> Jeff Lombardo wrote on Mon, 13 July 2026 10:50 UTC: > "Here are some comments on the elements listed as Gaps..."
> "you identify that OAuth is not capable of understand an intent. > True but is it the purpose of OAuth?" > "Impractical Revocation... write operations could be perform > through the usage of Transaction Tokens" > "If tokens are cryptographically bound to a client key, they > cannot be shared... See DPoP (RFC9449)" > "This is a big misconception. OAuth is perfectly capable of > handling claims... If you are looking for standards, you should > look at OpenID Foundation AuthZEN" > "there is progress in the right direction with ID JAG and > Transaction Token Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity > and Authorization Chaining" Thanks, Blake, Yossi, Jeff, and Thi, for the detailed discussion. Your feedback is very helpful as we refine the draft. I agree with the specific technical points raised — especially the pointers to TXN tokens, DPoP, CIMD, ID-JAG, and AuthZEN. Each of these is moving in the right direction. However, I want to zoom out and look at the overall picture. Even though multiple OAuth-related projects exist, they currently lack a systematic connection. It is hard to see them forming a complete authorization solution for agent security. Let me illustrate with one concrete example: - Transaction Tokens can trace the full operation chain — good. - But what is their relationship with agent identity? - What about the agent39s dynamic, per-operation permissions? - Can the existing building blocks answer this core question: an agent inherits permissions from the user, yet those permissions may change dynamically with each operation? I believe we need to answer the following questions systematically, often requiring cross-project collaboration: 1. Binding between agent identity and user identity — whom does the agent represent, and how is this binding expressed and verified during authorization? 2. Binding between agent identity and operation — which agent initiated each operation? How to prevent identity spoofing? 3. Traceability of agent actions — TXN tokens should serve as a post-hoc audit trail forming a complete "agent -> operation" trace tree. That tree does not exist today. 4. Non-repudiation of agent actions — once an operation is completed, can the agent or its principal deny it? We need cryptographic guarantees. 5. Permission inheritance — how does an agent inherit permissions from the user? What are the boundaries? Can inheritance be partial? 6. Local agent integration — how do on-device agents interact with the cloud-based OAuth ecosystem? This remains underexplored. 7. Intent propagation — the user39s original intent should travel with each operation, so the executing party can verify consistency. Jeff39s references are valuable, but they feel like scattered puzzle pieces. The challenge is not whether each piece exists, but whether they can be assembled into a coherent picture. We need a systematic solution, not isolated fixes for each sub-problem. The goal of this draft should be to identify these systemic gaps and provide a common reference framework for future cross-project collaboration. Looking forward to further discussion. Best regards, Jia Chen E-mail: [email protected]
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