I have to agree with Phillip. Many application developers don't know how to properly integrate PKI into their systems. For instance, some email system providers still don't know what S/MIME is. Some applications ignore Policy OID processing or simply skip revocation checking or chain processing or whatever. Gate keeping is best performed by a programmable system that can determine whether the signed blob is appropriate for its intended purpose. But I'm not defending all CAs either. I've seen many examples of strange blobs being passed off as certificates, but relying party systems need to be able to reject these if they don't satisfy the criteria needed for trustworthy processing.
On 11/10/2011 12:14 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: >See above. The primary responsibility for making sure >the crypto is strong enough has to fall on the >application provider. >The CAs should provide a backup but this does not >absolve the application designer from making the right >choice. >What I am objecting to here is that this exercise >seems to only ever be interested in holding CAs >accountable.
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
