The use case for a client revoking a token is one of a well-behaved and well-intentioned client being "logged out", uninstalled, or otherwise decommissioned. In these cases, you want to have a mechanism for a client saying to the AS, "Hey, I don't need this token anymore, get rid of it. Incidentally, if anyone else tries using it, then it's not me."

As you point out, it doesn't help the case of a client being compromised -- since why would a compromised client revoke its own tokens?

 -- Justin

On 09/11/2012 11:21 AM, William Mills wrote:
I think a resource server might validly revoke a token, but that a client will 
not.

-bill


----- Original Message -----
From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]>
To: William Mills <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]>; Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]>; 
Justin Richer <[email protected]>; "[email protected] WG" <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 1:49 AM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-00

Hi Bill,

if I read your post correctly then you are saying that you do not like what is in 
<draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-00>

Did I understood you correctly?

Ciao
Hannes

On Sep 11, 2012, at 7:45 AM, William Mills wrote:

Well, the only way the client would request revocation is if the client thinks 
the token is compromised, e.g. that the client has done dumb stuff.  In that 
sense I think the client requesting revocation makes no sense.

I am also not in favor of token introspection endpoints at all, the client 
should already have all of the information it needs about the token.

From: Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]>
To: Justin Richer <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected] WG" <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, September 10, 2012 12:55 PM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-00

+1

Am 10.09.2012 15:49, schrieb Justin Richer:
That requires the client and/or resource server to run an endpoint of their own 
at all times, and it requires the AS to keep track of all instances of a client 
and RS. This isn't likely to be particularly desirable, scalable, or usable. I 
don't see too much harm in trying to define it, but I don't think it will see 
much adoption.

Besides, the client can find out the token is revoked by just presenting it to 
the RS and getting back a 40x code. Clients don't really need anything faster 
than that for security reasons, and any shortcuts would be for performance. The 
connection between the RS and AS isn't defined -- but I think this is another 
instance where the generic token introspection endpoint makes more sense. If 
the RS wants to check, the AS can just tell it (via introspection) that the 
token was revoked so don't honor it.

   -- Justin

On 09/10/2012 08:25 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
The current draft defines an additional endpoint, the token revocation 
endpoint, so that clients can request the revocation of a particular token.

Wouldn't it make sense to also allow Authorization Servers to tell Clients or 
Resource Servers to revoke tokens?

Ciao
Hannes

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