Sangam, you asked whether this gap is already solved somewhere. We have
implemented an answer in the AIC work and it is running; details and test
matrices are in the public demo repo below.


The pattern, in the vocabulary this thread has converged on:


1. The policy assertion is certificate-bound and independent of the model
   output. A principal signs a DelegationAuthorization carrying 
capability
   declarations with precise parameters (database: tables, columns,
   row_filter, limit; wallet: assets, per-transaction amount, 
recipient
   allowlist; MCP: tool allowlist). These are encoded in an X.509 
agent
   certificate and its JWT carrier. The authorized bounds come from 
the
   principal (optionally intersected with the operator role's policy 
at
   issuance) -- never from the model's emitted arguments.


2. Enforcement happens at the sink boundary. An AIC-aware gateway verifies
   the presented credential, then checks per request that the concrete
   operation parameters fall within the certificate's declared bounds
   before forwarding. For MCP, a tools/call must reference an 
allowlisted
   tool; the structured operation (table, amount, recipient, 
environment,
   tool) is matched against the bound parameters. Unknown or 
out-of-bounds
   operations are denied (fail-closed).


3. One boundary I want to state explicitly: this enforces at the network
   gateway / MCP endpoint, not inside the host process's first 
dispatch
   (the function table). In-process enforcement would require the 
host to
   invoke the same verifier at that earlier point; that is a different
   layer.


The credential is transport-identity anchored (X.509 presented over mTLS,
or a short-lived JWT issued from the same CA). This composes with, rather
than replaces, RAR / mission-bound dynamic authorization: the certificate
supplies offline-verifiable bounds, and an online policy decision can
further narrow them.


Running implementation (capability schemes, gateway plugins, test
matrices): https://github.com/varwof/aic-capability-demo


Happy to map the details if useful.


Best,
Jijie Wei
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