Also, Donald, the other thing that should be considered is the format of your 
scope strings: they're not individual scopes, but rather a payload that's 
parsed to infer some meaning. This means that the authorization server cannot 
advertise the scopes supported by that authorization server in the OAuth 
Authorization Server Metadata response (RFC8414).

I would strongly encourage NAESB ESPI to adopt Rich Authorization Requests 
(RFC9396) in the future, which are specifically designed for these sort of 
complex authorization requests, and where scope strings often fall short, since 
they're requiring an exact comparison.

For your test case 5, I assumed it was that the scope value was syntactically 
valid per the RFC, and that the scope was not supported by the authorization 
server, in which case invalid_scope or silently ignoring is correct. If you 
instead meant "the scope value does not parse according to NAESB ESPI's parsing 
logic", well, the specification for that would need to define what the correct 
behaviour is.

Rich Authorization Requests are still probably what you want instead of parsing 
a scope string as anything more than a space separated set of scopes.

— Emelia

> On 6 Aug 2026, at 18:30, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> I am the Technical Manager of the Green Button Alliance.  I am responsible 
> for certifying that electric, natural gas, and water utilities comply with 
> the North American Energy Standards (NAESB) Energy Service Provider Interface 
> (ESPI) standard and need a ruling from the IETF OAuth WG regarding an issue 
> that has arisen for Hydro One Networks, Inc.
> 
> Hydro One Networks, Inc., the largest electric utility in Ontario, Canada, 
> implemented the NAESB ESPI (a.k.a. Green Button) standard in 2023, which uses 
> the OAuth 2.0 standard for customers to authorize client applications to 
> access their energy data.  At the time, they were using an IBM Tivoli 
> Authorization Server, which fully complied with the Green Button Alliance 
> legislatively mandated certification test for Section 4.1.2.1.  Authorization 
> Error Response.  They recently upgraded to the IBM Verify Authorization 
> Server, which no longer passes the same Section 4.1.2.1. Authorization Error 
> Response tests.  IBM has agreed to comply with the IETF OAuth Working Group’s 
> response to my questions.
> 
> The GBA Certification test platform currently submits the following invalid 
> Authorization Endpoint requests and expects the Authorization Server to 
> comply with Section 4.1.2.1. Authorization Error Response error messages: 
>  
> iTestID
> Label
> Test Name
> Query string
> Status Code
> Expected Error Message
> 0
> Case 0: no response_type
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (No response_type field-value)
> ?client_id=(client_id)&redirect_uri=(redirect_uri)&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
> 302/303
> ?error=invalid_request parameter and no or empty location header
> 1
> Case 1: no client_id
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (No client_id field-value)
> ?response_type=code&redirect_uri=(redirect_uri)&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
> 302/303
> ?error=invalid_request parameter and no or empty location header
> 2
> Case 2: invalid response_type
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (Invalid response_type field-value:
> ?response_type=badresponsetype& 
> client_id=(client_id)&redirect_uri=(redirect_uri)&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
> 302/303
> ?error=unsupported_response_type parameter and no or empty location header
> 3
> Case 3: invalid client_id
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (Invalid client_id field-value)
> ?response_type=code& 
> client_id=invalid_third_party&redirect_uri=(redirect_uri)&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
> 302/303
> ?error=unauthorized_client parameter and no or empty location header
> 4
> Case 4: invalid redirect_uri
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (Invalid redirect_uri field-value)
> ?response_type=code& 
> client_id=(client_id)&redirect_uri=https://services.greenbuttondata.org&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
>  
> <https://services.greenbuttondata.org&scope=(scope)&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018/>
>         
> 302/303
> ?error=invalid_request parameter and no or empty location header
> 5
> Case 5: invalid scope
> Malformed Authorization Code Request (Invalid scope field-value)
> ?response_type=code& 
> client_id=(client_id)&redirect_uri=(redirect_uri)&scope=FB=????&state=ee148ec2-9898-466e-a013-4dedf1eb3018
> 302/303
> ?error=invalid_scope parameter and no or empty location header
> 
> All scope string values are application variable contents shown as () entries 
> if present.  Malformed values are shown as strings.  I do not test for 
> missing state= elements, although the NAESB ESPI standard requires them.
> 
> The following table contains the current response by the IBM Verify 
> Authorization Server for each of the above test cases:
> 
> 
> iTestID
> Status Code
> Response
> 0
> 303
> https://cmdcert.greenbuttonalliance.org:8445/ThirdParty/espi/1_1/OAuthCallBack?error=unsupported_response_type&error_description=...
> 1
> 401
> The response included a full-screen HTML showing the error “CSIAQ0154E The 
> requested OAuth 2.0 Client does not exist”
> 2
> 303
> https://cmdcert.greenbuttonalliance.org:8445/ThirdParty/espi/1_1/OAuthCallBack?error=unsupported_response_type&error_description...
> 3
> 401
> The response included a full-screen HTML showing the error “CSIAQ0154E The 
> requested OAuth 2.0 Client does not exist”
> 4
> 400
> The response included a full-screen HTML showing the error “CSIAQ0167E The 
> redirection URI provided in the request is either invalid or does not match 
> any of the OAuth 2.0 Client’s pre-registered redirect URLs”
> 5
> 302
> https://...verify.ibm.com/idaas/mtfim/sps/idaas/login...
>  
> Note: 
> https://cmdcert.greenbuttonalliance.org:8445/ThirdParty/espi/1_1/OAuthCallback
>  is the value of the redirect_uri for all but the negative redirect_uri tests
> 
> The IBM team indicated that case 5 (invalid scope): The OpenID Connect spec 
> allows ignoring unknown scopes vs. returning an invalid_scope error 
> (https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest).  The 
> referenced section of the OpenID Connect standard is the Authentication 
> section, which is NOT what case 5 is testing.  However, Section 3.1.2.2. 
> Authentication Request Validation of the OpenID Connect specification 
> indicates the Authorization Server MUST validate all the OAuth 2.0 parameters 
> according to the OAuth 2.0 specification.  That includes (2) verifying that a 
> scope parameter is present and contains the openid scope value (If no openid 
> scope value is present, the request may still be a valid OAuth 2.0 request 
> but is not an OpenID Connect request).
> The IBM team indicated that case 4 (invalid redirect): An OpenID Connect 
> certification has precedence over the IETF OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 and referenced 
> their official OpenID Foundation cert test for invalid redirect URI, which 
> expects an error page, not a redirect 
> (https://www.certification.openid.net/log-detail.html?log=Lbzq5uCWSM1Sij3&public=true).
> The NAESB ESPI standard does not support the OpenID Connect standard, so we 
> contend that the IBM Verify team’s position that their OpenID Connect server 
> does not need to comply with the IETF RFC 6749 and 6750 standards is a “red 
> herring”.  For cases 0 and 2, they have demonstrated the ability to support 
> Section 4.1.2.4 Authorization Error Response properly.
> 
> The business issue and why I am submitting this email is that Hydro One 
> Networks, Inc. is required by Ontario legislation to be certified by the 
> Green Button Alliance as being in compliance with the NAESB ESPI standard.  
> Without that certification, Hydro One Networks, Inc. will face continuing 
> financial penalties from the Ontario Energy Board.
>  
>  
> Best regards,
> Don
> Donald F. Coffin
> Founder/CTO
>  
> REMI Networks
> 2335 Dunwoody Crossing Suite E
> Dunwoody, GA 30338-8221
>  
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to