I read it that way as well.
 -- Justin

On 8/19/2015 9:01 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
And while we are at the history, my original draft idea (on my blog) on Aug. 3, 2012 had "nau" -- named authorized user. So, three of us came up with a similar idea independently with more or less the same idea, and it was unified to azp -- authorized presenter.

The name change to authorized party took later to expand the meaning of it.

From what I see, authorized presenter is a subset of authorized party.


2015-08-20 9:52 GMT+09:00 Mike Jones <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>:

    Just to complete the history, I believe the original Google
    deployed claim name for this purpose was “cid” (Client ID) – a
    name that seemed ripe with ambiguity.

    *From:*OAuth [mailto:[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>] *On Behalf Of *John Bradley
    *Sent:* Wednesday, August 19, 2015 5:50 PM
    *To:* Justin Richer


    *Cc:* OAuth WG
    *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] RS as a client guidance

    Ah yes,  Now I recall that we had Google change the claim once to
    azp and then discussed changing it again once we decided that azp
    was not the necessarily the presenter presenter.  That was what we
    decided was too cruel getting them to change the name again for
    something that they then had released in production.   That caused
    us to re-acrom “azp”.

    John B.

        On Aug 19, 2015, at 9:39 PM, Justin Richer <[email protected]
        <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

        Just want to clear up some history: "azp" did not come from
        any existing claims from Google or otherwise. I very clearly
        recall proposing that we name it "prn" for "presenter", and
        Mike told me not to be evil[1] because we had just changed
        "prn" (for "principal") in the ID token to "sub" in order to
        match the more generic JWT. John suggested "a-zed-p" in the
        same discussion. As such, it clearly was "authorized
        presenter" in the first take, then it got widened/shifted a
        little bit in the final definition for reasons I never quite
        followed (nor cared much about at the time).

         -- Justin

        [1] Being told "don't be evil" by a Microsoft employee remains
        one of my proudest achievements.

        On 8/19/2015 8:35 PM, John Bradley wrote:

            It could, but I remain to be convinced that would be a
            good idea.   “azp” came from a existing Google claim, I am
            not attached to the name.

            John B.

                On Aug 19, 2015, at 9:29 PM, Nat Sakimura
                <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

                Well, the abstract meaning is the same, but the
                practical implications and interpretation can vary
                within the boundaries depending on the context.

                A jku is a URI of a cryptographical key, which can be
                a uri of a signing key or encryption key depending on
                the context. Similarly the azp in an ID Token and an
                Access Token can share the same abstract concept while
                the concrete meaning in that particular concept can vary.

                2015年8月20日木曜日、Mike
                Jones<[email protected]
                <mailto:[email protected]>> さんは書きました:

                Let me second John’s point that we shouldn’t have two
                different definitions for “azp”.  As I wrote in my
                friendly review of draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-04 at
                http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg14679.html
                
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ietf.org%2fmail-archive%2fweb%2foauth%2fcurrent%2fmsg14679.html&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=3TbSJzfONy8nvH1hDcjGQPmdeen39IJDHk1R99tD7BE%3d>,
                the claim “azp” has already been registered by OpenID
                Connect Core at
                http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml
                
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.iana.org%2fassignments%2fjwt%2fjwt.xhtml&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=kijVXFcn2du2Ha5xvX%2bTgwohVGOl%2fxmryplQNsWHYzo%3d>
                and so cannot be re-registered.  Given that I believe
                the intended semantics are the same, please cite the
                existing definition in rjwtprof, rather than repeating
                it or revising it.

                Thanks,

                -- Mike

                *From:*John Bradley [mailto:[email protected]
                <mailto:[email protected]>]
                *Sent:* Wednesday, August 19, 2015 11:05 AM
                *To:* Nat Sakimura
                *Cc:* Mike Jones; OAuth WG
                *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] RS as a client guidance

                Having two azp claims with slightly different
                definitions is not a good way to go,  both access
                tokens and id_tokens are JWT.

                For better or worse the claim was defined for bearer
                tokens where it was only the identity of the requester
                that was able to be confirmed by the token endpoint.

                It supported a simple use case where a refresh token
                is used by client A to use as an assertion at AS B.

                In the simplest 3 party sase the requester of the
token and the presenter of the token are the same. However in some situations they are not the same.

                The important thing was to allow the “aud” recipient
                of the token to be able to differentiate a token that
                it requested from a a token that a 3rd party requested
                and presented to it.

                The “azp” should probably be left as it is and not
                tied to proof of possession/ binding the token to the
                presenter.

                There was a lot of debate and back and forth on azp at
                the time, the main reason to include it was to warn
                normal Connect clients that JWT containing that azp
                claim need to have it’s value be them or someone they
                know and trust that can request assertions for them.
                That was because we knew that token containing that
                claim exist in the wild using that claim.

                    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05
                    
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=VTIpHaqCd%2fmxrEfxKD8i5h5AzeWV5rsZC05oVOv73SA%3d>
 should
                    probably be using a different claim to reduce the
                    confusion.

                John B.

                    On Aug 19, 2015, at 3:17 AM, Nat Sakimura
                    <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
                    wrote:

                    So, Mike,

                    Authorized Presenter is a defined term in *_Sender
                    Constrained JWT for OAuth 2.0_*

                    (
                    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05
                    
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=VTIpHaqCd%2fmxrEfxKD8i5h5AzeWV5rsZC05oVOv73SA%3d>
 ).
                    It is used in the context of OAuth 2.0 Access
                    Token, not a claim in ID Token of OpenID Connect.

                    Nat

                    2015-08-19 11:44 GMT+09:00 Mike Jones
                    <[email protected]
                    <mailto:[email protected]>>:

                    Just as a point of clarification, the definition
                    of the “azp” claim is not “authorised presenter”.
                    At least as defined by OpenID Connect, its
                    definition is:

                    azp

                    OPTIONAL. Authorized party - the party to which
                    the ID Token was issued. If present, it MUST
                    contain the OAuth 2.0 Client ID of this party.
                    This Claim is only needed when the ID Token has a
                    single audience value and that audience is
                    different than the authorized party. It MAY be
                    included even when the authorized party is the
                    same as the sole audience. The azpvalue is a case
                    sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value.

                    A reference to this definition is registered by
                    OpenID Connect Core
                    http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
                    
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=3e6US9sxQoQVejthrxO%2fo%2bvdltE%2fBUj1NUSMBk6vOS0%3d>
                    in the IANA “JSON Web Token Claims” registry at
                    http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml
                    
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.iana.org%2fassignments%2fjwt%2fjwt.xhtml&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=kijVXFcn2du2Ha5xvX%2bTgwohVGOl%2fxmryplQNsWHYzo%3d>.

                    -- Mike

                    *From:*OAuth [mailto:[email protected]
                    <mailto:[email protected]>] *On Behalf Of
                    *Nat Sakimura
                    *Sent:* Tuesday, August 18, 2015 7:37 PM
                    *To:* Adam Lewis
                    *Cc:* OAuth WG
                    *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] RS as a client guidance

                    It is not directly, but *_Sender Constrained JWT
                    for OAuth 2.0_*

                    (
                    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05
                    
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=VTIpHaqCd%2fmxrEfxKD8i5h5AzeWV5rsZC05oVOv73SA%3d>
                    )

                    talks about a model that allows it.

                    In essence, it uses a structured access token that
                    is sender constrained.

                    It as a claim "azp" which stands for authorised
                    presenter.

                    To be used, the "client" has to present a proof
                    that it is indeed the party pointed by "azp".

                    In your case, the native mobile app obtains the
                    structured access token

                    with "azp":"the_RS". Since "azp" is not pointing
                    to the mobile app,

                    the mobile app cannot use it.

                    The mobile app then ships it to the RS.

                    The RS can now use it since the "azp" points to it.

                    In general, shipping a bearer token around is a
                    bad idea.

                    If you want to do that, I think you should do so
                    with a sender constrained token.

                    Nat

                    2015-08-13 2:01 GMT+09:00 Adam Lewis
                    <[email protected]
                    <mailto:[email protected]>>:

                    Hi,

                    Are there any drafts that discuss the notion of an
                    RS acting as a client? I'm considering the use
                    case whereby a native mobile app obtains an access
                    token and sends it to the RS, and then the RS uses
                    it to access the UserInfo endpoint on an OP.

                    It's a bearer token so no reason it wouldn't work,
                    but obviously it is meant to be presented by the
                    client and not the RS. Curious to understand the
                    security implications of this, read on any
                    thoughts given to this, or to know if it's an
                    otherwise accepted practice.

                    tx

                    adam


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--
                    Nat Sakimura (=nat)

                    Chairman, OpenID Foundation
                    http://nat.sakimura.org/
                    
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--
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                    Chairman, OpenID Foundation
                    http://nat.sakimura.org/
                    
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-- Nat Sakimura (=nat)

                Chairman, OpenID Foundation
                http://nat.sakimura.org/
                
<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fnat.sakimura.org%2f&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c8fc7f0da91324dd9570908d2a8f94fc1%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=HNVIwuDJAOWxfWyduzov8RK%2fZKG17xQnYZVFWv94oqY%3d>
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http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en

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