While this is mostly covered in section 8.6 of RFC 8252 for native apps, I wonder if we shouldn't mention "Client Impersonation" in this doc as well in that any public client can be easily impersonated. Mobile OS's are providing additional mechanisms for "authenticating" the client but it's unclear whether those will be made available in desktop environments where native apps also exist. At this stage Universal Links (iOS) and App Links (Android) should be best practice for any mobile native app. Best practice for desktop apps is less clear.

Impersonating a public client is very easy especially if the only mechanism available for the callback is a custom scheme URL.

Thoughts?

On 4/6/21 9:15 AM, Daniel Fett wrote:
Hi all,

this version most importantly updates the recommendations for Mix-Up mitigation, building upon https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00. The description of Mix-Up attacks has also been improved.

Smaller changes:

   * Make the use of metadata RECOMMENDED for both servers and clients
   * Make announcing PKCE support in metadata the RECOMMENDED way (before: either metadata or deployment-specific way)
   * AS also MUST NOT expose open redirectors.
   * Mention that attackers can collaborate.
   * Make HTTPS mandatory for most redirect URIs.

I'll present more details in the interim meeting next monday.

As always, your feedback is appreciated. We hope that we can proceed to a WGLC for this document soon.

-Daniel

Am 06.04.21 um 15:06 schrieb [email protected]:
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.

         Title           : OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
         Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
                           John Bradley
                           Andrey Labunets
                           Daniel Fett
        Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-17.txt
        Pages           : 52
        Date            : 2021-04-06

Abstract:
    This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0.
    It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to
    incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was
    published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader
    application of OAuth 2.0.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-17.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-17


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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