Hi all,
here are some comments as part of my shepherd review of the OAuth Security BCP.
First, I want to send a big "Thanks" to everyone in the group for the work on
this document and to the authors in particular. It has taken us a while to come
up with such an impressive list of security recommendations for OAuth 2.0.
At this point in time my review comments can only be minor given the amount of
feedback this documents has already received.
Here are a few remarks.
I believe we should indicate that the specification updates other OAuth RFCs.
The obvious documents it updates are RFC 6749, RFC 6750 and RFC 6819.
You can set these "updates" in the template you are using.
In Section 1 you say:
"
It does not supplant the security advice given in
[RFC6749], [RFC6750], and [RFC6819], but complements those documents.
"
In the subsequent paragraph you state that you "depreciate some modes of
operation".
I believe you are need to be clear about what you are doing in relationship to
these prior documents. It might also be useful to say something about OAuth 2.1.
Expand abbreviations on first use. Example: "AS" and "PKCE" in Section 2.1. The
AS abbreviation is only expanded later in Section 3. Decide whether you want to
use abbreviations or not. You mix them throughout the document without no
reasons.
Listing the abbreviations in Section 1.2 may also be useful. There are not that
many abbreviations anyway.
I have wording suggestions for this paragraph:
FROM:
"
Authorization servers SHOULD use client authentication if possible.
It is RECOMMENDED to use asymmetric (public-key based) methods for
client authentication such as mTLS [RFC8705] or using signed JWTs
("Private Key JWT") in accordance with [RFC7521] and [RFC7523] (in
[OpenID.Core] defined as the client authentication method
private_key_jwt). When such methods for client authentication are
used, authorization servers do not need to store sensitive symmetric
keys, making these methods more robust against a number of attacks.
"
TO:
"
Authorization servers SHOULD enforce client authentication, if possible.
It is RECOMMENDED to use asymmetric cryptography for
client authentication, such as mTLS [RFC8705] or using signed JWTs
("Private Key JWT"), in accordance with [RFC7521] and [RFC7523] (in
[OpenID.Core] defined as the client authentication method
private_key_jwt). When asymmetric cryptography for client authentication is
used, authorization servers do not need to store sensitive symmetric
keys, making client authentication more robust against leakage of keys.
"
(Note: For the reader it is always better if they are told what attacks
are prevented rather than saying "a number of attacks". You don't want the
reader
to guess what you mean.)
Section 2 is a summary of what follows in Section 4. Maybe you can make this
explicit
either in the title of Section 2 or in the first paragraph of Section 2.
Section 3.
You write:
"
These attackers conform to the attacker model that was used in formal
analysis efforts for OAuth [arXiv.1601.01229]. This is a minimal
attacker model. Implementers MUST take into account all possible
types of attackers in the environment in which their OAuth
implementations are expected to run.
"
When you say "these attackers" please clarify which attackers you are talking
about.
Prior to this paragraph you have just spoken about various forms of network
attackers.
Just before that you talked about network and web attackers.
Then, you introduce more attackers and you keep talking about "this attacker
model" and
"these attackers". Make it easier for the reader by referring explictly which
attackers
you are talking about in a specific paragraph.
Then, you conclude the section with a hint that there is an even stronger
attacker model.
As a reader I might want to know what this stronger attacker model looks like
and why you
do not consider it in this document.
Section 4.1.1:
You write:
"
Note: Vulnerabilities of this kind can also exist if the
authorization server handles wildcards properly.
"
I believe you are saying that the vulnerabilities caused by incorrect redirect
URI validation parsing when you refer to "this kind".
I would also remove the "note"
Section 4.1.3:
You write:
"
* Servers on which callbacks are hosted MUST NOT expose open
redirectors (see Section 4.11).
"
Are you talking about authorization servers (which is what was referenced in
the paragraph before)?
Section 4.10.1: Sender-constrained Access Tokens
The text gives the reader the impression that the token binding would be an
option for developers to use.
I don't think that this is the case. I am particularly referring to this
sentence:
"
* *DPoP* ([I-D.ietf-oauth-dpop]): DPoP (Demonstration of Proof-of-
Possession at the Application Layer) outlines an application-level
sender-constraining for access and refresh tokens that can be used
in cases where neither mTLS nor OAuth Token Binding (see below)
are available.
"
I would change it to:
"
* *DPoP* ([I-D.ietf-oauth-dpop]): DPoP (Demonstration of Proof-of-
Possession at the Application Layer) outlines an application-level
sender-constraining for access and refresh tokens that can be used
in cases where mTLS is not available.
"
I would then remove the subsequent text talking about old, expired drafts.
Alternatively, you could move the text to the appendix.
Section 4.10.2: Audience Restricted Access Tokens
In the text you say:
"
Audience restriction essentially restricts access tokens to a
particular resource server. The authorization server associates the
access token with the particular resource server and the resource
server SHOULD verify the intended audience.
"
You have to put a MUST here. If the resource server does not check the audience
restriction when using audience restricted access tokens then you obviously do
not
get the value from it. It is like using DPOP and not using the
proof-of-possession.
Likewise the SHOULD language in this sentence is also questionable:
"
The client SHOULD tell the authorization server the intended resource
server. The proposed mechanism [RFC8707] could be used or by
encoding the information in the scope value.
"
If the client does not tell the authorization server what the intended resource
server
is then how should the authorization server know (unless in a very limited
setup).
Also the reference to RFC 8707 is a bit weak. We standardized resource
indicators: why not
recommend using it?
Section 4.10.3: The section heading is "Discussion: Preventing Leakage via
Metadata".
The content of the section is not really a discussion but rather a description
of why
this path has not been taken. I wonder whether it would be better to move this
section
to the appendix and then start the text by explaining why other solutions have
been used instead of this approach.
Section 4.11: I would put the definition about what an "open redirector" is
into the terminology section since you
are using the term already in earlier sections. Here is the definition:
"
An open redirector is an endpoint that forwards a user's
browser to an arbitrary URI obtained from a query parameter.
"
Typos/Wording:
FROM:
"
Afterwards, the updated the OAuth attacker model is presented.
"
TO:
"
Afterwards, the updated OAuth attacker model is presented.
"
Section 4.1:
"... wild ."
^
Consider using the guidelines for inclusive language:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/part2/#inclusive_language
For example, "If the attacker is able to ... , **he** will directly get access
to ..."
Another example is "whitelisted".
Section 4.1.2: a wording suggestion.
FROM:
"
The attack
described here combines this behavior with the client as an open
redirector (see Section 4.11.1) in order to get access to access
tokens.
"
TO:
"
The attack
described here combines this behavior with the client as an open
redirector (see Section 4.11.1) to obtain access tokens.
"
Section 4.7.1: word missing
FROM:
"
PKCE provides robust protection against CSRF attacks even in presence
of an that can read the authorization response (see Attacker A3 in
Section 3).
"
TO:
"
PKCE provides robust protection against CSRF attacks even in presence
of an attacker that can read the authorization response (see Attacker A3 in
Section 3).
"
Section 4.18.2: capitalization
FROM:
"
Wildcard origins like "*" in postMessage MUST not be used as
attackers can use them to leak a victim's in-browser message to
malicious origins.
"
TO:
"
Wildcard origins like "*" in postMessage MUST NOT be used as
attackers can use them to leak a victim's in-browser message to
malicious origins.
"
You might also want to replace the short title "oauth-security-topics" (which
can be found on each page) with something like "OAuth 2.0 Security BCP".
Ciao
Hanns
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