Hi Hannes
On 25/02/13 12:46, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi all,
I just submitted an updated version of the draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03.txt.
It definitely has more interesting content (about architecture, session
keys, etc) - this is really useful IMHO.
What I'm not really understanding is why a 2-way TLS transport for the
session key is not even considered.
Instead this uber-complex (in the context of this spec, IMHO) JWT thing
is there once again. I appreciate why it may be the case, primarily to
do with reusing the work done around JWT and having some
common/recommended access token representation, but disallowing a basic
bearer token be 'enhanced' with MAC over two-way TLS seems like not
ideal at all IMHO.
To be honest, I'm not sure why would anyone use JWT+MAC instead of just
JWE, in cases when people are really comfortable with doing JWT. I guess
we may be talking now about better security characteristics, but this
will help a very limited audience as compared to a wider one which can
use Bearer+MAC over 2-way TLS, straightforward, very cheap effort to get
started.
just my 2c
Thanks, Sergey
I would like to point out that this is **discussion input** -- not agreed
content. Anything in the document is subject to change!
You also may notice that there are a few questions in the writeup.
I was trying to more specific about some of the design aspects that folks had
proposed during the last few months.
I have also re-submitted the draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk, which includes a TLS
and a JSON-based solution approach.
In general, the open questions still seem to be related to
* Key distribution: What should be described in a document? What is mandatory
to implement?
* Selective header field protection: This is something that was brought forward
in discussions and I have included a proposal of how this could look like.
* Channel Binding: Functionality is also included to deal with
man-in-the-middle attacks against TLS. There are, however, two types of channel
bindings defined in RFC 5929. Are both needed? If not, which one should be
selected?
* Integrity protection and data origin authentication in both directions: The
current writeup allows the protection to be extended to messages beyond the
initial request. This also offers key confirmation by the server and protection
of any responses.
Writing the text I also noticed that I do not quite understand how nested JWT
documents are supposed to look like. For example, how do I encrypt the mac_key
carried inside the JWT plus add a signature of all other fields? Currently, I
have just encrypted the entire payload.
I hope to have some discussions prior to the IETF meeting so that we have a
more fruitful discussion at the face-to-face meeting.
Ciao
Hannes
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