hi Phil. On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:21 PM, Phil Hunt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
So, let’s say you have a client that has “obtained” a client Id from a legit registered client. How does the malicious client exploit the previously registered URL if the server only redirects to that URL? These are the steps: - the malicious client can registers a malicious url (attacker.com<http://attacker.com>) - the malicious client builds a malicious request to the AS (victim.com<http://victim.com>) that looks like http://victim.com/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=bc88FitX1298KPj2WS259BBMa9_KCfL3&scope=WRONG_SCOPE&redirect_uri=http://attacker.com as per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 the user is redirected to http://attacker.com (since the wrong parameter is the scope ) regards antonio Are you referring to the case Nat Sakimura previously raised where mobile app stores do not enforce custom URL registrations? Phil @independentid www.independentid.com<http://www.independentid.com> [email protected] On Sep 15, 2014, at 2:11 PM, Antonio Sanso <[email protected]> wrote: On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:08 PM, Phil Hunt <[email protected]> wrote: I’m not sure I understand why this is an OAuth protocol problem? If you are starting with a false client with a false registration, everything down stream is likely invalid. registration is not false. But the client can be a malicious one…. This seems like a registration curation (whitelisting) problem. there is not way a whitelist can cover all the malicious uris.. regards antonio This is a bit like saying, how can I prove that the application on this jail-broken phone is legitimate? Phil @independentid www.independentid.com [email protected] On Sep 15, 2014, at 1:52 PM, Antonio Sanso <[email protected]> wrote: The problem is that a malicious client can register a malicious redirect uri and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 does the rest (as previously discussed) regards antonio On Sep 15, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Phil Hunt <[email protected]> wrote: If a server accepts a URL from a client to be used as a redirect that the server doesn’t recognize or is not registered, that is an open redirect. The specification does no allow open-redirects, it considers this a mis-configuration. Take a look at sections 3.1.2.2 and 10.15 of RFC6749. Phil @independentid www.independentid.com [email protected] On Sep 15, 2014, at 1:00 PM, John Bradley <[email protected]> wrote: There may be a problem with semantics in this discussion. There is a redirect performed by athe authorization endpoint to a fixed uri that is pre registered with the authorization server without user prompting. That probably doesn't fit the strict definition of a open redirector. It may however create similar security issues in situations with relatively open registration of clients. The largest issues are that the browser might leak information across the redirect in the fragment or referrer. That has been used in attacks against Facebook in the past. This is no where near the end of the world, however we need to look at the security considerations and see if we can provide better advice to implementors. In some cases returning a error to the browser may be best. I don't think we need to go so far as not returning any error to the client under any circumstance. John B. Sent from my iPhone On Sep 15, 2014, at 4:41 PM, Phil Hunt <[email protected]> wrote: Simply not true. Phil @independentid www.independentid.com [email protected] On Sep 15, 2014, at 12:10 PM, Antonio Sanso <[email protected]> wrote: hi *, my understanding is that there is a rough consensus that if an OAuth Provider follows rfc6749 verbatim will end up having an open redirector. My next question would be now, is there anything we can do to raise some awareness about this issue? regards antonio On Sep 4, 2014, at 3:15 PM, Hans Zandbelt <[email protected]> wrote: I am convinced about the issue in the use case Antonio provided but I hope not to close the door on returning errors to known and trusted clients. Not sure anymore if that's possible though because the distinction can't be "registered"... Hans. On 9/4/14, 3:01 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote: hi Bill On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Bill Burke <[email protected]> wrote: FWIW, Antonio convinced me and I'm going to change this in our IDM project. Thanks Antonio. What convinced me was that the user is probably expecting a login screen. Since there is this expectation, it might make it a little easier for the attacker to convince the user that a spoofed login screen is real. I know this issue can only happen with unrestricted registration, but, IMO, this proposed change doesn't really have much of an effect on usability and is even backward compatible with the current RFC. Wouldn't it better though to never do a redirect on an invalid request and just display an error page? thanks for sharing your thoughts :). Display an error 400 is what Google does :) regards antonio On 9/4/2014 3:50 AM, Antonio Sanso wrote: Hi Hans, I really fail to see how this can be addressed at registration time for cases where registration is unrestricted (namely all the big Providers) regards antonio On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Hans Zandbelt <[email protected]> wrote: Classifying like this must also mean that consent should not be stored until the client is considered (admin) trusted, and admin policy would interfere with user policy. IMHO the security consideration would apply only to dynamically registered clients where registration is unrestricted; any other form would involve some form of admin/user approval at registration time, overcoming the concern at authorization time: there's no auto-redirect flow possible for unknown clients. Hans. On 9/4/14, 9:04 AM, Richer, Justin P. wrote: I think this advice isn't a bad idea, though it's of course up to the AS what an "untrusted" client really is. In practice, this is something that was registered by a non-sysadmin type person, either a dynamically registered client or something available through self-service registration of some type. It's also reasonable that a client, even dynamically registered, would be considered "trusted" if enough time has passed and enough users have used it without things blowing up. -- Justin On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:26 AM, Antonio Sanso <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: hi again *, after thinking a bit further IMHO an alternative for the untrusted clients can also be to always present the consent screen (at least once) before any redirect. Namely all providers I have seen show the consent screen if all the request parameters are correct and if the user accepts the redirect happens. If one of the parameter (with the exclusion of the client id and redirect uri that are handled differently as for spec) is wrong though the redirect happens without the consent screen being shown.. WDYT? regards antonio On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:54 PM, Antonio Sanso <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Well, I do not know if this is only dynamic registration... let’s talk about real use cases, namely e.g. Google , Facebook , etc.. is that dynamic client registration? I do not know… :) Said that what the other guys think? :) Would this deserve some “spec adjustment” ? I mean there is a reason if Google is by choice “violating” the spec right? (I assume to avoid open redirect…) But other implementers do follow the spec hence they have this open redirector… and this is not nice IMHO... On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:40 PM, Hans Zandbelt <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: On 9/3/14, 7:14 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote: On Sep 3, 2014, at 7:10 PM, Hans Zandbelt <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Is your concern clients that were registered using dynamic client registration? yes I think your issue is then with the trust model of dynamic client registration; that is left out of scope of the dynreg spec (and the concept is not even part of the core spec), but unless you want everything to be open (which typically would not be the case), then it would involve approval somewhere in the process before the client is registered. Without dynamic client registration that approval is admin based or resource owner based, depending on use case. Otherwise the positive case is returning a response to a valid URL that belongs to a client that was registered explicitly by the resource owner well AFAIK the resource owner doesn’t register clients… roles can collapse in use cases especially when using dynamic client registration and the negative case is returning an error to that same URL. the difference is the consent screen… in the positive case you need to approve an app.. for the error case no approval is needed,,, I fail to see the open redirect. why? because the client and thus the fixed URL are explicitly approved at some point Hans. Hans. On 9/3/14, 6:56 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote: On Sep 3, 2014, at 6:51 PM, Hans Zandbelt <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Let me try and approach this from a different angle: why would you call it an open redirect when an invalid scope is provided and call it correct protocol behavior (hopefully) when a valid scope is provided? as specified below in the positive case (namely when the correct scope is provided) the resource owner MUST approve the app via the consent screen (at least once). Hans. On 9/3/14, 6:46 PM, Antonio Sanso wrote: hi John, On Sep 3, 2014, at 6:14 PM, John Bradley <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: In the example the redirect_uri is vlid for the attacker. The issue is that the AS may be allowing client registrations with arbitrary redirect_uri. In the spec it is unspecified how a AS validates that a client controls the redirect_uri it is registering. I think that if anything it may be the registration step that needs the security consideration. (this is the first time :p) but I do disagree with you. It would be pretty unpractical to block this at registration time…. IMHO the best approach is the one taken from Google, namely returning 400 with the cause of the error.. *400.* That’s an error. *Error: invalid_scope* Some requested scopes were invalid. {invalid=[l]} said that I hope you all agree this is an issue in the spec so far…. regards antonio John B. On Sep 3, 2014, at 12:10 PM, Bill Burke <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: I don't understand. The redirect uri has to be valid in order for a redirect to happen. The spec explicitly states this. On 9/3/2014 11:43 AM, Antonio Sanso wrote: hi *, IMHO providers that strictly follow rfc6749 are vulnerable to open redirect. Let me explain, reading [0] If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid, the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI. If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI, the authorization server informs the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirection URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, perAppendix B <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B>: Now let’s assume this. I am registering a new client to thevictim.com <http://thevictim.com/> <http://victim.com/><http://victim.com <http://victim.com/> <http://victim.com/>> <http://victim.com <http://victim.com/> <http://victim.com/>> provider. I register redirect uriattacker.com <http://uriattacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/><http://attacker.com <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>> <http://attacker.com <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>>. According to [0] if I pass e.g. the wrong scope I am redirected back to attacker.com <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/><http://attacker.com <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>> <http://attacker.com <http://attacker.com/> <http://attacker.com/>>. Namely I prepare a url that is in this form: http://victim.com/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=bc88FitX1298KPj2WS259BBMa9_KCfL3&scope=WRONG_SCOPE&redirect_uri=http://attacker.com and this is works as an open redirector. Of course in the positive case if all the parameters are fine this doesn’t apply since the resource owner MUST approve the app via the consent screen (at least once). A solution would be to return error 400 rather than redirect to the redirect URI (as some provider e.g. Google do) WDYT? regards antonio [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Bill Burke JBoss, a division of Red Hat http://bill.burkecentral.com <http://bill.burkecentral.com/> _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Hans Zandbelt | Sr. Technical Architect [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>| Ping Identity -- Hans Zandbelt | Sr. Technical Architect [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> | Ping Identity -- Hans Zandbelt | Sr. Technical Architect [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>| Ping Identity _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Hans Zandbelt | Sr. Technical Architect [email protected] | Ping Identity _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Bill Burke JBoss, a division of Red Hat http://bill.burkecentral.com _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Hans Zandbelt | Sr. Technical Architect [email protected] | Ping Identity _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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