Hi John,
Thank you for your reply. Would appreciate if you consider my inline comments below and respond again! R, Madjid From: John Bradley [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2014 5:56 PM To: Madjid Nakhjiri Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] refresh tokens and client instances In 3.3 It is saying that the refresh token is a secret that the Authorization server has bound to the client_id, that the Authorization server effectively uses to differentiate between instances of that client_id. Madjid>>If I have 10,000s of devices, each with an instance of the OAUTH client, but they are all using the same client ID, how would the server know which token to use for what client? unless when I am creating a token, I also include something that uniquely identifies each instance? Don't I have to use SOMETHING that is unique to that instance (user grant/ID?)? When the refresh token is generated, it can be stored in a table with the client_id and the information about the grant. You could also do it statelesly by creating a signed object as the refresh token. Madjid>>agreed, but for the signed object to be self-sustained, again would I not need something beyond a "population" client_ID? Are we prescriptive what "information about the grant" is? The spec is silent on the exact programming method that the Authorization server uses. Madjid>>Are there any other specs in IETF or elsewhere (OASIS, etc?) that prescribe token calculation (e.g. hash function, parameters, etc)? In 3.7 Deployment independent describes using the same client_id across multiple instances of a native client, or multiple instances of a Java Script client running in a browsers with the same callback uri. Since the publishing of this RFC we have also developed a spec for dynamic client registration so it is possible to give every native client it's own client_id and secret making them confidential clients. Madjid>>I would need to look at those specs, however, I thought that the "confidential client" designation has to do with the client ability to hold secrets and perform a-by-server-acceptable authentication. Does dynamic client registration affect client's ability in that aspect? There is also a middle ground some people take by doing a proof of possession for code in native applications to prevent the interception of responses to the client by malicious applications on the device. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse/ John B. On Jun 25, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Madjid Nakhjiri <[email protected]> wrote: Hi all, I am new to OAUTH list and OAUTH, so apologies if this is very off-topic. I am evaluating an OAUTH 2.0 implementation that is done based on bare bone base OAUTH2.0 RFC. From what I understand, many (or some) client implementations use a "global ID/secret" pair for all instances of the client. Looking at RFC 6819 and there seem to be a whole page on this topic, if I understand it correctly. So questions: 1) Section 3.7 talks about deployment-independent versus deployment specific client IDs. I am guessing "deployment-independent" refers to what I called "global", meaning if I have the same client with the same client ID installed in many end devices, that is a deployment independent case, correct? 2) Section 3.3 on refresh token mentions that the token is secret bound to the client ID and client instance. Could somebody please point me to where the token generation and binding is described? Also how is the client instance is identified? Thanks a lot in advance, Madjid Nakhjiri _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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