Hannes, thank you for the review. Answers inline. On Nov 24, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Justin, Mike, John, Maciej, > > as part of my shepherd write-up I carefully read through > draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05. Overall the document is in good > shape but I have a few minor clarification questions that should be > resolved before the document goes to the IESG. > > In Section 1.4. "Registration Tokens and Client Credentials" you explain > the different credential types and I was wondering why you aren't > issuing client_secrets to all clients instead of introducing another > credential, the registration access token. While you try to explain the > reasons those appear somewhat constructed. For example, you say that > "not all types of clients have client credentials" but you are the > author of the specification and you can essentially decide what to do. > The registration access token is essentially the same as the client > credential since it is "is uniquely bound to the client identifier". > > I believe we have discussed this issue in the past but I don't remember > what the reasoning was. Can you describe what your design rational was > (and add it to the document)? That's exactly the question this section is trying to answer, and if it can be made clearer then please suggest some text that will help that purpose. The rationale for the registration access token is very simple: we want to have a means to call the management endpoint in a protected manner, and treating the management endpoint as an OAuth Protected Resource makes a lot of sense. RFC6750 gives us the means to make an authorized call to an API endpoint, so we're re-using that instead of trying to invent some other mechanism. Shouldn't we be helping the world get away from API passwords? And it's very true that not every client is going to have a client secret to use at the token endpoint -- some will have no use of one (public and implicit clients) and some will be using TLS or asymmetric keys (JWT assertions, for instance) or other mechanisms to authenticate that don't involve the secret. Instead of forcing these clients to use a client secret for one new endpoint, or forcing that endpoint to potentially support the infinite number of client authentication mechanisms, we decided to just use OAuth. These are OAuth clients, remember -- they will *all* have the ability to send OAuth tokens to a protected resource already built in. > > In Section 1.4.1. "Credential Rotation" you write: > > " > The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration access > token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret") > throughout the lifetime of the client. > " > > You might want to add reasons why the authorization server may want to > take this step. OK, but there's nothing normative here in my view. It's basically up to the auth server to say "well let's make a new credential". Can you suggest text that would clarify this? > > There are also a bit too many SHOULDs in the document. Every time you > write SHOULD you have to keep in mind to tell the reader what happens in > the other case. > For example, in Section Section 1.4.1 you write: > > " > The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to > an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which > point the new registration access token is returned to the client and > the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both > parties. > " > > Here the question arises whether you are using the SHOULD to indicate > that the authorization server does not always need to rotate the > registration access token and if he does then is must only happen in > response to an update request or does it indicate that the authorization > server could also rotate it in response to other calls? It's more that the server SHOULD NOT throw out a registration access token that a client still thinks is good without some way to communicate the new token to the client. Think of it this way, you've got the token, the server decides to chuck it on you -- what do you do? You can try calling your READ or UPDATE operations to get the new one but no dice, your token is bad. So what we're saying here is not to throw out the client's only means of finding out if its keys are good anymore. > > Also, in the second line one would wonder why the old registration > access token isn't mandatorily discarded. If there are good reasons, > then tell the reader. We've tried to put requirements on the server discarding tokens in the past, but there was significant pushback from providers who use non-revocable time-limited tokens. Maybe they won't be doing that here, for the reason above. > Furthermore, the text in Section 2.2 seems to contract this statement: > " > If the authorization server includes a new client secret and/or > registration access token in its response, the client MUST > immediately discard its previous client secret and/or registration > access token. > " This is a requirement on the client, not the server, so it's not bound by the token lifetime restrictions above. We're telling the client to stop using a secret or token after it's been given a new one, that's fine. > In Section 2.2 you write: > " > However, since read > operations are intended to be idempotent, the read request itself > SHOULD NOT cause changes to the client's registered metadata values. > " > > I am wondering whether this SHOULD NOT statement adds a lot of value > since you allow the request to change metadata values. I think you're right, since the metadata values might have changed through outside forces since the client last read, and all the clients need to be able to deal with that. We can remove that line. > You also write the security consideration section: > " > the registration access token MAY be > rotated when the developer or client does a read or update operation > on the client's client configuration endpoint. > " > > This means that the content of the registration access token may also > change with a read operation. That's correct. > Terminology: > > Sometimes you write "Client Information Response" and sometimes "client > information response" > The same with "Authorization Server" and "authorization server" They're all supposed to be lower cased, as is the style in RFC6749. I tried to bump everything down in a previous edit but it looks like I missed some. > Typo: > > " > Some values in the response, > including the "client_secret" and r"egistration_access_token", MAY be > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > different from those in the initial registration response. > " Thanks, noted! > > In Section 2.4 "Client Delete Request" you write: > > " > The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing > authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with this > client. > " > > Under what circumstances wouldn't the authorization invalidate all > grants and active tokens? When it's using a non-revocable stateless token and it can't physically do that. Too bad 2119 doesn't have MUST IF POSSIBLE or equivalent. > You might also want to say what tokens you are talking about since there > are at least the following tokens around: > - access tokens > - refresh tokens > - registration access tokens > - initial access token OK, we can add that. > > " > If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST > respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported. > " > > Why aren't you demanding that the server must support this method? > This would essentially mean that there would be some cases where > deregistration isn't possible. > Of course, there may be the question how important deregistration > actually is if the registration > automatically expires. Because delete is not always an easy operation to implement. The client should be able to call the endpoint with the DELETE verb and at least know if it's allowed to do that or not. > > You write: > " > If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond > with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to > make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked. > " > > If the client does not exist and someone sends a request with a random > registration access token I am not sure what exactly you want to revoke > here. It's not the case of a random token, it's the case of a client having been deleted but using an otherwise valid access token. If the token's no good, you don't get this far -- you return a 401 as defined in RFC6750. > > In Section 3.1. "Client Information Response" you state the new elements > that are returned to the client. While the client_secret has an > expires_at field the registration_access_token doesn't. Does the expiry > value of the client_secret_expires_at automatically indicate the > lifetime of the registration access token? I think so. But what happens > if the client_secret is not issued? To make it more complicated you > write the following text in the security consideration section: > > " > While the client secret can expire, the registration access token > SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered. > " There isn't a separate expiration for the registration access token because it's not supposed to unceremoniously expire on a client. It should be good until it gets rotated out on a future read/update operation or the client's registration is no good anymore. > > The IANA consideration section is empty. Wouldn't it be necessary to > register 'registration_access_token' and 'registration_client_uri' into > the OAuth Dynamic Registration Client Metadata Registry? No, these are not client metadata. The client can not send these in a registration request, so they don't need to be in there. -- Justin _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
