BISI. ROE : 50 DER : 0.78
----- Original Message ----- From: Bambang Kansah To: obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2008 6:16 PM Subject: Re: [obrolan-bandar] BANDARMOLOGIST Iya d Mbah, aku sih nunut aja sama Mbah, abis takut kualat :-D. Nah, sekarang aku mau kasih clue utk borong saham "B", karena price-nya udah obral abis2an, tp kinerjanya masih sangat yahud. Siapa tuh si "B"? Yg jelas bukan dari sektor perbankan and bukan "saham sejuta umat". Tp sory ya Mbah, aku ngak bisa ngasih tau, abis entar diolok2 lagi sama para profesor yg lidahnya sadis2 itu (kayak lagunya Afgan) he.. He.. On 12/14/08, tirta858 <tirta...@yahoo.com> wrote: > Di Indonesia, Quotenya level berapa yah buat bandar since RTI dan > IQPlus etc cuma Level 1 :P > > > > > > > > > --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "tirta858" <tirta...@...> > wrote: >> >> www.investopedia.com/university/electronictrading/trading8.asp >> >> Specialist see not the Level 2 but Level 3 Quote. >> >> There are a variety of ways in which Nasdaq quotes security prices > to >> the public. These levels vary on the amount of information and > access >> they provide to investors. >> >> >> Level I >> This type of quote is most often published on the net as a "real- > time >> quote." Level I consists of real-time bid/ask quotes for securities >> trading on the Nasdaq stock market. This type of access does not >> disclose who is bidding or asking for the stock, and it does not > show >> how many shares the market maker is looking for. Real-time quotes >> show the current quote, but it may be from a different lot than > what >> you are trading. Market makers love clients with this type of > access >> because it doesn't show you the order sizes, and therefore your > order >> may be passed around or held until market makers can profit from > your >> order. >> >> Level II >> This type of quotation system is a step up from the Level I. Level > II >> access provides real-time access to the quotations of individual >> market makers registered in every Nasdaq-listed security as well as >> the offering or bidding lots that they are looking for. This level > of >> access also gives the name of the market maker looking to trade the >> stock. It allows traders to see what market makers are showing the >> most interest in a stock and to identify the patterns for each > market >> maker. Level II access is available over the internet - but at a >> cost. This can range in the hundreds of dollars per month depending >> on the company. For clients placing a large number of trades, the >> firm may waive the access fee because they will make up the costs > on >> your commissions. >> >> Level III >> This is a trading service consisting of everything in Level II plus >> the ability to enter quotes, execute orders and send information. >> This service is restricted to NASD member firms that function as >> registered market makers. Level III allows you to enter bid/ask >> quotes as the trades are being executed right in front of you. It > is >> the fastest way to execute a trade and is typically found only on > the >> trading floors of brokerage firms and market makers. >> >> 1. The Specialist : >> >> >> What's the difference between a Nasdaq market maker and a NYSE >> specialist? >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------- > -- >> ---------- >> >> What's the main difference between a specialist and a market maker? >> Not much. Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialist and > the >> Nasdaq market maker try to increase the liquidity on the exchange > and >> provide more fluid and efficient trading. >> >> >> A specialist is a dealer representing a NYSE specialist firm - one > of >> the main facilitators of trade on the exchange. A market maker is a >> broker-dealer who facilitates the trading of shares by posting bid >> and ask prices along with maintaining an inventory of shares. It is >> important to note that a specialist is a type of market maker. The >> NYSE has seven specialist firms while the Nasdaq has nearly 300 >> market makers. The NYSE is an auction-based market where traders > meet >> on the floor of the exchange, using person-to-person, telephone >> orders or electronic orders. The Nasdaq, on the other hand, is >> strictly an electronic exchange. >> >> NYSE >> Specialists working on the NYSE have four roles to fulfill in order >> to ensure a fair and orderly market: >> >> Auctioneer - because the NYSE is an auction market, bids and asks > are >> competitively forwarded by investors. These bids and asks must be >> posted for the entire market to see to make certain that the best >> price is always maintained. It is the job of the specialist to > ensure >> that all bids and asks are reported in an accurate and timely > manner, >> that all marketable trades are executed and that order is > maintained >> on the floor. Along with posting the daily bid and ask prices, the >> specialist must also set the opening price for the stock every >> morning. This price can greatly differ from the previous day's >> closing price based on after-hours news and events. The role of the >> specialist is to find the correct market price based on supply and >> demand. >> >> Agent - the specialist can also accept limit orders relayed by >> investors through brokers or electronic trading. It is the >> responsibility of the specialist to ensure the order is transacted >> appropriately on behalf of others, using the same fiduciary care as >> the brokers themselves once the price of the stock has reached the >> limit criteria. >> >> Catalyst - as the specialists are in direct contact with the > bidders >> and sellers of particular securities, it is their responsibility > that >> enough interest exists for a particular stock. This is carried out > by >> specialists seeking out recently active investors in cases where > the >> bids and asks can't be matched. This aspect of the specialist's job >> helps to induce trades that may not of happened if the specialist > had >> not been there to bring buyers and sellers together. >> >> Principal - in the instance where there's a demand-supply imbalance >> of a particular security, the market maker must make adjustments by >> purchasing and selling out of his/her own inventory to equalize the >> market. If the market is in a buying frenzy the specialist will >> provide shares from their inventory until the price is stabilized. >> They'll also buy shares for their inventory in the event of a large >> selloff. >> >> Nasdaq >> Market makers working on the Nasdaq exchange are actually not at > the >> exchange. They are large investment companies which buy and sell >> securities through an electronic network. These market makers >> maintain inventories and buy and sell stocks from their inventories >> to individual customers and other dealers. >> >> Each market maker on the Nasdaq is required to give a two-sided >> quote, meaning they must state a firm bid price and a firm ask > price >> that they are willing to honor. >> >> Each security on the Nasdaq generally has more than one market > maker, >> with an average of 14 market makers for each stock which provides >> liquidity and efficient trading. The market makers are openly >> competitive amongst themselves and facilitate competitive prices; > as >> a result, individual investors generally will get the best price. > As >> this competition is evident in the limited spreads between posted >> bids and asks, the market makers on the Nasdaq will in some > instances >> act very much like the specialists on the NYSE. >> >> "Negative Obligation" "Bagged" >> >> 2.THE Specialist: >> >> Well-deserved attention has been focused on the $140 million >> compensation package received by Richard Grasso, the recently >> departed chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. Undoubtedly there >> will now be significant changes at the NYSE Board. But the real >> question is why that Board, with representatives from the most >> sophisticated firms on Wall Street, agreed to pay its chairman such > a >> rich compensation package. There is only one conclusion: He was > worth >> the money. >> >> While the NYSE bills itself as "a private company with a public >> purpose," there is no doubt that its chairman's most important role >> is to protect the interests of its members. And no interest is more >> important than the protection of the trading profits derived by the >> NYSE's floor-based specialists. Thanks in large part to Mr. > Grasso's >> efforts, the NYSE has, until recently, enjoyed a remarkable level > of >> prestige, providing the cover necessary to protect its inherently >> unfair and inefficient trading system. >> >> Every security traded on the NYSE is assigned exclusively to a >> specialist firm. The specialist ultimately sees every order in its >> assigned stocks submitted to the exchange either electronically or >> through brokers on the floor. But while the NYSE grants specialists > a >> privileged position in order to maintain a "fair and orderly > market" >> (which, curiously, is nowhere defined), the specialist is also >> permitted to simultaneously trade for his own account -- an obvious >> conflict of interest. >> >> NYSE rules attempt to limit the specialist's ability to improperly >> use inside information by limiting specialists to trading only when >> there is a temporary disparity between supply and demand, buying > when >> there are no other buyers and selling when there are no other >> sellers. Yet if specialists really traded only when there is an >> absence of buyers or sellers, one would think they would lose > money. >> >> The fact is that specialists are profitable, in Samuel Johnson's >> words, "beyond the dreams of avarice." A forthcoming study by >> Precision Economics will reveal that publicly traded firms with >> specialist units last year enjoyed pre-tax profit margins ranging >> from 35% to 60%. Labranche, the largest NYSE specialist, generated >> more than a quarter of a billion dollars in revenues, almost > entirely >> from trading for its own account on the floor. Pretty profitable > for >> trading only when nobody else wants to! >> >> Since trading is a zero-sum game, these profits come at the direct >> expense of investors such as large institutions, which desperately >> want competitive alternatives to the NYSE but are reluctant to >> publicly complain about the fundamental unfairness of the NYSE > model. >> After all, institutions have to do business with the NYSE because >> there are no real competitive alternatives. >> >> The NYSE has perpetuated myths that mislead regulators and the >> investing public into believing that specialists serve the public. >> For instance, the NYSE asserts that investors need specialists >> because without them, "who is going to be there to buy or sell when >> nobody else wants to?" The NYSE claims that the specialist reduces >> market volatility by acting as the buyer or seller of last resort. >> >> Think about that: Envision SpecialistMan, emerging amongst the > bedlam >> of a fast falling stock with a giant "S" on his chest. Quickly >> calming the crowd, he exclaims "I will buy from every one of you >> because it is my duty, even though I will lose money." They sell >> their shares to SpecialistMan, praising him for his willingness to >> selflessly provide liquidity, regardless of the impact on his >> profits. >> >> While this notion is ridiculous on its face, it is still put > forward >> to defend the NYSE specialist when nearly every other major >> instrument is traded completely electronically without anyone being >> given an informational advantage. The truth is that when a stock > like >> Enron starts falling, just like everyone else, SpecialistMan gets > out >> of the way. >> >> We ought to ask ourselves why we even want a specialist to manage > the >> decline of a stock. In an efficient market, that is the last thing > we >> should want. The market should be permitted to clear -- move to its >> equilibrium point -- as quickly as possible, without somebody > trying >> to manage the process. A slowly declining stock only hurts buyers > at >> the expense of sellers, and vice versa. >> >> We need not worry about the specialist abusing his privileged >> position, we are assured, because the NYSE's cardinal principle is >> that the investor's interest is always served first. But it's easy > to >> get around this tenet. Even though there is no imbalance between >> supply and demand, the specialist simply trumps the price of > investor >> orders. If a specialist is holding investor orders to buy IBM for >> $10.00, he cannot buy at $10 until all investor orders at $10.00 > are >> executed. But he can buy at $10.01. With his informational > advantage >> over everybody else concerning the likely direction of a stock's >> price, the specialist will outbid investors only at the most >> advantageous moments. >> >> Ironically, the specialist is rewarded for this exclusive >> opportunity. The NYSE calls this "price improvement" because the >> investor trading with the specialist receives a better price. The >> NYSE actually brags about the frequency of price improvement, which >> really represents how often the specialist uses his informational >> advantage (what most of us would otherwise call insider > information) >> to make a trading profit and disadvantage investors. >> >> These points should not be a revelation. Why would NYSE members pay >> approximately $2 million for the privilege of standing on an old, >> crowded floor all day unless they gained some sort of advantage? >> Membership has its privileges. But does the public benefit from a >> structure that grants privileges to a select few even though, > thanks >> to technology, we now have more efficient ways to trade securities? >> >> SEC rules ban floor brokers from trading for their own accounts. >> Specialists, however, are exempted from this prohibition because > they >> are assumed to be performing a public service, an assumption belied >> by the facts. So let's be clear. While the NYSE Board structure > needs >> to be fixed, and fixed promptly, we investors ought to focus most > of >> our attention on the profit center of the NYSE, its specialist >> system. >> > > >
