Ok. That's much better than my guess that you wanted to drop all the registration text from the specificationā¦
What I'm looking for is a simple text that answers the question: "What to do if my client isn't simply public or confidential?" If we just drop the current text, the answer is implicitly "you can't have such a client" because there is no way to register a client of any other type. So let's try this again, and focus exclusively on answering this question. My text takes a position which is, "you can't - unless". Your suggestion is more of a vague discussion of the topic. I'd like to see clear, normative answer to this question. EH On 3/15/12 12:30 PM, "Breno de Medeiros" <br...@google.com> wrote: >I am proposing the entire removal of: > >"A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its >own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential >server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST >register each component separately as a different client to ensure >proper handling by the authorization server." > >In particular the example of a server-side component versus >browser-based components is particularly unhelpful since it violates >the entire principle of why two response_type 'code' and 'token' were >defined, and how OAuth2 is typically implemented. That's when I claim >this normative language is redefining the protocol. > > >On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 12:13, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com> wrote: >> Which text in -25 are you proposing we remove exactly? I can't judge the >> text below without the full context of where and how it is proposed in >>the >> current document. >> >> Also, you are ignoring my detailed analysis of the current facts. We >>have >> two client types and the issue here is what to do with other, undefined >> types. >> >> EH >> >> >> On 3/15/12 11:54 AM, "Breno de Medeiros" <br...@google.com> wrote: >> >>>My proposal is to remove any reference to registration (which is a red >>>herring and has raised all the problems we refer here) and refer to >>>client authentication instead. >>> >>>Proposal: >>> >>>"Clients may be implemented as a distributed set of components that >>>run in different security contexts. For instance, a single client may >>>include a webserver component and a script component in a browser. It >>>is not appropriate for the different components to utilize the same >>>client authentication mechanisms, since client authentication >>>credentials that are held securely in one context cannot be deployed >>>securely in another. >>> >>>Servers MUST mitigate security threats from client components that >>>cannot hold client credentials as securely by distinguishing them from >>>client components that can. Example of suitable measures are: >>> >>>- Requiring separate registration of components such as web server and >>>a mobile application. >>>- Restricting the time validity of tokens issued to clients that hold >>>no authentication credentials, such as browser script-based >>>components." >>> >>>Please don't truncate explanations in the interest of space if the >>>resulting text is confusing and possibly misleading. Better to say >>>nothing instead. >>> >>>On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 11:32, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com> wrote: >>>> Here are the facts: >>>> >>>> The authorization server must know the client type in order to enforce >>>>many >>>> of the requirements in the specification. >>>> The requirement to provide a client type is not decorated with a MUST >>>>or >>>> SHALL but that is implied. >>>> The specification only defines two client types: public and >>>>confidential. >>>> There is no client type defined for a hybrid client. >>>> The specification needs to address the very common use case of clients >>>>with >>>> both public and private components. >>>> >>>> I don't want to discuss in the specification how client identifiers >>>>are >>>> provisioned, nor do I want to discuss the potential binding of >>>>response >>>> types to client types. But we do need to provide some guidance to >>>>clients >>>> and authorization servers what to do with clients that do not fit the >>>> current type definitions. >>>> >>>> It is far too late for us to define a new client type, along with all >>>>the >>>> security considerations that such type imply. Our entire security >>>> consideration section and protocol design are based on have a well >>>>defined >>>> client type. >>>> >>>> Requiring separate registration for each component is the most >>>> straight-forward solution. Allowing the authorization server to offer >>>> alternatives is the backdoor to enable extensibility. >>>> >>>> Within these constraints, I am open to other prose or creative >>>>solutions. >>>> But the add-ons proposed are all ugly hacks. They clarify specific >>>>questions >>>> raised which I do not believe represent the core confusion here which >>>>is >>>> what is the right way to handle hybrid clients. >>>> >>>> The best way to move forward is to take a minute and ask the group to >>>>share >>>> how they handle such cases or how they think they should be handled. >>>>Based >>>> on that we can come up with a clear solution. >>>> >>>> EH >>>> >>>> From: Breno de Medeiros <br...@google.com> >>>> Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2012 09:56:13 -0700 >>>> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com> >>>> Cc: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org> >>>> >>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 07:45, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com> >>>>wrote: >>>>> >>>>> This add-on is unnecessary. It already says the authorization server >>>>>can >>>>> handle it any way it wants. The fact that other registration options >>>>>are >>>>> possible clearly covers the client identifier reuse case. As for the >>>>> response type, thatĀ¹s not an issue but more of an optimization for an >>>>>edge >>>>> case raised. >>>> >>>> >>>> It still feels like a horse by committee to me. "unless the >>>> authorization server provides other registration options to specify >>>>such >>>> complex clients." seems a very round about way to say that the core >>>>spec >>>> already provides for such arrangements in the most common scenario. It >>>>is a >>>> bit of a stretch to say that the server provides "other registration >>>> options" by simply following strategy already laid out in the spec. >>>> >>>> In particular, I feel that this wording will be harmful to register >>>>extended >>>> behavior, e.g., alternative response_types by leading to fruitless >>>> conversations about spec compliance in the absence of real security >>>>risks. >>>> >>>> I do not believe the current text is the best representation of the >>>>spirit >>>> in which the spec was written (in particular the effort to specify two >>>>flows >>>> in detail to deal with precisely this issue) and possibly lead to >>>>harmful >>>> future interpretation. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> EH >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On >>>>>Behalf >>>>>Of >>>>> Nat Sakimura >>>>> Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 2:04 AM >>>>> To: Breno de Medeiros; OAuth WG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So, Eran's first proposal: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A client application consisting of multiple components, each with >>>>>its >>>>> own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential >>>>> server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST >>>>> register each component separately as a different client to ensure >>>>> >>>>> proper handling by the authorization server, unless the >>>>>authorization >>>>> server provides other registration options to specify such complex >>>>> clients. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> kind of meets my concern. There seems to be another issue around the >>>>> usefulness of return_type in such case raised by Breno, and if I >>>>>understand >>>>> it correctly, Eran's answer was that these separate components may >>>>>have the >>>>> same client_id so that return_type is a valid parameter to be sent at >>>>>the >>>>> request. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So, to clarify these, perhaps changing the above text slightly to the >>>>> following solves the problem? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A client application consisting of multiple components, each with >>>>>its >>>>> own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential >>>>> server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST >>>>> register each component separately as a different client to ensure >>>>> >>>>> proper handling by the authorization server, unless the >>>>>authorization >>>>> server provides other registration options to specify such complex >>>>> clients. >>>>> >>>>> Each component MAY have the same client_id, in which case the >>>>>server >>>>> >>>>> judges the client type and the associated security context based >>>>>on >>>>> the response_type parameter in the request. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Would it solve your problem, Breno? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> =nat >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> --Breno >>> >>> >>> >>>-- >>>--Breno >> > > > >-- >--Breno _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth