Dear All,

Cross-posting to wimse@: §5 positions this draft as complementary to WIMSE
WIT/WPT — WIT/WPT proves workload identity at the application layer; this
draft binds the OAuth token to the specific TLS connection.

-07 is available:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens/


*What it is.* A PoP profile for OAuth 2.0 access tokens, scoped to mTLS
deployments where the verifier is a direct TLS endpoint or co-located
sidecar. The primary motivation is bearer-token replay in autonomous
multi-hop agentic AI workflows, where RFC 8693 delegation chains amplify
the consequences of any single token compromise. The Session-Binding Proof
binds a token to the current TLS connection via the TLS Exporter (RFC 5705
/ RFC 8446 §7.5), amortized to one signature per (token, connection) pair.

*What it isn't.* Not a revival of TLS Token Binding (RFC 8471–8473): no new
TLS extension, no persistent client keys, binding scoped to the TLS
session. Not for browsers (EKM not exposed to JavaScript). Not for remote
TLS termination. All explicitly out of scope, stated up front in §1.

*Why not per-hop DPoP + RFC 8693.* Per-hop DPoP can gate chain extension;
this draft doesn't claim otherwise. Session binding is structurally
stronger on three axes (§5.2.1, new in -07): key custody outside the agent
runtime, attestation provenance of the binding key, and N vs. N×M
signatures across multi-hop chains.

*Threat model (§6).* T1–T5 unchanged. New T6: stolen-token chain extension
at the authorization server (AS) — a stolen session-bound token cannot be
exchanged for a successor without possession of the binding key. Composes
with draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain for the AS-visible prior-hop evidence half
of the multi-hop story.

Implementation Status (RFC 7942) added in §10. Feedback particularly
welcome on §5.2.1, T6, the cross-protocol key reuse analysis (§6), and the
WIMSE/OAuth boundary articulation (§5).


Thanks, Ramki (on behalf of the co-authors)

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, Jun 20, 2026 at 11:53 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-07.txt
To: Diego R. Lopez <[email protected]>, A Prasad <
[email protected]>, Ramki Krishnan <[email protected]>, Srinivasa
Addepalli <[email protected]>


A new version of Internet-Draft
draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-07.txt
has been successfully submitted by ramki krishnan and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:     draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens
Revision: 07
Title:    TLS-Session-Bound Access Tokens for OAuth 2.0
Date:     2026-06-20
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    45
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-07.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens/
HTML:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-07.html
HTMLized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens
Diff:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-07

Abstract:

   This document defines a mechanism for binding OAuth 2.0 access tokens
   to a specific mutual TLS (mTLS) connection.  The binding is achieved
   through a proof token that incorporates the TLS Exporter value (RFC
   5705) derived from the current connection and an access token hash,
   signed by the client's private key corresponding to its mTLS
   certificate.  This mechanism prevents stolen bearer tokens from being
   replayed on a different TLS connection.  The proof is constructed
   once per (token, connection) pair and reused across all requests on
   that connection, delivering session binding with no per-request
   signing overhead and no additional key management beyond what mTLS
   already provides.  The mechanism is applicable to TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3,
   and QUIC transports.  While applicable to any OAuth 2.0 access token
   presented over mTLS, this specification is primarily motivated by the
   OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange protocol (RFC 8693), where multi-hop
   delegation chains in autonomous, agent-driven architectures create
   elevated replay risk.



The IETF Secretariat




-- 
Thanks,
Ramki
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