Thanks, Craig. On 5/23/07, Craig L Russell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On May 22, 2007, at 7:22 PM, Kevin Sutter wrote: > Here's my take (just to generate some discussion)... > > Right now, it doesn't seem like OpenJPA is ready for Java 2 Security. It's a bug that OpenJPA doesn't use doPrivileged blocks around security-protected APIs. Can you file a JIRA issue with as many of these cases as you can find? They need to be fixed.
Done. OPENJPA-244.
As > Albert has pointed out, there only seems to be two places in the > code where > doPriv blocks exist. It would seem that any application-managed > path that > would attempt to access secure operations would require a doPriv > block. Right. > This may also apply to the container-managed paths, but more than > likely, > these paths have some type of application-server wrapper around the > OpenJPA > objects and they could do the proper doPrivs. Doubtful. It would be a bug for trusted code to wrap a call to untrusted code in a doPrivileged block. That would defeat the architecture of the security model. Rather, each component that needs to access secure resources needs to wrap the call in doPrivileged blocks.
I agree, especially for 3rd party JPA providers that are plugged into an app server's environment. But, if OpenJPA was "trusted", then this wrapper approach would suffice.
It would also seem that we > would need to provide instructions for proper updating of the > policy files > (for both the application-managed and container-managed scenarios). Correct. > > I know we're hitting these type of problems in the WebSphere > environment. I > would be surprised if other app servers won't be experiencing similar > problems if Java 2 security is turned on. We're just trying to > figure out > the who's responsible for what processing. I've been through this exercise with JDO and put doPrivileged blocks around everything that needed it. It turned out to be about 40 places in the code. Not a big deal. > > Patrick, were there any discussions on the expert group concerning the > relationship between JPA and the Java 2 Security? I asked a number of times for a security audit to be made of the security implications of JPA and it was never taken up. Most of the vendors make extensive use of privileged operations including getting system properties, reflection, and class loader operations and IMHO not enough attention was paid to getting it right.
:-) This seems to be a common theme. I ran this question by another participant in the EJB3 expert group and he said basically the same thing... I used to be involved with the JCA specification and implementation and that spec was quite clear on the Java 2 security expectations. Too bad there aren't some "boiler plate" sections of these specs for all JSR's to properly address. Craig
> > Thanks, > Kevin > > On 5/17/07, Albert Lee <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> I ran into the following exception when I enabled Java 2 security >> in the >> Java EE environment using openjpa in the WebSphere environment: >> >> java.security.AccessControlException: Access denied ( >> java.lang.RuntimePermission getClassLoader) >> at java.security.AccessController.checkPermission( >> AccessController.java >> :104) >> at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPermission >> (SecurityManager.java:547) >> at com.ibm.ws.security.core.SecurityManager.checkPermission( >> SecurityManager.java:189) >> at java.lang.Thread.getContextClassLoader(Thread.java:490) >> at org.apache.openjpa.lib.conf.Configurations.findDerivedLoader( >> Configurations.java:232) >> at org.apache.openjpa.lib.conf.Configurations.newInstance( >> Configurations.java:194) >> at org.apache.openjpa.lib.conf.ObjectValue.newInstance( >> ObjectValue.java >> :103) >> at org.apache.openjpa.lib.conf.PluginValue.instantiate( >> PluginValue.java >> :101) >> at org.apache.openjpa.lib.conf.ObjectValue.instantiate( >> ObjectValue.java >> :79) >> at >> >> org.apache.openjpa.conf.OpenJPAConfigurationImpl.getDataCacheManagerI >> nstance >> (OpenJPAConfigurationImpl.java:583) >> at org.apache.openjpa.kernel.AbstractBrokerFactory.newBroker( >> AbstractBrokerFactory.java:169) >> at org.apache.openjpa.kernel.DelegatingBrokerFactory.newBroker( >> DelegatingBrokerFactory.java:142) >> at >> >> org.apache.openjpa.persistence.EntityManagerFactoryImpl.createEntityM >> anager >> ( >> EntityManagerFactoryImpl.java:190) >> at >> com.ibm.websphere.ejb3sample.counter.StatelessCounterBean.getTheValue >> (StatelessCounterBean.java:63) >> >> The scenario is a openjpa entity manager factory is injected to a >> stateless >> session bean and it is trying to create an EntityManager from the >> factory. >> Since the factory is directly injected in the application, the >> container >> has >> no involvment in handling the AccessController.doPrivileged(). >> Another >> similiar scenario is Persistence.createEntityManagerFactory() is >> called >> from >> within a stateless session bean, in which a similiar but different >> security >> related symptom is surfaced. These tests run successfully when Java 2 >> security is disabled. A security policy has put in place in the >> app server >> to give all permissions to the openjpa jar files in the app server. >> >> For experimentation, I add a doPrivilege block in the >> Configurations.findDerivedLoader where the above exception took >> place and >> I >> was able to by-pass the failure and the doPriv seems to work. >> However I >> went >> into the same exception in different places when >> getSystemClassLoader() >> and >> other privileged operations are used. >> >> Questions: >> 1) How is security being handled in openjpa or JPA in general? >> 2) What is the philosphy of putting doPrivilege construct around >> security >> sensitive code in openjpa? I only find 2 instances of doPrivilege >> usage in >> openJPA. >> 3) Who is responsible to define and enable security in a app server >> environment? >> 4) Is injecting a provider entity manager factory to user code an >> valid >> procedure? I understand EntityManager proxy/wrapper is needed for >> persistence context injection but I see no reason why provider's >> entity >> manager factory can not be injected to user code. >> >> Am I way off base regarding security in OpenJPA and/or JPA in >> general? >> >> Any insights into this topics is greatly appreciated. >> Thanks. >> Albert Lee. >> Craig Russell Architect, Sun Java Enterprise System http://java.sun.com/products/jdo 408 276-5638 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] P.S. A good JDO? O, Gasp!
