Nat,

How is proof of possession established in a modern web browser in the
implicit flow?

My understanding is that token binding was removed from Chrome recently
effectively killing browser-based PoP tokens.

https://identiverse.com/2018/10/31/chrome-puts-token-binding-in-a-bind/

Am I missing something?

Aloha, Jim


On 11/27/18 9:00 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
> I am actually -1. 
>
> +1 for public client and the tokens that are not sender/key constrained. 
>
> Just not being used right now does not mean that it is not useful.. In
> fact, I see it coming. 
> Implicit (well, Hybrid “token id_token” really) is very useful in
> certain cases. 
> Specifically, when the client is confidential (based on public key
> pair), and uses sender constrained (key-constrained) token such as the
> one explained in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04#section-5, it
> is very useful. 
> (Key-constrained token is the remaining portion of this draft that did
> not get incorporated in the MTLS draft. )
> In fact it is the only viable method for Self-Issued OpenID Provider. 
>
> So, the text is generally good but it needs to be constrained like
> “Unless the client is confidential and the access token issued is key
> constrained, ... “
>
> Best, 
>
> Nat Sakimura
>
>
> 2018年11月27日(火) 16:01 Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladi...@connect2id.com
> <mailto:vladi...@connect2id.com>>:
>
>     +1 to recommend the deprecation of implicit.
>
>     I don't see a compelling reason to keep implicit when there is an
>     established alternative that is more secure.
>
>     Our duty as WG is to give developers the best and most sensible
>     practice.
>
>     CORS adoption is currently at 94% according to
>     https://caniuse.com/#feat=cors
>
>     Vladimir
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
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>
> -- 
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
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-- 
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com

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