+ onap-discuss. We now have a wiki page https://wiki.onap.org/display/DW/Dependency+Security on the topic, thanks Bob for creating it! Please check that page which now has some more items than the below mail.
Comments/feedback appreciated, please write those on the wiki page. As coming SECCOM-lead work I think we should evaluate the need to improve the current ONAP process & practices in this area - this should of course be a risk based exercise, also considering the practical side ie needed effort vs. achieved risk mitigation. brs, Samuli From: Samuli Kuusela Sent: 28 July, 2021 10:49 To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; Paweł Pawlak <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Dependency confusion attacks vs. ONAP SW build process Hi, In yesterday's SECCOM I brought this up and promised to send summary & question, so here comes: The novel types of dependency confusion attacks utilize the way some package managers work (by default). In this case, "A dependency confusion attack or supply chain substitution attack occurs when a software installer script is tricked into pulling a malicious code file from a public repository instead of the intended file of the same name from an internal repository". Quote from dependency confusion attacks<https://secureteam.co.uk/news/what-is-a-dependency-confusion-attack/>, I recommend you read that very short article. So my question is, if ONAP SW build process can be improved wrt. this types of attack. Quote from the same article: Microsoft's whitepaper<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-gb/resources/3-ways-to-mitigate-risk-using-private-package-feeds/> details three ways to mitigate the risk of a substitution attack: 1. Only use a single private package feed - pull any dependent public packages into your private repository so you can be sure of control. However, this does then mean you need to manually update the public package versions as needed. 2. Control the scope - if your package manager supports scope control (like npm does) you can prevent internal packages from being retrieved from a public repository. 3. Client side verification - integrity verification, when enabled in the package manager, will abort the build if an unexpected change is detected in a dependent file. Brs, Samuli PS. FYI, high number of malicious packages indeed started to appear, as I heard in Infosec Podcast RiskyBiz #617<https://risky.biz/RB617/> (btw, I do recommend listening to RiskyBiz in general). Their show notes links to https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/open-source-software-repositories-play-whack-a-mole-as-dependency-confusion-copycats-exceed-5-000. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#23460): https://lists.onap.org/g/onap-discuss/message/23460 Mute This Topic: https://lists.onap.org/mt/84684024/21656 Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://lists.onap.org/g/onap-discuss/unsub [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
