses and we do know that there are some security > advantages to TLS 1.2 vs. 1.0. (BTW, has anyone considered how > or if the BEAST attack might affect oauth? Be good to know if > someone's done that analysis.) > > However, as AD, I could live with either, since lots of other > specs just say TLS. (But you need to point to the latest RFC as > normative or that will I bet generate discusses.)
Agreed. Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/ _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
