Unless you’re implementing both halves with parallel wrongness, in which case 
you’re completely screwed and have no idea.

 — Justin

> On Jul 17, 2015, at 12:38 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> As for “ECDH-SS rfc6278 (being) easier for implementers to get wrong than 
> ECDH-ES” the good news about crypto is that if you get it even a little bit 
> wrong, it doesn’t work with other’s implementations at all, so this situation 
> tends to be self-correcting.
>  
>                                                             Cheers,
>                                                             -- Mike
>  
> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
> Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 7:02 AM
> To: Brian Campbell
> Cc: oauth
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Nesting Signatures and Encryption JWT Tokens
>  
> They provide integrity protection for the encryption,  that is very important 
> for preventing padding oracle attacks.
>  
> AES GCM 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7518%23section-5.3&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=Km4lrYHuFSmIvYONtiusFoZEtSRoAj4Ri8udIoiA5Nk%3d>
>  and AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7518%23section-5.2&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=IaQ9hYN4Lw5bVTXRcSwNi4RzKnojIKAAIdtf53JDBvE%3d>
>  are both examples of Authenticated Encryption 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fAuthenticated_encryption&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=eRV5xgf17IWyz0j5QwgDmubDw5rqJneMaYtCHu1CLVs%3d>
>  in the sense that the received encryption is true and not that the sender is 
> identified.
>  
> English speakers have a hard time with the subtle difference between 
> identification and authentication , so I wanted to be clear.
>  
> That being said there is a special case where if the JWT ie encrypted with a 
> symmetric key known only to two parties and it is “authenticated” and you 
> didn’t create it, then by a process of elimination it cold have only come 
> from one party.   This is NOT a signature,  however it is a useful trick that 
> some people use to only encrypt and while still knowing with relative 
> certainty who encrypted it.
>  
> I should note that ECDH-SS rfc6278 a key agreement algorithm we didn’t put in 
> the base JWA spec also has the property of providing encryption and 
> authenticity based on the  public keys of both sender and receiver.
> (note this is easier for implementers to get wrong than ECDH-ES but that is 
> another debate:)
>  
> Probably more than you wanted to know, but Nat started it:)
>  
> John B.
>  
>  
> On Jul 17, 2015, at 2:09 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com 
> <mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com>> wrote:
>  
> Though you want to be careful with that as the asymmetric algs in JWE don't 
> provide authentication of the sender.
>  
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:26 PM, Nat Sakimura <n-sakim...@nri.co.jp 
> <mailto:n-sakim...@nri.co.jp>> wrote:
> Hi Malla, <>
>  
> Just to add one more thing:
> If you just want to “sign” for the sake of integrity protection, you really 
> do not need to do it as all the algs in JWE are integrity protected.
>  
> --
> Nat Sakimura <n-sakim...@nri.co.jp <mailto:n-sakim...@nri.co.jp>>
> Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
>  
> PLEASE READ:
> The information contained in this e-mail is confidential and intended for the 
> named recipient(s) only.
> If you are not an intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified 
> that any review, dissemination, distribution or duplication of this message 
> is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please 
> notify the sender immediately and delete your copy from your system.
>  
> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] 
> On Behalf Of John Bradley
> Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 7:45 AM
> To: Malla Simhachalam <mallasimhacha...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:mallasimhacha...@gmail.com>>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Nesting Signatures and Encryption JWT Tokens
>  
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-11.2 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7519%23section-11.2&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=bJjUa9H%2fhsoQGfjmZEBQIyYxwZNc5Hlt%2bDzrEj%2bHG70%3d>
>  
> It is in the JWT spec.   You can do it both ways however you really need a 
> good reason not to sign then encrypt, and then after you have a good reason 
> you should still sign then encrypt because you probably have not considered 
> everything,
>  
> There are probably some edge cases that are exceptions to the rule, but they 
> are rare.
>  
> John B.
>  
>  
> On Jul 16, 2015, at 11:33 PM, Malla Simhachalam <mallasimhacha...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:mallasimhacha...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>  
> Hi,
> 
> I am looking at the 
> spechttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7520/?include_text=1 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fdatatracker.ietf.org%2fdoc%2frfc7520%2f%3finclude_text%3d1&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=9X3auySnL4XlT%2fRW%2bAOaBG5wX8jrNc82AZ0Go%2bZIruM%3d>
>  for combining JWS and JWE use case, I could not find it obvious that a JSON 
> document should be signed first and then encrypt or other way around.Are 
> there any recommendations one over the other?
> 
> Thanks for help.
> Malla
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=ldOnSanQEP6YOoHdd36Ur6bWEnQga%2fINlTLAx4BOEes%3d>
>  
> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth 
> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=ldOnSanQEP6YOoHdd36Ur6bWEnQga%2fINlTLAx4BOEes%3d>
>  
>  
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to