Derek Atkins <[email protected]> 写于 2012-09-17 21:33:14: > [email protected] writes: > > >> Sure, this works for a single request. However it also means you need > >> to have the AS involved in *every* request because you cannot reuse R. > >> Another option would be: > >> > >> AS sends an Access token, encrypted to the RS, and includes a MAC > >> Session Key (Kms). The Client can send the token, a Nonce (N), and N > >> encrypted with Kms ({N}Kms) to prove posession of Kms. Of course to > >> protect replay attacks the RS has to keep a cache of all Nonces used > >> under Kms. > > > Prove knowledge of key by encryption is not a good idea,as you > > mentioned, for having to keep a cache. > You only have to keep a cache for the validity of the token. In your > case you have to keep a cache forever, because the token could > theoretically be reused over and over with the same commitment and R
In my case, token can also have validity time, and the token could not be used over and over again even using the same commitment and R, because the commitment is boud to the token, use of R is limited to the validity time of the token. > values. At best the caches are the same, but in both cases you have to > contain a cache. Therefore your statement above is invalid. I am not saying my case is superior to the example you mentioned. What I am tyring to say is we could think about more options. > > -derek > -- > Derek Atkins 617-623-3745 > [email protected] www.ihtfp.com > Computer and Internet Security Consultant >
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