Hi Tony,
thanks for your review comments.
*** @Justin: thanks for jumping in. ***
I would like to recap the results of the discussion so far and propose
some changes.
Am 24.01.2013 00:54, schrieb Anthony Nadalin:
Review:
1.Since not stated I assume that the Revocation Endpoint can exist on
a different server from the Authorization server (or is it assumed
that they are 1), if so how is the Revocation Endpoint found?
Having read your arguments I realize the current text is a bit specific
about the means to obtain the endpoint location (as it does not mention
other means).
current text:
The location of
the token revocation endpoint can be found in the authorization
server's documentation. The token endpoint URI MAY include a query
component.
proposal:
The means to obtain the location of the revocation endpoint is out of scope of
this specification.
There is a range of options. The client could, for example,
automatically discover this information (along with other server
andpoints and properties). Alternatively, the client developer could
also get to know the endpoint location from the server's documentation.
Note: As this endpoint is handling security sensible credentials, such
information must be obtained from a trustworthy resource.
2.Any token type that is supported can be revoked, including refresh
token ?
The draft currently explicitly states support for access and refresh
tokens. Do you want the draft to be weaker at this point and to allow
for the revocation of any token?
3.Why does one have to send the token, can't this just be an auth_code ?
The draft is intended to support token revocation. I agree with Justin.
Authz codes are short duration and one time use. I don't see a need to
revoke them. I also don't see the need to use them to revoke the
respective access token indirectly.
4.Says CORS SHOULD be supported, I think a MAY be better here since a
site may have issues supporting CORS
I'm fine with MAY since I tend to see CORS as an optional feature. What
do others think?
5.Does not say but is the revocation to be immediate upon the return
of the request ?
The client must assume the revocation is immediate upon the return of
the request. I could explicitly express this in the text
current text
In the next step, the authorization server invalidates the token.
The client MUST NOT use this token again after revocation.
Proposal
In the next step, the authorization server invalidates the token. The
client must assume the revocation is immediate upon the return of the
request. The client MUST NOT use the token again after the revocation.
6.Does the revocation of the access token also revoke the refresh
token (if it was provided) ? Or is this a revocation policy decision ?
As described by Justin, there are two use cases:
- if the token passed to the request is a refresh token and the server
supports access token revocation, the server SHOULD also revoke them.
- if the token passed to the request is an access token, the server may
decide to revoke the respective refresh token as well.
I think every client must be prepared to cope with "sudden" invalidation
of any token type. So having different server policies with respect to
related tokens shouldn't create interop problems.
What changes would you expect?
7.Section 2 says "the client MUST NOT use this token again", well that
seems odd, not sure this should be here as the client could try to use
it gain, there is no need to put support in client to prevent this.
The client should discard the token immediately after revocation.
regards.
Torsten.
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