To me it seems reasonable that a client may send multiple signed messages in one second.
So I´m +1 for a nonce. A more fine grained timestamp is nice but I think we might end upp at the same place, someone saying that they think it is reasonable to send multiple signed messages the same millisecond. //Samuel On Sun, Feb 28, 2016 at 10:34 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: > I understand how they work, I’ve built exactly that cache before. But I > askWouldn’t a unique timestamp have the same effect? Currently it’s integer > seconds but slicing that down further (floating point seconds?) if people > desired would allow for multiple signed messages in the same second from > the same client using the otherwise same parameters. > > “Other protocols do it” is not a compelling reason on its own, especially > when the example of “other protocols” includes WS-* ;) > > Seriously though, an optional nonce is easy to add to the draft if there’s > enough WG support, I’m just hesitant to add more complexity than needed to > this. > > — Justin > > On Feb 26, 2016, at 11:06 PM, Dominick Baier <dba...@leastprivilege.com> > wrote: > > The nonce would allow to build a replay cache, the timestamp to trim that > cache and reject messages that are too old. > > Similar protocols have a nonce for the above reasons (ws-sec msg security, > hawk)... > > — > cheers > Dominick Baier > > On 27 February 2016 at 03:48:00, Justin Richer (jric...@mit.edu) wrote: > > I’d be glad to add in a nonce if there’s a compelling reason for it, such > as closing a security attack vector. > > What’s the proposed purpose of the nonce? Is it just to add randomness to > the signing base? Or is it to prevent replay at the RS? If the former, the > timestamp should add enough of that and it can be verified to be within a > reasonable window by the RS by comparing it with the time the request was > made. If the latter, the RS is going to have to track previously used > nonces for some amount of time. > > There was a small discussion of just signing an outgoing “Date:” header > instead of the separate timestamp, but the timestamp seemed to be more > robust. I forget the full reasoning though. > > — Justin > > On Feb 26, 2016, at 9:49 AM, Brock Allen <brockal...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Question about the HTTP signing spec – why is there no nonce (and just a > timestamp)? > > TIA > > -Brock > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
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