Next question – doesn’t using the Form Post Response Mode
https://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html mitigate the
threats you’re describing below John? If so, I believe the Security Topics
draft should say this.
I believe we owe it to readers to present the complete picture, which is why I
believe that describing profiles using ID Tokens and the Form Post Response
Mode are in scope.
-- Mike
From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of John Bradley
Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2018 7:47 AM
To: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code
instead of implicit
Yes the at_hash protects the client from accepting an injected AT.
Unfortunately it doesn't do anything to protect against leakage in logs or
redirects.
So without the AT using some sort of POP mechanism it is hard to say sending it
in a redirect is a good security practice.
John B.
On 11/20/2018 4:35 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
Hi Mike,
I agree that OIDC hybrid flows offer additional security over the OAuth
implicit grant and are used in the wild. On my slides and in the initial
version of the new section, we had included the hybrid OIDC flows because of
their known token injection countermeasures.
I nevertheless feel very uncomfortable to recommend those flows and any flow
issuing access tokens in the front channel. In the course of the detailed
review of the new text we realized two issues:
1) Since the access token is exposed in the URL, such flows possess a
significantly higher risk to leak the access token (e.g. through browser
history, open redirection and even referrer headers) than the code grant.
2) There is no viable way to sender constrain access tokens issued in the front
channel. Given the WG decided to recommend use of sender constraint tokens
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09#section-2..2),
it seems contradictory to recommend response types not supporting such an
approach.
kind regards,
Torsten.
Am 19.11.2018 um 23:13 schrieb Mike Jones
<Michael.Jones=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org><mailto:Michael.Jones=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org>:
This description of the situation is an oversimplification. OpenID Connect
secures the implicit flow against token injection attacks by including the
at_hash (access token hash) in the ID Token, enabling the client to validate
that the access token was created by the issuer in the ID Token (which is also
the OAuth Issuer, as described in RFC 8414). (Note that this mitigation was
described in draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation.)
Given the prevalence of this known-good solution for securing the implicit
flow, I would request that the draft be updated to describe this mitigation.
At the same time, I’m fine with the draft recommending the code flow over the
implicit flow when this mitigation is not used.
Thank you,
-- Mike
From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org><mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf
Of Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Monday, November 19, 2018 2:34 AM
To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org><mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code
instead of implicit
Hi all,
The authors of the OAuth Security Topics draft came to the conclusion that it
is not possible to adequately secure the implicit flow against token injection
since potential solutions like token binding or JARM are in an early stage of
adoption. For this reason, and since CORS allows browser-based apps to send
requests to the token endpoint, Torsten suggested to use the authorization code
instead of the implicit grant in call cases in his presentation
(seehttps://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/slides-103-oauth-sessb-draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-01).
A hum in the room at IETF#103 concluded strong support for his recommendations.
We would like to confirm the discussion on the list.
Please provide a response by December 3rd.
Ciao
Hannes & Rifaat
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