I tend to agree with Neil here. I'm struggling to see the relevance of this attack.
It seems like the PDF writeup describes two possible reasons an attacker could get access to the authorization code and PKCE code verifier. 1. The attacker has access to the logs of the token endpoint. 2. The attacker can intercept HTTPS connections between the client and AS (VPN, corporate network proxy, etc) For 1, the solution is to stop logging the contents of the POST body, and secure your infrastructure. I don't think making the client jump through extra hoops is a good solution if you are already logging more than you should be or you don't trust the people who have access to the infrastructure. If this really is a concern, I suspect there are a lot more places in the flow that would need to be patched up if you don't trust your own token endpoint. For 2, if the attacker can intercept the HTTPS connection, then the proposed solution doesn't add anything because the attacker could modify the requests before it hits the authorization server anyway, and change which DPoP key the token gets bound to in the first place. Plus, the attacker would also have access to anything else the client is sending to the AS, such as the user's password when they authenticate at the AS. Are there other attack vectors I'm missing that might actually be solved by this mechanism? Aaron On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 12:40 PM Neil Madden <neil.mad...@forgerock.com> wrote: > Sadly I couldn’t make the DPoP session, but I’m not convinced the attack > described in the earlier message really needs to be prevented at all. The > attack largely hinges on auth codes not being one-time use, which is not a > good idea, or otherwise on poor network security on the token endpoint. I’m > not convinced DPoP needs to protect against these things. Is there more to > this? > > The proposed solutions also seem susceptible to the same problems they > attempt to solve - if an attacker is somehow able to interrupt the client’s > (TLS-protected) token request, why are they somehow not able to > interrupt/modify the (far less protected) redirect to the authorization > endpoint? > > — Neil > > On 30 Nov 2021, at 20:15, Mike Jones < > Michael.Jones=40microsoft....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > As described during the OAuth Security Workshop session on DPoP, I created > a pull request adding the dpop_jkt authorization request parameter to use > for binding the authorization code to the client’s DPoP key. See > https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/89. > > This is an alternative to https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/86, > which achieved this binding using a new DPoP PKCE method. Using this > alternative allows PKCE implementations to be unmodified, while adding DPoP > in new code, which may be an advantage in some deployments. > > Please review and comment. Note that I plan to add more of the attack > description written by Pieter Kasselman to the security considerations in a > future commit. This attack description was sent by Pieter yesterday in a > message with the subject “Authorization Code Log File Attack (was DPoP > Interim Meeting Minutes)”. > > -- Mike > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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