On 27/11/12 15:29, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
The client can indeed save a round trip by proactively refreshing the access
token. This does not necessarily revoke the existing access token. Many
implementations do that, so your mileage may vary.
I don't understand.
So the client will still have the existing access token which may have
not been revoked, and then also another access token which was just
returned in response to the refresh grant request ?
And if you mean that no actual revocation is actually done, why then
have the client worry about doing the proactive refresh ?
I can imagine that may be that it will only be the actual refresh token
refreshed itself, but why keep the access token if the client has
requested a refresh ?
Sergey
-- Justin
On Nov 27, 2012, at 5:18 AM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
On 27/11/12 08:52, Guangqing Deng wrote:
It seems that the client cannot know whether the refresh token should be
used until a HTTP 401 error is returned from the resource server due to
the expiration of current access token or some other reasons. However, a
period of time cannot be ignored will be spent on obtain a new access
token using the refresh token after the resource server returns a HTTP
401 error to the client, which may degrade the user experience since the
real-time nature of the service cannot be guaranteed. Is a mechanism by
which the client can check the validity of the access token (or the
refresh token) in advance needed by Oauth?
I believe an access token response may offer an expires_in parameter which can
provide some hint. Actually this raises an interesting question.
Suppose the client actually checks this parameter and decides to use
a refresh token it also has to pro-actively refresh its current token.
IMHO this should work even if the access token has not expired yet and effectively
represents another form of a client-initiated revocation of the access token ? It will
mean a client which works with the "expires_in" parameter can save a one round
trip (the one which returns a failure in case of the access token being expired) ?
Does it make sense ? If it does, can some relevant wording make it into the
revocation token draft ?
Cheers, Sergey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangqing Deng
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Justin Richer<[email protected]>
*To:* Sergey Beryozkin<[email protected]>
*Cc:* [email protected]
*Sent:* Wednesday, November 21, 2012 6:11 AM
*Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] How the client can decide it is time to use
the refresh token
There's no signaling regarding the validity of the refresh token from
the protected resource. In more distributed setups, the protected
resources know nothing about the refresh tokens because the PR never
sees them. In any case. the code path is fairly straightforward, even if
both tokens are expired:
- client presents AT to resource
- resource returns data, AT worked
- [or] resource returns 400 error to client, AT didn't work
- client presents RT to auth server
- auth server returns new AT, RT worked
- [or] auth server returns 400 error to client, RT didn't work
- client has to go get a new auth grant from the resource owner,
start over
-- Justin
On 11/21/2012 06:50 AM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
Hi
I'm looking for some guidance on how the client which already owns an
access token can decide, after getting HTTP 400 back from the resource
server it tries to access on behalf of the end user/resource owner, can
decide that the refresh token it has can now be used to get a new access
token.
[1] refers to various error conditions but it is not obvious to me
that the same conditions (some of them) should or can be reported during
the actual client accessing the protected resource.
My question is, what error condition, if any, from [1] should be
reported back to the client failing to access a protected resource due
to the access token being invalid or expired, so that it can help the
client who also owns the refresh token to decide it can use it now...
Thanks, Sergey
[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
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